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Preface
This Risø Energy Report, the ninth in a series that began in 
2002, analyses the long-term outlook for energy technolo-
gies in 2050 in a perspective where the dominating role of 
fossil fuels has been taken over by non-fossil fuels, and CO2 
emissions have been reduced to a minimum. 
Against this background, the report addresses issues like:
•	 	How	much	 will	 today’s	 non-fossil	 energy	 technologies	
have evolved up to 2050? 
•	 	Which	non-fossil	energy	technologies	can	we	bring	into	
play in 2050, including emerging technologies?
•	 What	are	the	implications	for	the	energy	system?
Further, Volume 9 analyses other central issues for the 
future energy supply:
•	 	The	role	of	non-fossil	energy	technologies	in	relation	to	
security of supply and sustainability
•	 System	aspects	in	2050
•	 Examples	of	global	and	Danish	energy	scenarios	in	2050
The report is based on the latest research results from Risø 
DTU, together with available international literature and 
reports.
Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
Risø National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy,
Technical University of Denmark
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Summary and main conclusions
Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen, Risø DTU, Denmark
Long-term energy security depends on the continuing avail-
ability of fossil fuels and their potential substitution by re-
newable energy sources. Coal and gas may well dominate 
the global primary energy supply for the rest of this century 
if no special effort is made to promote renewables. However, 
for many countries energy security concerns are accom-
panied by a preference for renewable options which can 
reduce their dependence on imported oil and gas, as well as 
helping to meet environmental policy objectives.
To keep the global mean temperature rise below 2°C we 
need, according to the IPCC, to reach global stabilisation 
at 450 ppm CO2eq, which means that global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions must be halved by 2050 and in fact redu-
ced even more in the OECD countries.
According to the analyses presented in this report, it will 
be difficult for the European countries to meet these targets 
as mitigation options from the energy sector alone do not 
seem to be sufficient, but have to be supplemented by action 
from	other	sectors,	for	example	the	agricultural	sector.
On the other hand, the Danish case described in this report 
shows that Denmark stands a good chance of meeting the 
mitigation goals and of being able to phase out fossil fuels 
rapidly and thus reduce GHG emissions at the pace needed. 
Denmark’s	wind	and	biomass	resources,	in	particular,	would	
allow the phase-out of fossil fuels from the generation of 
electricity and heat before 2040. Removing fossil fuels from 
the transport sector will probably take another 10 years. 
Renewable energy technologies
Solar energy can be used to generate heat and electricity all 
over	the	world.	Our	technical	ability	to	exploit	this	resource	
has improved dramatically in recent years, and by 2050 the 
IEA forecasts that the PV and CSP technologies will each 
produce	11%	of	the	world’s	electricity.
PV is by nature a distributed generation technology, whereas 
CSP is a centralised technology, so their deployment will follow 
very different routes. PV is unique among electricity gener-
ation technologies in that its distributed nature allows it to be 
integrated with human settlements of all sizes, urban or rural.
Since 1970, wind energy has grown at spectacular rates, and 
in the past 25 years global wind energy capacity has doubled 
every	three	years.	The	current	wind	energy	capacity	of	approxi-
mately	160	GW	is	expected	to	generate	more	than	331	TWh	in	
2010, covering 1.6% of global electricity consumption. 
Most of the development effort so far has been dedicated 
to the evolutionary scale-up and optimisation of the land-
based three-bladed standard wind turbines which emerged 
as commercial products at the beginning of the 1980s.
The coming decade may see new technological advances and 
further scale-up, leading to more cost-effective, reliable and 
controllable wind turbines and new offshore and onshore ap-
plications, including the introduction of wind power in the 
built	environment.	With	increased	focus	on	offshore	deploy-
ment combined with the radically different conditions com-
pared to onshore, it is likely that completely new concepts 
will	emerge,	such	as	the	vertical-axis	turbine	currently	being	
developed	 at	Risø	DTU.	Wind	 energy	has	 the	potential	 to	
play	a	major	role	in	tomorrow’s	energy	supply,	cost-effectively	
covering 30-50% of our electricity consumption.
Hydropower is a mature technology close to the limit of 
efficiency, in which most components have been tested and 
optimised over many years. 
Wave	energy	can	be	seen	as	stored	wind	energy,	and	could	
therefore form an interesting partnership with wind energy. 
Globally, the potential for wave power is at least 10% of total 
electricity consumption, or more if we tolerate higher prices. 
An ambitious yet realistic goal for Danish wave power by 
2050 could be around 5% of electricity consumption.
Biomass	presently	covers	approximately	10%	of	the	world’s	
energy consumption. A realistic estimate of the total sus-
tainable biomass potential in 2050 is 200-500 EJ/yr covering 
up	to	half	of	the	world’s	energy	needs	in	2050.
A large proportion of biomass will probably still be in the 
form of wood for direct burning in less developed areas of 
the world. Biomass plays a special role as an easily storable 
form of energy, in CHP systems based on sophisticated 
combustion technologies, and as a source of liquid fuels for 
transport.
Several technologies are currently being developed with a 
view to improving biomass use, and these will help to make 
bioenergy competitive when oil prices increase. Biomass 
is a limited resource, and increases in biomass production 
should preferably not compete with the food supply.
Geothermal energy is used in two ways: At least 24 coun-
tries produce electricity from geothermal energy, while 76 
countries use geothermal energy directly for heating and 
cooling. In 2008, the global production of geothermal heat 
was	0.2	EJ,	with	10	GW	of	installed	baseload	electricity	pro-
duction capacity. 
The potential for the future is huge. According to estimates 
by the International Energy Agency, the most probable po-
tential	for	the	global	geothermal	resource	is	approximately	
200 EJ/yr, including 65 EJ/yr from electricity production. 
In Denmark, the potential for geothermal energy is substan-
tial since suitable aquifers are available, and the technology 
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is	an	excellent	match	for	the	district	heating	systems	already	
widely	 used.	 Geothermal	 energy	 is	 therefore	 expected	 to	
cover a large part of the demand for future district heating. 
The Greater Copenhagen area has enough geothermal re-
serves to meet all its needs for heat for thousands of years.
To date, R&D work on energy storage has focused on elec-
tricity, as electricity storage has an obvious, straightforward 
and urgent role in the energy market. Many types of electri-
city storage will be of great importance in the coming decades.
A shift to sustainable energy sources will also require mobile 
storage technologies for vehicles. Capturing electricity from 
wind and solar sources in a concentrated form, these will 
need to deliver driving ranges similar to those of modern 
gasoline and diesel vehicles.
In future storing energy as hydrocarbons synthesised from 
hydrogen, made by the electrolysis of water, and carbon di-
oxide	 extracted	 from	 the	 atmosphere	may	 become	 viable.	
The distribution system for liquid fuels is in place, so syn-
thetic liquid fuels will not require huge investments in new 
distribution systems.
There is also considerable technical and economic poten-
tial for heat storage. Energy storage has enormous technical 
potential, and it is likely to appear in many different guises 
among the building blocks of a future sustainable energy 
system. However, the costs associated with storing energy 
are often considerable and sometimes prohibitive.
Nuclear	fission	is	a	proven	technology,	but	its	exploitation	
has grown only slowly in the past 30 years. However, the 
need for an energy supply with low fossil fuel dependence 
and low greenhouse gas emissions has led to renewed inter-
est in nuclear energy. Many countries now plan to adopt or 
expand	their	use	of	nuclear	fission.	In	total,	nuclear	provides	
14%	of	the	world’s	electricity	consumption,	though	this	fig-
ure has fallen slightly in recent years.
USA	 expects	 a	 nuclear	 renaissance,	 and	China,	 India	 and	
Russia	have	even	more	ambitious	plans	for	expanding	nu-
clear power by 2030 through the installation of 100, 60 and 
20	GWe,	respectively.	Based	on	existing	plans,	world	nuclear	
capacity	may	therefore	 increase	 from	its	present	340	GWe	
to	more	than	1,000	GWe	in	2050,	increasing	nuclear’s	share	
of	the	electricity	supply	to	20%.	The	next	generation	of	nu-
clear energy systems, Generation IV, may be deployed from 
2040 onwards. Generation IV systems include fast-neutron 
breeder reactors, allowing for a much improved utilisation 
of uranium and thorium resources and a reduction of the 
radioactive waste. The reactors have higher operating tem-
peratures, which opens up for new applications of nuclear 
energy, such as the production of liquid chemical fuels and 
thermo-chemical hydrogen production. Fusion research is 
now	 taking	 the	 next	 step	 with	 the	 construction	 of	 ITER.	
Expected	to	start	operating	in	2020,	ITER	will	demonstrate	
self-sustaining controlled fusion for the first time by 2026. 
Building	on	experience	gained	from	ITER,	plans	are	to	build	
the future DEMO faci lity in 2030-2040 and for it to operate 
during 2040-2050, generating several hundreds of mega-
watts	for	extended	periods	of	time.	DEMO	will	also	test	and	
qualify key components under realistic operating conditions. 
If every thing goes according to plan, the first commercial fu-
sion power plant will then be commissioned by 2050.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be used on large 
point sources based on fossil fuels such as power plants and 
industrial	furnaces.	The	technology	can	be	retrofitted	at	ex-
isting combustion plants without major changes, but run-
ning costs are rather high.
The main cost of CCS relates to the CO2 capture stage, in terms 
of both its capital cost and the loss in efficiency at the power 
plant to which it is fitted, which is to the order of 24-40%.
To improve the chances of meeting the targets for CO2 re-
duction, CCS should be used worldwide, and the building of 
full-scale demonstration plants must be accelerated to drive 
down costs. Proven fossil fuel reserves, especially coal, will 
last	far	beyond	this	century.	With	CCS	we	can	continue	to	
burn fossil fuels even in a carbon-neutral future. Later, CCS 
can even be used with biomass-fired power plants to create 
net negative CO2 emissions.
Denmark	 still	 has	 a	 good	 chance	 of	 exploiting	CCS,	with	
plenty of geological storage capacity both onshore and off-
shore.	With	an	 increase	 in	wind	energy,	Danish	coal-fired	
power	plants	will	provide	the	baseload	and	can	operate	flex-
ibly even with CCS. 
System aspects
It will not be possible to develop the energy systems of the 
future	simply	by	improving	the	components	of	existing	sys-
tems. Instead, we need an integrated approach that will opti-
mise the entire system, from energy production, through 
conversion to an energy carrier, energy transport and distri-
bution, and efficient end-use.
Similarly, significant reductions in primary energy consum p-
tion will not be reached through evolutionary development 
of	 existing	 systems.	This	will	 require	 paradigm	 shifts	 and	
revolutionary changes, such as the automatic adaptation of 
consumption to match the instantaneous availability of all 
forms of energy.
There is also a need for a smart grid which will link produc-
tion and end-use at the local level. End-users must help to 
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maintain balance in the future energy system. New end-use 
technologies have to be widely introduced, including highly 
insulated, almost self-sufficient houses, smart electronic 
equipment, energy storage and local energy supplies such as 
heat pumps. Information and communications technology 
(ICT) will be very important to the successful integration of 
renewables in the grid.
Electric supergrids based on high-voltage direct current 
(HVDC) technology are promising because they offer the 
controllability needed to handle wind power effectively as 
well as efficient transport of electricity over long distances, 
even between different synchronous zones. Compared to 
other energy distribution systems, power grids are particu-
larly vulnerable to disturbances and accidents. Today, the 
welfare gains are too insignificant to motivate end-users, 
because in most countries the production cost of electricity 
is	small	compared	to	the	fixed	added	taxes	and	tariffs.	Switching	
to	value	added	taxes,	grid	payments	which	vary	according	to	
the	grid	load,	and	variable	tariffs	and	taxes	could	stimulate	 
flexible	demand	and	“demand	shifting”.
Main conclusions
By 2050, the sum of the potential of all the low-carbon energy 
sources	exceeds	the	expected	demand.	The	challenge	for	a	sus-
tainable global energy system with low CO2 emissions by 2050 
is therefore to utilise this potential in the energy system to the 
extent	that	it	can	be	done	in	an	economically	attractive	way.
It will not be possible to develop the energy systems of the 
future	simply	by	improving	the	components	of	existing	sys-
tems. Instead, we need an integrated process that will opti-
mise the entire system, from energy production, through 
conversion to an energy carrier, energy transport and distri-
bution, and efficient end-use.
Similarly, significant reductions in primary energy con-
sumption will not be reached through evolutionary deve-
l	opment	 of	 existing	 systems.	 This	 will	 require	 paradigm	
shifts and revolutionary changes, such as the automatic 
adap tation of consumption to match the instantaneous 
availability of all forms of energy.
Several energy supply technologies with low or even zero 
GHG emissions are already available on the market or will be 
commercialised in the decades ahead. 
A future intelligent power system requires investment now, 
since uncertainty among investors is already hindering pro-
gress towards a higher share of renewable energy. If we do 
not make this investment, future generations may look back 
in disbelief that for so long we tolerated an antiquated energy 
system without putting in place the improvements that were 
already possible.
Developments in non-fossil energy technologies 2010 – 2050
2010 2050
Wind energy Solar energy Geothermal energy Nuclear energy Hydropower Bioenergy
►Combustion technologies for heat and power
►Gasification technologies for heat and  power
►Bioethanol produced in biorefineries
►First-generation bioethanol
►Second-generation bioethanol
►Biodiesel from animal waste and plants with high oil content
►Algal biodiesel 
►Biogas
►Biogas from water-rich biomass for heat and power
►Hydropower ►Wave
    power ►Barrage 
   tidal power
►Marine current and
    open tidal power ►Salinity gradient ►Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)
►Lifetime-extended fission reactors►Existing fission reactors ►Generation III fission reactors ►Generation IV fission reactors Fusion reactors►
►Enhanced Geothermal 
    Systems (EGS)
►Deep Unconventional 
    Geothermal Resources 
    (DUGR)
►Hot Dry Rock geothermal
►Low-temperature geothermal ►Middle and high-temperature geothermal
►Concentrating PV
►Crystalline silicon PV ►Thin-film PV
►Concentrator 
    technologies 
    (CSP)
►Advanced inorganic 
    thin-film PV
►Organic PV
►Emerging technologies 
    and novel concepts PV
►2-3 MW onshore, 3-5 MW oshore
6-10 MW oshore, direct drive, fixed foundation►
Small wind turbines in built environment►
6-10 MW oshore,  direct drive, floating foundation►
Combined wind-wave systems►
Wind turbines integrated with pumped storage►
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Introduction
This chapter considers scenarios for future energy systems 
over	the	next	40-100	years,	focusing	on	how	policy	on	en-
ergy security and climate change can influence the penetra-
tion of renewable energy. The scenarios discussed here ad-
dress energy security in terms of the availability of fossil fuel 
resources and potential renewable substitutes.
The	studies	 reviewed	expect	 fossil	 fuels,	 in	particular	 coal	
and gas, to remain sufficiently plentiful and cheap that they 
will continue to dominate global primary energy consump-
tion for the rest of this century if no special efforts are made 
to promote renewable energy and to support climate change 
mitigation.
Working	 against	 this,	 however,	 is	 the	 assumption	 that	 re-
newables can help many countries to both increase their 
energy security, by reducing their dependence on scarce 
imported oil, and to meet environmental priorities. Policies 
for stabilising climate change share some common ground 
with policies for increasing energy security in terms of the 
energy	options	they	recommend.	When	countries	depend	on	
imports, fossil fuel consumption, for instance, will tend to de-
crease in both cases, with a consequent increase in the use 
of renewable energy. However, carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) by coal, oil, and gas power plants can help to meet cli-
mate change goals, yet would compete with renewable energy 
as a climate change mitigation option and could even reduce 
energy security by increasing the demand for fossil fuels.
The following section presents the results of three global en-
ergy	studies:	the	IEA’s	Energy	Technology	Perspectives	(IEA	
2008), scenarios based on the IMAGE model by the Nether-
lands Environmental Assessment Agency (Rao et al. 2008), 
and scenarios based on the MiniCam model by Battelle in 
the USA (US 2007). After this we discuss a case study for 
India	based	on	the	ANSWER-MARKAL	model	(Shukla	et	
al. 2010).
Global scenarios
The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) (IEA 2008) 
covers the 2005-2050 period (Figure 1) in three scenarios:
•	 a	baseline	case;
•	 ACT	Map,	which	includes	climate-friendly	technologies,
	 both	existing	and	advanced;	and
•	 BLUE	Map,	which	 assumes	more	 rapid	 changes	 in	 the	 
 energy system designed to stabilise global warming at 2°C.
Our focus here is on the BLUE Map scenario, whose climate 
policy goals are comparable with those of the other studies 
discussed in this chapter.
In the BLUE Map scenario, global CO2 emissions from the 
energy sector have in 2050 fallen to 50% of their 2005 level, 
corresponding to the low end of the reductions required to 
stabilise global warming at 2°C according to the IPCC, 2007. 
Out of this reduction, energy efficiency improvements 
account for as much as 36% in the ACT Map and 44% in 
the BLUE Map of emission reductions in 2050. 
The CO2 emission reduction also requires major changes 
in fuel composition compared with the baseline scenario. 
In the BLUE Map scenario, fossil fuel consumption falls 
by 59% by 2050. Renewable energy, especially biomass, in-
creases fast, and by 2050 is almost as large as total oil con-
sumption was in 2005 (around 6,000 Mtoe). However, by 
2005 fossil fuels still provide almost 50% of our primary en-
ergy, while renewables account for just below 30%, of which 
biomass makes up two-thirds. In the ETP baseline scenario, 
for comparison, fossil fuels cover 84% of total primary en-
ergy consumption in 2050.
3
The global energy scene in 2050
Kirsten Halsnæs, Risø DTU, Denmark; P.R. Shukla, Indian Institute of Management, India; 
John M. Christensen, UNEP Risø Centre, Risø DTU, Denmark
+ 3 4 %
- 2 7 %
- 1 8 %
Figure 1
World primary energy sources under the ETP baseline, ACT Map and BLUE Map scenarios, 2050
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The IMAGE scenarios (Figure 2) cover the period up to 
2100. They include two stabilisation scenarios, of which one 
(the	“2.9	W/m2	radiative	forcing	case”)	is	comparable	with	
the target atmospheric GHG concentration set by the ETP 
scenario and set by the ETP BLUE Map scenario.
The IMAGE baseline scenario makes similar predictions to 
those of ETP: Fossil fuels will contribute about 80% of our 
primary energy in 2050, a share that will decrease slightly by 
2100 as oil reserves are depleted and natural gas is increas-
ingly used for transport as a substitute for oil.
The	2.9	W/m2 stabilisation scenario predicts a decrease in 
energy consumption of about 30% in 2050. Coal consump-
tion is reduced during the first part of the period studied, 
when coal is used to produce electricity with carbon capture 
and	storage	(CCS).	In	the	years	up	to	2100,	coal’s	share	of	pri-
mary energy rises again, and oil consumption also increases 
slightly.	The	increase	in	oil	use	is	explained	as	consumption	
postponed due to relatively high oil prices in the first part of 
the century. Coal increases its share of primary energy con-
sumption in the last part of the scenario period due to the use 
of the emerging CCS technology. Renewable energy contrib-
utes about 30% of primary energy consumption in 2050 and 
also in 2100, and bioenergy is very dominant. 
Our third set of long-term scenarios are those developed 
at Battelle by the US Climate Change Science Program (US 
2007) using the MiniCam model. One of the three Battelle 
scenarios	is	for	climate	change	stabilisation	at	2.9	W/m2, as 
in the IMAGE study (Figure 3).
  
The MiniCam baseline scenario predicts that fossil fuels will 
contribute about 70% of global primary energy in 2100 and 
a similar share in 2050. Oil consumption grows relatively 
slowly at the beginning of the period as depletion leads to 
higher prices, but this in turn encourages the development 
of new unconventional resources, causing oil consumption 
to rise again later in the period. Among non-fossil energy 
sources, renewables, especially non-biomass, rise faster than 
nuclear power.
In the stabilisation scenario, by contrast, global gas, oil and 
coal consumption falls by two-thirds by 2100, and total en-
ergy demand falls by about 15%. Nuclear power doubles in 
size. The greatest increase in renewables is seen in commer-
cial biomass, especially beyond 2050. Non-biomass renew-
able energy sees only a modest rise compared to the baseline 
scenario, reflecting an assumption that these energy sources 
are less cost-effective than CCS, nuclear power and bio-
energy.	Such	results	do	not	need	 to	match	exactly	what	 is	
concluded in assessments of individual technologies, which 
can	be	more	context-specific	and	can	take	other	issues	into	
consideration	as	for	example	synergies	with	local	environ-
mental goals. 
An overall conclusion from this brief comparison of three 
global	modelling	studies	is	that	expanding	the	time	horizon	
from 2050 to 2100 might set a new agenda for energy secur-
ity issues and also open a new window of opportunity for 
climate-friendly technologies. Furthermore, it is a common-
ality that energy efficiency improvements are key to reduc-
ing costs and also to generally reducing energy consump-
tion due to limited renewable energy options.
The baseline scenarios of the IMAGE and MiniCam stud-
ies foresee increasing possibilities for oil and natural gas in 
the last part of the 21st century due to the discovery of new 
resources.	This	 expectation	 is	 shared	with	 the	 recent	 IEA	
Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 (ETP 2010). Together 
with rich coal resources, this will allow fossil fuels to provide 
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Energy use in the IMAGE baseline and stabilisation scenarios
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up to 80% of global primary energy in 2100 without really 
compromising energy security, despite the issue of depend-
ence on imported fuels.
In contrast, the ETP baseline scenario for the period up to 
2050	assumes	fossil	fuels’	share	to	be	only	about	75%	,	with	
a lower consumption of oil and gas in 2050 compared to the 
IMAGE and MiniCam scenarios. Nuclear power, especially, 
and renewable energy play more important roles in the ETP 
study than in the IMAGE and MiniCam studies. One reason 
for these differences is that the depletion of oil resources and 
the associated price increases seem to become more acute in 
the years around 2050, when the ETP study ends. The two 
longer-term studies assume that new oil and gas resources 
will be discovered later in the century, though we might 
consider this rather uncertain.
Climate change stabilisation scenarios for low temperature 
rise targets based on the ETP, IMAGE and MiniCam studies 
require large cuts in fossil fuel use, especially coal, but the 
studies also conclude that adding CCS to coal, oil and gas 
power plants will allow the continued use of fossil fuels on a 
large scale. These resources contribute about 50% of global 
primary energy consumption in 2050 according to the ETP 
study, about 60% in 2100 in the IMAGE study, and about 
40% in 2100 in the MiniCam study. In the stabilisation scen-
arios of all three studies, nuclear power typically doubles its 
share.	As	a	result,	renewables	are	expected	to	cover	less	than	
30% of global primary energy consumption in 2100, or 2050 
in the case of the ETP study.
Case study: India
Researchers in India have used the energy sector MARKAL-
Answer model to assess the potential for increasing the 
country’s	use	of	renewable	energy	as	part	of	action	to	stabil-
ise climate change (Shukla et al. 2010). Figure 4 shows the 
trends in primary energy consumption from 2005 to 2050 
in the baseline case.
 
The	baseline	scenario	expects	primary	energy	consumption	
to grow more than five-fold from 2005 to 2050. The shares of 
nuclear power and renewable energy increase slightly, and 
among fossil fuels coal becomes increasingly important, 
which reflects the availability of domestic and other cheap 
coal resources in the region.
The Indian study also includes climate change stabilisation 
scenarios developed as part of a general sustainable develop-
ment model for the whole economy. This model emphasises 
changes in consumption patterns, urban planning, recycling 
and greater use of renewable energy as ways of meeting goals 
for both climate change and general development. Altogether 
energy efficiency, reduced consumption, recycling and ma-
terial substitution contribute about 35% of the total CO2-
equivalent emission reduction in this scenario. The resulting 
synergies produce a significant increase in the penetration 
of renewable energy in 2050 (Table 1). In the Sustainable 
Development and Climate Change Stabilisation scenario, 
the contributions from hydropower, wind and biomass by 
2050 are significantly higher than in the baseline case, en-
suring that India stays abreast of global emissions targets to 
Figure 3
Global primary energy consumption in the MiniCam baseline (left) and stabilisation (right) scenarios
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The global energy scene in 2050
stabilise CO2 at 450 ppm. The Indian CO2-equivalent emis-
sions are, as part of this global 450 ppm scenario, increasing 
by about 50% from 2000 to 2050.
The Sustainable Development and Climate Change Stabil-
isation scenario predicts a 22% fall in total primary energy 
consumption by 2050 compared with the baseline scenario. 
In addition to the assumed increases in hydropower, wind 
and biomass, this scenario also assumes that almost 300 
Mtoe of solar energy with a high share of PV will be added 
in 2050 relative to the baseline case. CCS contributes about 
10% of the greenhouse gas emission reduction in this scen-
ario. Note, however, that even in the Sustainable Develop-
ment and Climate Change Stabilisation scenario fossil fuels, 
in	particular	coal,	are	expected	to	cover	more	than	50%	of	
primary energy consumption in 2050.
The Indian study included another scenario variant which 
assessed climate change stabilisation more narrowly, with-
out assuming sustainable development in other areas. Here, 
renewable energy is less prominent than in the Sustainable 
Development and Climate Change Stabilisation scenario, 
and wind energy accounts for a higher share relative to com-
mercial biomass and solar power. This reflects carbon prices 
that are higher than in the sustainable development scen-
ario, making wind energy more attractive, and the fact that 
a less sustainable development path reduces the availability 
of biomass with more land for urban areas and less emphasis 
on agricultural development and forests.
Similarities between the three studies
The three scenario-based studies assessed above all con-
clude that fossil fuels will continue to contribute about 80% 
of	 the	 world’s	 primary	 energy	 throughout	 this	 century	 if	
high energy security and climate change are not high policy 
priorities.
However,	the	scenarios	to	some	extent	reflect	the	idea	that	
oil	 resources	 could	 become	 scarcer	 and	 more	 expensive.	
This implies that within 30-40 years from now, coal and gas 
consumption will be increasing faster than oil.
Some of the studies assume that new oil resources could 
become available later in the century, as a result of new 
exploitation	 technologies,	 though	 this	must	be	 considered	
rather	uncertain.	However,	new	discoveries	are	expected	to	
give	OECD	members	a	larger	share	of	the	world’s	oil	and	gas	
supply, increasing the energy security of these countries and 
so reinforcing their continued large-scale use of oil and gas.
The studies suggest that without special policies, renewable 
energy will not see rapid take-up. The assumption is that re-
newables	will	remain	more	expensive	than	fossil	fuels,	even	
when	the	latter	carry	the	extra	cost	of	CCS.
Climate change stabilisation scenarios aimed at keeping 
global temperature rise low imply faster penetration of re-
newable energy, but even here fossil fuels will still provide 
about 50% of global primary energy in 2100. Since this will 
require fossil fuel power plants to use CCS, a critical issue is 
how well CCS will work in practice.
The Indian case study shows that a large increase in the pene-
tration	of	renewable	energy	is	to	be	expected	when	sustain-
able development is aligned with climate change goals. Such 
an integration of policy objectives also cuts the cost of 
India’s	 eventual	 participation	 in	 a	 global	 450	 ppm	 stabil-
isation scenario, from $200/t CO2 in a conventional climate 
change scenario to $120/t CO2 in a scenario addressing both 
sustainable development and climate change.
The	extent	to	which	renewable	energy	will	replace	fossil	fuels	
depends on assumptions about costs and availability. The 
models used in such long-term studies are by nature very 
aggregate and general. They include little detail on regional 
potential for specific renewable energy technologies, which 
in	the	case	of	wind	power	and	bioenergy,	for	example,	can	
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Baseline primary energy consumption for India, 2005–2050
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Table 1
Contributions of hydropower, wind and biomass in 2050 in baseline and sustainable development scenarios for India
Baseline scenario Sustainable Development and Climate Change Stabilisation scenario
Hydropower (GW) 150 250
Wind (GW) 65 200
Biomass (Mtoe/yr) 155 200
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be very site-specific. This may mean that some of the poten-
tial and costs assumed in the models are high when com-
pared with more detailed studies at national or sub-national 
level that can assume the utilisation of very attractive local 
renewable energy sites or resources. Furthermore, the cost 
data used in the global studies only reflect the costs that can 
be directly associated with climate change mitigation, en-
ergy systems and macro-economic costs. There can be other 
direct or indirect impacts of introducing renewable energy 
options	such	as,	for	example,	local	environmental	impacts,	
job creation, innovation spillovers etc. that in reality are key 
drivers for renewable energy penetration. As a result, it may 
be no surprise that many global modelling studies end up 
predicting relatively small proportions of renewable energy 
compared with what is the outcome of more detailed tech-
nology assessments.
Conclusions
Scenario-based studies of global energy and climate change 
mitigation, and a study specific to India, show that intro-
ducing large volumes of renewable energy will require ad-
ditional efforts beyond what is assumed in the studies about 
climate change stabilisation that are reviewed in this chap-
ter.	 According	 to	 these	 studies,	 the	 extent	 to	which	 fossil	
fuels are replaced by renewables depends on a number of 
critical but also rather uncertain assumptions, including the 
discovery of new oil and gas resources in the latter part of 
the	century;	the	costs	and	reliability	of	CCS,	and	its	suitabil-
ity	for	bioenergy	as	well	as	fossil	fuel	power	plants;	and	the	
potential and costs of new commercial bioenergy sources. 
Furthermore, the penetration of renewable energy will also 
depend on a set of broader policy priorities relating to the 
local environment, employment, innovation spillovers and 
business development.
The increasing interest in green energy as part of national 
political	agendas	relating	to	the	“green	economy”	is	a	factor	
which may rapidly change the assumptions underlying the 
models. Countries like the USA, China and South Korea, for 
instance, are all aggressively promoting investments in re-
newable energy and energy efficiency. This political market 
stimulus is a factor which many of the global models have 
not yet captured.
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Introduction
The challenge of avoiding dangerous climate change will de-
mand massive greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions in the EU 
and other OECD countries. According to the IPCC (Metz 
et al. 2007), limiting the global mean temperature rise to 
2°C (450 ppm CO2eq) will demand a global reduction in 
GHG emissions of 50-85% before 2050. For the world to 
achieve this and still leave room for economic development, 
the OECD countries must reduce their GHG emissions by 
80-95% before 2050.
A reduction of 80-95% in GHG emissions would require 
many	countries’	energy	systems	to	become	net	CO2-free in 
the second part of the century. This means that energy con-
version should either not rely on fossil fuels at all, or should 
include	carbon	capture	and	storage	(CCS);	“negative	emis-
sions”,	created	for	example	by	equipping	biomass-fired	power	
plants with CCS, would also be needed to compensate for 
emissions that cannot be mitigated, such as some of those 
from	agriculture	(Labriet	et	al.	2010;	Loulou	et	al.	2009).
With	this	challenge	in	mind,	researchers	have	used	various	
modelling systems to create scenarios for future energy con-
sumption and conversion in Europe as a whole, the Nordic 
countries and Germany.
The important questions are whether Europe and Denmark 
can	reduce	GHG	emissions	to	the	required	extent,	and	how	
much this will cost.
GHG reductions in the EU
The EU member countries face a double challenge. First, 
if current energy and transport policies remain in place, 
emissions of CO2	from	the	EU	area	will	increase	by	approxi-
mately 5% by 2030 compared to 1990 level (Capros et al. 
2008). This is worrying at a time when the climate seems to 
4
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Figure 5
Proportion of final energy demand covered by renewable energy sources. Renewable energy targets as agreed by the EU member states
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be	changing	even	faster	than	was	expected	a	few	years	ago,	
and when CO2 emissions from the industrialised countries 
should be on the decrease. Second, the EU is becoming ever 
more vulnerable with regard to the security of its energy 
supplies.	A	continuation	of	existing	trends	implies	that	the	
EU’s	proportion	of	imported	energy,	presently	50%,	will	rise	
to	approximately	65%	in	2030.
In facing these challenges the EU has in recent years adopted 
a	 fairly	 ambitious	 energy	 and	 climate	 change	 policy.	 Ex-
pressed	as	“20-20-20	by	2020”,	the	targets	imply	that	by	2020:
•	 greenhouse	gas	emissions	will	fall	by	20%	compared	
	 to	1990;
•	 renewables	will	cover	20%	of	final	energy	demand;	and
•	 energy	consumption	will	fall	by	20%	compared	to	a	
 baseline development.
As	an	example	of	how	these	targets	will	affect	the	EU	mem-
ber states, Figure 5 shows their respective contributions to 
the renewable energy target.
 
Figure	5	makes	it	clear	that	all	the	member	states’	individual	
renewable energy targets are quite ambitious. Taken to gether 
with the requirements of climate change policies, these targets 
will require drastic changes in the energy systems of all 
countries in both the short and the long term.
In the following discussion, focus is on long-term scenarios 
for the EU countries, up to the end of this century. To the 
EU27 countries we have also added three associate member 
countries: Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.
Modelling for the EU27+3
The scenarios for the EU27 countries plus Norway, Switzer-
land	and	Iceland	(EU27+3)	were	examined	using	the	global	
energy	system	model	TIAM-World.	The	EU27+3	countries	
form one of 16 regions in the model (Loulou and Labriet 
2008;	Loulou	2008).
TIAM-World	is	a	detailed,	technology-rich	global	TIMES1 
model.	TIAM-World	is	a	partial	equilibrium	model,	where	
equilibrium in the energy system is found via linear pro-
gramming. It is able to model and optimise the entire global 
energy system from the bottom up, from primary resource 
extraction	 to	end-use,	 including	upstream	energy	use	and	
emissions from the mining of fuels.
TIAM-World	 has	 many	 capabilities	 which	 normally	 fall	
outside the scope of energy system models, such as mining 
and trading in fuels, and modelling fuel prices. It also in-
cludes climate equations to calculate GHG concentrations 
in the atmosphere and the oceans, the consequential changes 
in radiative forcing, and hence changes in global mean 
temperature	(Loulou	and	Labriet	2008;	Loulou	2008).
Many modelling groups have tried to produce GHG reduc-
tion	scenarios	aiming	at	a	maximum	2°C	increase	in	global	
mean temperature (stabilising around 450 ppm CO2eq), but 
not many have been able to come up with feasible solutions 
(EMF22 2009), especially not if the reduction target for the 
developing	countries	is	delayed	(so-called	“late	entry”).	This	
shows the difficulty of the problem: The models simply do 
not include enough mitigation options, such as energy sub-
1 TIMES refers to both a model generator and a family of models. Further information is available at http://www.etsap.org/tools/TIMES.htm.
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Total primary energy consumption (including mining) in the EU27+3 countries in the 550 ppm CO2eq stabilisation scenario. 
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stitution, demand adjustments, and biological, geological or 
oceanic sinks.
This	also	applies	to	the	version	of	TIAM-World	used	in	the	
analyses	below;	developed	primarily	for	the	energy	sector,	it	
cannot reach stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2eq without add-
ing mitigation options at end-use level and from other sec-
tors, such as non-energy-related emissions from agriculture 
and the manufacturing industry. This limitation made it 
necessary	to	relax	the	requirement	for	stabilisation,	setting	
the target at 550 ppm CO2eq instead.2 
Accordingly, the results presented here show how the 
EU27+3 countries can play their parts in a global GHG re-
duction scenario stabilising at around 550 ppm CO2eq by 
the end of the period studied (2100). This assumes perfect 
cooperation between all countries, including the developing 
countries, so that marginal abatement costs and CO2 prices 
are the same across the world.
This does not take into account the need for OECD coun-
tries to make larger reductions than developing countries 
before	2050,	but	 it	represents	an	 ideal	 that	 is	useful	 in	ex-
ploring the most cost-efficient global strategies.
Such	a	scenario	also	excludes	the	allocation	of	emission	tar-
gets to individual countries, as is currently under discussion 
in international negotiations. Such an allocation, with an as-
sociated market in emission allowances, can of course also 
be	explored	with	a	model	 like	TIAM-World	(Labriet	et	al.	
2010).
The EU27+3 nations can manage stabilisation at 550 ppm 
CO2eq if by 2050 they can reduce their GHG emissions by 
slightly more than 40%. Figure 6 shows some results for Eur-
ope over the time horizon 2010-2100. Even though focus is 
on the period up to 2050, the model is run until 2100 to make 
sure that GHG concentrations do not start to rise again after 
this time. Overshooting the target is allowed before 2090.
The model shows that stabilisation at 550 ppm CO2eq would 
make the global and EU27+3 energy system cost 3-4% more 
than a reference case with no binding target (based on com-
parison of net present values of total system cost discounted 
at 5%). This estimate does not, however, take into account 
any allocation of and trading in emission allowances be-
tween	countries,	so	the	extra	cost	could	vary	a	lot	from	re-
gion to region and from country to country, depending on 
how the burden is shared.
The global GHG reduction target creates a global price for 
GHGs in the model. This GHG price will influence the 
choice of technologies and fuels being at the level of second-
ary transformation (power plants and heating, hydrogen 
etc.) or final end-uses (transport, motors, cooling, cooking, 
heating etc.), as well as the general level of demand for ener-
gy. The result is that during the period studied, the EU27+3 
countries maintains their primary energy consumption at 
around 70,000 PJ/yr by obtaining more energy from GHG-
neutral sources, especially wind and solar power.
Running the model without a restriction on GHGs leads to a 
30% increase in primary energy consumption by 2050 com-
pared to 2010. In this case, the main trends in primary en-
ergy are decreases in the share of oil and coal, and increases 
in the proportion of gas, nuclear power and renewables.
Even a relatively modest target such as 550 ppm CO2eq 
means a drastic long-term reduction in GHG emissions 
from the EU27+3 countries, with energy-related net CO2 
emissions having to fall to zero before 2090. This can be 
done by introducing more renewables and by adding CCS 
technology to power plants and industrial processes wher-
ever possible, including those firing biomass (Figure 7).
Most of the GHG reductions would be achieved in the power 
sector by phasing out conventional coal and more than half 
of traditional gas firing before 2050, while alternative tech-
nologies such as wind, geothermal and tidal power become 
competitive. In 2050, the model shows that 32% of electri-
city comes from nuclear power plants and 26% from wind 
power. Nuclear production does not grow throughout the 
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Total energy-related CO2 emissions for the EU27+3 countries 
in the 550 ppm CO2eq scenario
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2 The restriction to the model is actually implemented as an allowed increase in radiative forcing, to 3.5 W/m2. According to the IPCC (Metz et al. 2007), 
this corresponds to stabilisation at 535 ppm CO2eq.
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period modelled as in this scenario its production capacity 
was	fixed	to	reflect	uncertainty	regarding	its	acceptance	in	
future. On the other hand, any phase-out of nuclear power 
in Europe could, of course, increase the share of other low-
carbon power plants, and sensitivity analyses of this may 
deserve attention in future work. Gas and coal-fired power 
with CCS technology appears around 2030, but even by 
2050 accounts for just 4-5% of power production (Figure 8).
GHG	mitigation	 in	 transport	 is	more	difficult	 and	expen-
sive, so changes in this sector are less marked in the period 
leading up to 2050. After 2050 there is a switch first to bio-
diesel, and later to electric vehicles and hydrogen (Figure 9). 
Note	that	the	TIAM-World	model	has	no	option	for	modal	
shifts (i.e. replacing one form of transport by another) in the 
transport sector. 
The conclusion of this brief analysis is that the EU27+3 
countries can cut their GHG emissions by at least 40% be-
fore	 2050	 without	 significant	 extra	 costs	 relative	 to	 their	
GDP – and with huge potential remaining for further re-
ductions, since the model shows that up until 2050 the 
transport	 sector	 is	 still	 running	on	 fossil	 fuels	 (except	 for	
a small amount of biodiesel). Renewable energy for power, 
heat	and	transport	purposes	is	not	exploited	to	anything	like	
its full potential in this scenario, so a lot more can be done, 
although costs might then increase. Analyses assuming 
stricter targets for Europe up to 2050 show different conclu-
sions, however (Labriet et al. 2010).
GHG reductions in Denmark
Compared to Europe as a whole, Denmark is a special 
case: The country is notable for its history of development 
towards	 a	 flexible	 energy	 system	 incorporating	 renewable	
energy	sources,	and	its	exchange	of	electricity	with	neigh-
bouring	 countries.	 After	 an	 introduction	 to	 the	 existing	
Danish energy system, therefore, the following sections take 
this trend to its logical conclusion by describing a scenario 
involving a total phase-out of fossil fuels in Denmark.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Denmark has treated cli-
mate change as one of the important driving factors for na-
tional energy policy. The results have included strong meas-
ures to improve energy efficiency and conserve energy, and 
the development and implementation of carbon-efficient 
technologies such as cogeneration and wind power. Since 
Denmark is a member of the EU, this development is driven 
by the EU as well as national policies.
The Danish energy system has three main characteristics:
•	 	Denmark	 has	 a	 diverse	 and	 distributed	 energy	 gener-
ation system based around three national grids for power, 
 district heating and natural gas. The combination of these 
grids implies that Denmark has a highly efficient energy 
supply system with a high proportion of combined heat 
and power.
•	 	Renewable	 energy,	 especially	wind	power,	plays	 a	 large	
and increasingly important role in the Danish energy 
system. At present 20% of Danish power demand is met 
by wind and Denmark is the global front-runner in the 
development of offshore wind farms. It is envisaged that 
by 2025 wind power will provide more than half of the 
country’s	power	needs.
•	 	Denmark’s	 geographic	 position	 between	 the	 European	
continent and the Nordic countries allows the country 
to act as a buffer between the Nordic and the European 
energy	 systems.	As	a	member	of	 the	Nordic	power	ex-
Oil products
Hydrogen
Gas
Electricity
Biodiesel
Alcohol (ethanol, methanol)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Figure 9
Fuels for road transport in the EU27+3 countries 
in the 550 ppm CO2eq scenario
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change,	Nord	 Pool,	Denmark	 trades	 power	 extensively	
with the Nordic countries and Germany, and also han-
dles considerable volumes of transit power between the 
continent and the other Nordic countries. The Danish 
natural gas grid connects Sweden with Germany.
Denmark	is	the	only	country	in	the	EU	which	is	a	net	export-
er of energy. In 2008, production from Danish oil and gas 
fields	in	the	North	Sea	exceeded	the	country’s	gross	energy	
consumption	by	approximately	75%.	Furthermore,	for	more	
than 20 years Denmark has succeeded in keeping its gross 
energy consumption almost constant, despite the fact that 
GDP has increased by more than 80% over the same period.
From the above it is clear that in terms of energy Denmark 
is far better off than most EU countries. Nevertheless, Den-
mark	also	faces	a	number	of	challenges;	some	of	these	are	
general to the EU, while others are specific to Denmark:
•	 	Oil	and	gas	production	peaked	in	2005	and	will	gradually	
decrease to a level below domestic consumption, thus in-
creasing the vulnerability of the Danish energy supply. 
To	mitigate	the	country’s	increasing	dependence	on	im-
ported fossil fuels, the government has set up a Climate 
Change Commission whose task is to come up with pol-
icy measures that will phase out fossil fuels within the 
next	 50	 years.	These	measures	will	 also	 be	 vital	 to	 the	
national climate change policy in reducing Danish emis-
sions of GHGs.
•	 	Combined	 heat	 and	 power,	 together	 with	 an	 extensive	
district	heating	system,	is	the	cornerstone	of	Denmark’s	
highly efficient energy system. However, the widespread 
use of small-scale CHP plants has taken the heating mar-
ket	to	its	limit,	so	the	potential	for	expansion	is	modest.
•	 	With	20%	of	all	its	electricity	supplied	by	wind	turbines,	
Denmark has the highest proportion of wind power in 
the world. Accommodating more wind power will re-
quire innovative solutions.
•	 	Transport	 is	 the	only	sector	 in	Denmark	 to	be	 increas-
ing its use of energy. Replacing fossil transport fuels with 
renewable energy sources is a major challenge for the fu-
ture.
New policies are therefore required which – relying increas-
ingly on renewable sources – will change the Danish (and 
European) energy systems radically in the coming decades. 
The	following	scenarios	show	the	extent	to	which	the	Dan-
ish energy system could actually change in future.
Modelling for Denmark
The setup used for the Danish projections consists of a 
macro-economic model to forecast energy demand, an en-
ergy system optimisation model describing the production 
of electricity, heat and transport fuels, and a spreadsheet 
model of the complete national energy balance, including 
the transport sector.
Energy demand forecasts for the Danish economy up to 
2050 are based on the macro-economic model ADAM3 
used by the Danish Ministry of Finance. This projection of 
economic activity in different sectors is then transformed 
into a demand for energy by the econometric sector model 
EMMA4. Possible energy savings are evaluated using cost 
curves for each sector, and implemented as efficiency trends 
in EMMA.
The optimum split of investments in heat savings and in the 
supply of electricity and heat are analysed in the energy sys-
tem optimisation model Balmorel5. The model version used 
here is a special version developed by the Centre for En-
3 ADAM is maintained by Statistics Denmark. See http://www.dst.dk/homeUK/guide/ADAM.  4 EMMA is maintained by the Danish Energy Agency. 
Detailed model description is available at http://www.ens.dk/en-US/Info/FactsAndFigures/scenarios/model/EMMA.   5 http://www.balmorel.com
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ergy, Environment and Health6 (CEEH). Compared to the 
original, the CEEH version includes more sectors, and also 
external	 health-related	 costs	 caused	 by	 air	 pollution	 from	
energy conversion processes. Heat demand and production 
are divided into 22 heating areas linked by the district heat-
ing grid, plus two areas (one in western and one in eastern 
Denmark)	to	which	the	grid	does	not	yet	extend.
This modelling framework does not cover the global energy 
markets, so fuel and CO2	prices	are	therefore	exogenous	to	
the	model.	The	set	of	prices	used	is	based	on	the	WEO	2009	
“450	ppm”	scenario	(IEA	2009)	up	to	2030,	after	which	time	
fossil fuel prices are projected to remain constant because of 
low demand. The CO2 price, on the other hand, has risen to 
€75/t CO2 by 2030, and this trend is projected to continue, 
resulting in a price of €155/t CO2 by 2050.
Biomass prices are assumed to sit between those of coal and 
natural gas until 2030. After that, due to high demand for 
biomass in a world with ambitious reduction targets, bio-
mass prices are assumed to rise so that they match natural 
gas by 2050.
On the demand side, the efficiency of electrical appliances 
improves by 2.1% per year until 2050, while Balmorel is used 
to predict heat savings in each of the heating areas (Figure 
10). To do this, a module developed for Balmorel by Erika 
Zvingilaite	and	Olexandr	Balyk	from	Risø	DTU	balances	the	
investment needed to save heat against that needed to build 
new heat supply capacity. Figure 10 shows that in this parti c-
ular model run, by 2050 more than 50% of the potential heat 
savings	in	the	existing	building	stock	have	been	realised.
Energy for industrial processes is switched away from fossil 
fuels by increasing the proportion of electricity used and by 
using more biomass. Transport, which is the most difficult and 
expensive	sector	to	decarbonise,	is	switched	towards	electrical	
vehicles and fuels such as hydrogen, methanol and biofuels. 
These	transport	fuels	will	be	important	to	the	flexibility	of	
the future energy system because their manufacture can sta-
bilise	the	power	grid	by	absorbing	excess	wind	power	when	
necessary. To force the model to create an energy system 
without fossil fuels, the model is simply prevented from in-
vesting in fossil-fuel heat and power plants after 2025. The 
transport	sector	is	not	expected	to	be	fossil-free	before	2050.
The energy supply system modelled in Balmorel produces 
electricity, heating (both individual buildings and district 
heating) and the transport fuels mentioned above. To cap-
ture the power market of which Denmark is part, the sur-
rounding countries, i.e. Finland, Sweden, Norway and 
Germany, are modelled as well. The model runs with en-
dogenous investment by minimising total system costs in 
the Nordic countries and Germany. The model will then 
find the optimum economic solution for the whole region.
Figure 11 shows the investment by the model in Denmark 
in five-year steps, so each column covers investments in the 
previous five years.
To start with, the model still builds gas and coal-fired power 
plants, but from 2015 onwards investment is mainly in heat 
pumps and wind power. Investments in electrolysers for hydro-
gen and methanol start in 2025. In 2035, there are huge 
investments	 in	 offshore	wind	 power	 because	 of	 the	 extra	
power demand from heat pumps and the transport sector, 
and because of the retirement of older plants.
The model divides heat production into district heating grid 
areas and individually heated areas. Coal is used in central 
CHP plants which are also co-fired with waste. Natural 
gas is used for primary and local CHP generation as well 
as in individual boilers. As the CHP plants are phased out, 
they are replaced by large heat pumps and waste-fired CHP 
plants. Individual heating is taken over by small heat pumps 
and some wood-burning boilers and stoves.
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6 http://www.ceeh.dk
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Power in the future Danish energy system will come mainly 
from wind turbines – onshore to begin with, and later off-
shore, once the price of CO2 has risen to the point where this 
becomes economical.
In the scenario presented here, in which fossil fuels are still 
abundant in the power sector by 2025, the model invests 
mainly in wind power, but also in waste incineration plants 
and	some	biomass-fired	gas	turbines.	With	the	fuel	and	CO2 
prices assumed here, the wind power solution is only mar-
ginally	more	expensive	than	coal	power	with	CCS.	As	a	re-
sult, the cost of eliminating fossil fuels is less than 1% more 
than the base scenario with no restrictions on energy source. 
However, this estimate does not include the costs of changing 
transport technologies, which could easily change the picture.
Figure 12 shows electricity generation according to fuel. 
Even	 though	 existing	 gas	 and	 biomass-fired	 CHP	 plants	
remain available until 2020, the model chooses not to use 
them because they cannot compete with coal and wind in 
the power market under the assumed price regime. After 
2030, when the last coal-fired power plant is decommis-
sioned, the model invests in some gas turbines running on 
gasified biomass to provide backup capacity when there is 
no wind. These gas turbines operate for so few hours a year, 
however, that they cannot be seen on the graph.
 
The massive amount of wind power in the Danish system is 
balanced by managing demand, production and transmis-
sion.	By	2050,	power	demand	is	assumed	to	be	very	flexible,	
allowing demand to move from peak periods with no wind 
to periods when there is plenty of wind. Production is bal-
anced through heat pumps and heat storage, and by produc-
ing hydrogen or methanol for the transport sector. Finally, 
Denmark’s	extensive	transmission	grid	can	move	power	to	
and	from	neighbouring	countries.	Without	all	this	flexibility	
it would not be possible to integrate such a large share of 
wind power.
Conclusions
The EU scenario shows that if the world is to stabilise the 
atmospheric concentration of GHGs at 550 ppm CO2eq or 
less, the European countries will have to reduce their GHG 
emissions by at least 40% by 2050.
However, this is only possible if we include all global mitiga-
tion options, without taking into account the fact that the 
need for development means that some parts of the world, 
for	 example	 Africa,	may	 need	 to	 delay	 their	 entry	 to	 the	
GHG reduction process. Once we take into account late 
entry for some regions, the EU countries will have to cut 
their emissions by much more than 40% even to meet the 
550 ppm CO2eq target.
For the 450 ppm CO2eq scenario, the EU would probably 
have to reduce GHG emissions by 80-95% by 2050. The 
extreme	difficulty	of	meeting	the	450	ppm	CO2eq target is 
underlined by the fact that only a few modelling groups 
have been able to produce global energy model scenarios 
keeping within this target.
As	stated	above,	the	version	of	the	TIAM-World	model	used	
in the present analyses was primarily developed for the en-
ergy sector, and cannot solve the need for stabilisation at 450 
ppm CO2eq without adding more mitigation options. A lot 
more work therefore needs to be done to identify new miti-
gation options which can be added to the models if they are 
to help guide us towards the 450 ppm CO2eq target.
On the other hand, the Danish case shows that some coun-
tries will be able to phase out fossil fuels rapidly enough to 
stabilise GHG levels – if only this could be done on a global 
scale – at 450 ppm CO2eq.
Especially because of its wind resources, Denmark can 
phase out fossil fuels from electricity and heat production 
before 2040. Removing fossil fuels from the transport sector 
will probably take a further 10 years. The increased costs of 
such a transformation in the electricity and heat sector will 
range	from	zero	to	just	a	few	per	cent,	but	the	extra	cost	in	
the transport sector is very uncertain.
Exogenous	assumptions	about	the	prices	of	fuels,	CO2 and 
technology have big impacts on the energy system. Despite 
this, sensitivity studies demonstrate the robustness of one 
of	the	most	important	conclusions:	That	a	“fossil-free”	Den-
mark	will	incur	low	or	even	no	extra	socio-economic	costs.
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Solar energy is the most abundant energy resource on earth. 
In a sustainable future with an ever-increasing demand for 
energy, we will need to use this resource better.
Solar energy technologies either convert sunlight directly 
into heat and electrical energy or use it to power chemical 
conversions	 which	 create	 “solar	 fuels”	 or	 synthetic	 com-
pounds.
Solar heating technologies have developed steadily for many 
years	 and	 solar	 heating	 and	 cooling	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	
commonest renewable energy technologies. This chapter, 
however, focuses on technologies for electricity production 
and touches more briefly on the prospects for solar fuels. 
The section on Danish perspectives also discusses solar 
thermal heating in district heating plants.
In recent decades, two technologies for converting solar en-
ergy into electrical energy have dominated: photovoltaics 
(PV)	and	concentrating	 solar	power	 (CSP).	Today’s	 silicon	
and thin-film PV technologies are advancing steadily, with 
new materials and technologies constantly being developed, 
and there are clear roadmaps for lowering production costs. 
In the discussion below we assess the maturation potential of 
currently	emerging	PV	technologies	within	the	next	40	years.
Concentrating solar power is already a proven technology, 
and below we evaluate its potential to become a substantial 
part	of	the	energy	mix	by	2050.	Solar	fuels	cover	a	range	of	
technologies.
The	chapter	is	to	a	great	extent	based	on	two	recent	road-
maps from the International Energy Agency (IEA). Many 
reports, predictions, scenarios and roadmaps for solar en-
ergy	 deployment	 exist.	The	 IEA	predictions	 for	 the	 pene-
tration of solar energy in the future energy system are low 
relative to many of the other studies. The IEA roadmaps, 
however, cover most aspects of the future deployment of the 
technologies and reference older work.
Photovoltaics
In its recent technology roadmap [1], the IEA concludes 
that solar PV power has significant potential for long-term 
growth in nearly every region of the world. The IEA esti-
mates that by 2050 PV will provide around 11% of global 
electricity. The installed PV capacity increased by 50% in 
2009	 to	 22	GWp.	The	 roadmap	 prediction	 assumes	 a	 de-
creasing	growth	rate	in	the	next	decades	reaching	200	GWp	
of	installed	capacity	by	2020,	900	GWp	by	2030	and	3,000	
GWp	by	2050.
According to the IEA, PV energy prices will match retail 
electricity	prices	(“grid	parity”)	before	2020	in	most	regions	
of the world. The IEA roadmap, like almost all other studies, 
says that financial incentives are needed to support the de-
ployment of PV, allowing a combination of increasing pro-
duction and market competition to drive down the indus-
try’s	costs.	Once	PV	reaches	grid	parity,	 the	IEA	roadmap	
foresees changes in policy frameworks and the creation of 
a self-sustaining market while guaranteeing PV owners the 
right to sell power to the grid.
The cost of PV electricity varies according to the amount of 
sunshine, financial terms, installation type and PV technol-
ogy. Despite this variation, the IEA has set cost reduction 
goals (Table 2) based on the Strategic Research Agenda and 
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Table 2
IEA cost reduction goals for PV [1]
Cost targets for the residential sector 2008 2020 2030 2050
Typical turnkey system price (2008 $/kWp) 6,000 2,700 1,800 1,200
Typical electricity 
generation costs 
(2008 $/kWh)1
2,000 kWh/kWp2 0.36 0.16 0.10 0.07
1,500 kWh/kWp2 0.48 0.21 0.14 0.09
1,000 kWh/kWp2 0.72 0.32 0.21 0.14
Cost targets for the commercial sector 2008 2020 2030 2050
Typical turnkey system price (2008 $/kWp) 5,000 2,250 1,500 1,000
Typical electricity 
generation costs 
(2008 $/kWh)1
2,000 kWh/kWp2 0.30 0.13 0.09 0.06
1,500 kWh/kWp2 0.40 0.18 0.12 0.08
1,000 kWh/kWp2 0.60 0.26 0.17 0.11
Cost targets for the utility sector 2008 2020 2030 2050
Typical turnkey system price (2008 $/kWp) 4,000 1,800 1,200 800
Typical electricity 
generation costs 
(2008 $/kWh)1
2,000 kWh/kWp2 0.24 0.11 0.07 0.05
1,500 kWh/kWp2 0.32 0.14 0.09 0.06
1,000 kWh/kWp2 0.48 0.21 0.14 0.09
1 Assumptions: interest rate 10%, technical lifetime 25 years (2008), 30 years (2020), 35 years (2030) and 40 years (2050); operations and maintenance (O&M) costs 1%.
2 Capacity factor; the amount of electricity generated by a PV system per Wp per year; a typical range is 1,000–2,000 kWh/kWp.
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the Implementation Plan of the European PV Technology 
Platform (2007, 2009), the Solar America Initiative (DOE 
2007), the Japanese PV roadmap towards 2030/PV2030+ 
(NEDO 2004, 2009) and the IEA Energy Technology Per-
spectives 2008. All cost targets are based on solar cell mod-
ules	rated	power	in	Watt-peak	(Wp).7 
A	variety	of	PV	technologies	exist,	and	few	other	renewable	
energy technologies boast such a portfolio of available tech-
nical options at different levels of maturity. This is one of 
the	premises	behind	the	expectation	that	the	cost	of	PV	will	
continue to fall for a long time.
Crystalline silicon solar cells and thin-film solar cells are 
well-established, yet roadmaps for these technologies still 
identify clear potential for substantially lower production 
costs	in	the	next	decade.
In addition, emerging technologies promise improved effi-
ciencies, high-volume production and even ultra-low costs. 
These technologies include cheap organic solar cells, high-
efficiency multi-junction concentrator cells, quantum dot 
structures and other novel semiconductor technologies.
The cost of PV production falls by nearly 20% with every 
doubling of production capacity, and the hope is that the 
emerging technologies will jump onto this curve (fig. 13) as 
they mature. In the meantime, the wide variety of applica-
tions for PV allows the various technologies to develop their 
own markets: from niche products like consumer electronics, 
through standalone PV systems, to Building Integrated PV 
(BIPV) and bulk electricity production.
For	a	number	of	years,	the	demand	for	PV	exceeded	produc-
tion capacity, and suppliers defined the market and prices. 
In 2009, however, the global financial crisis, the collapse of 
the Spanish market and especially the build-up of produc-
tion capacity led to a dramatic fall in PV module prices. Ac-
cording to Pike Research [2], the market is now demand-led 
and competes on price. In the long term, the competition 
between the established and emerging PV technologies will 
favour the technologies with the lowest system life span 
costs calculated over a given time span, i.e. a 25-year period.
PV technologies are demanding of materials, and the avail-
ability of materials is an issue if PV is to be widely used. Silver 
(Ag), Indium (In), Cadmium (Cd) and Tellurium (Te) are 
some of the elements commonly used in solar cells that are 
relatively	rare:	Known	reserves	will	be	exhausted	in	10-20	years	
at	the	current	extraction	rate.	As	a	result,	some	PV	techno	lo-
gies will simply be limited by shortages of materials.
As	an	example,	the	IEA	foresees	a	total	installed	PV	capacity	
of	3,000	GWp	by	2050.	If	these	solar	cells	are	all	of	the	CdTe	
type (see below) with a 1 µm CdTe layer and 15% efficiency, 
this will require 100,000 t of CdTe – vastly more than the 
world’s	known	Te	reserve	of	21,000	t	[3].
Although recycling and technical advances will reduce such 
limitations, shortages of materials for both solar cells and 
balance-of-system (BOS) components8 will continue to 
threaten the PV market as it grows. One conclusion is that 
we will need the full range of PV technologies to create an 
elastic market which can respond to changes in demand.
In conclusion, in the short term, current PV technologies 
are likely to benefit from economies of scale to the point 
where they reach grid parity and a total installed capacity 
of	at	least	200	GWp	by	2020.	A	broad	portfolio	of	PV	tech-
nologies will support a continued capacity build-up over the 
next	40	years,	at	least	to	the	level	of	the	IEA	estimate	of	11%	
of global electricity production from PV by 2050. Current 
PV	technologies	will	co-exist	with	emerging	and	novel	tech-
nologies in the market.
PV technologies
Crystalline silicon (c-Si) solar cell modules currently make 
up 85-90% of the global market. Single crystalline (sc-Si)
modules show power conversion efficiencies of up to 20% 
and	 are	 more	 expensive	 than	 multi-crystalline	 (mc-Si)9 
modules, which have efficiencies of up to 15%. The two 
classes share the market equally.
Thin-film solar cells currently account for 10-15% of global 
PV module sales. Amorphous (a-Si) and micromorph silicon 
(a-Si/μc-Si) modules have relatively low efficiencies (8%), 
whereas cadmium telluride (CdTe) and copper indium di-
selenide (CIS) and copper indium gallium diselenide (CIGS) 
show module efficiencies of 10-14%. It is noteworthy that 
thin-film PV companies report the lowest production costs 
of	all	PV	technologies:	approximately	1$/Wp	for	CdTe	and	
printed CIGS solar cells.
Emerging technologies include advanced thin-film and or-
ganic solar cells (OPV). The latter, which are about to enter 
the market via niche applications, encompass polymer solar 
cells, small-molecule solar cells and dye-sensitised solar 
cells. Polymer solar cells already have a low cost per square 
metre (Figure 14), but because they are relatively inefficient, 
their	cost	per	Wp	is	$8-12	today	[4].	Their	cost	is,	however,	
on a steep descent as illustrated in Figure 13. OPV and Si 
solar cells are the only PV technologies where the photovol-
taic material is not limited by the availability of materials. In 
7 Watt-peak (Wp); the rated module power measured under standard test conditions: 1,000 W/m2 light intensity, AM 1.5G spectrum, and 25°C.
8 BOS components: inverter, wires, frames etc.   9 Also termed poly-crystalline
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addition, polymer solar cells possess the potential for high-
speed production, which may allow for much larger produc-
tion	capacities	–	in	GWp	–	than	other	PV	technologies.	
PV concentrator technologies (CPV) use an optical con-
centrator system to focus solar radiation onto a small high-
efficiency cell. CPV technology is currently being tested in 
pilot applications.
Novel PV concepts aim to achieve ultra-high-efficiency solar 
cells via advanced materials and photo-physical processes. 
They are currently the subject of basic research.
Figure 15 shows predicted developments in power conver-
sion efficiency (PCE)10. Other important performance and 
production parameters like lifetime and energy payback 
time (EPT)11 also differ among the technologies. The overall 
IEA	expectation	is	a	gradual	increase	in	lifetime	for	c-Si	cells	
from 25 years today to 40 years by 2050. In the same time 
span,	EPT	is	likely	to	decrease	from	two	years	to	six	months.	
Organic solar cells may reach EPTs as low as a few months, 
but even the most optimistic guesses put their potential life-
time at only 10 years.
Figure 14 illustrates the ranges of production costs and 
module	prices	within	which	we	can	expect	to	find	PV	tech-
nologies.
Concentrating solar power
CSP technology has been used in central power plants for 
more than 20 years. Mirrors focus solar radiation which 
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heats a receiver to high temperatures. The heat is used to 
generate electricity by driving a turbine or some other en-
gine. Heat can also be used to generate hydrogen by decom-
posing	water,	 and	 to	power	more	 complex	 chemical	 reac-
tions producing other energy carriers (solar fuels).
The IEA also drew a technology roadmap for CSP [8] indi-
cating that:
•	 	CSP	can	provide	low-carbon,	renewable	energy	resources	
in	countries	or	regions	with	high	“direct	normal	irradiance”	
(DNI)	–	strong	sunshine	and	clear	skies;
•	 	by	 2050,	 with	 appropriate	 support,	 CSP	 could	 provide	
11.3% of global electricity, with 9.6% coming from solar 
power and 1.7% from backup fuels (fossil fuels or bio-
mass);
•	 	in	 the	 sunniest	 countries,	CSP	 is	 expected	 to	become	a	
competitive source of bulk power for peak and intermedi-
ate loads by 2020, and for base-load power by 2025-2030.
The possibility of integrated thermal storage is an import-
ant feature of CSP plants, and virtually all such plants also 
have backup capacity in the form of fuel that can be burned 
to	produce	power.	CSP	thus	offers	firm,	flexible	generating	
capacity to utilities and grid operators while also enabling 
effective management of a greater share of variable energy 
from other renewable sources, such as PV and wind power.
The IEA envisions North America as the region with the 
largest production and consumption of CSP electricity, fol-
lowed by Africa, India and the Middle East. 
North	Africa	is	potentially	a	major	exporter	(mainly	to	Eur-
ope), since its considerable solar resources largely compen-
sate for the additional cost of long transmission lines. The 
Desertec Industrial initiative (Dii) aims to realize this vision 
termed the Desertec Concept [9].
CSP can also produce significant amounts of high-temper-
ature heat for industrial processes. In particular, it can help 
meet growing demand for water desalination in arid countries.
Given the arid or semi-arid nature of environments that are 
well-suited for CSP, a key challenge is finding the cooling 
water needed for CSP plants. Dry or hybrid dry/wet cool-
ing can also be used in areas with limited water resources 
although at a performance penalty of 7%.
The	main	obstacle	to	the	expansion	of	CSP	plants	is	not	the	
availability of areas suitable for power production, but the 
distance between these areas and many large consumption 
centres.	The	 roadmap	 examines	 technologies	 that	 address	
this challenge through efficient, long-distance electricity 
transmission.
CSP facilities could start providing competitive solar-only 
or solar-enhanced gaseous or liquid fuels. Success in these 
areas	affirms	the	need	for	 larger-scale	experiments	to	sup-
port the further development and to establish a basis for 
evaluating their potential.
CSP technologies
The current CSP systems fall into four main classes depend-
ing	on	the	geometrical	configuration	used	to	focus	the	sun’s	
rays, receive the solar radiation and collect the resulting heat: 
parabolic trough plants, central receiver plants, dish Stirling 
systems and linear Fresnel systems (Table 3).
Parabolic troughs are the most mature of the CSP technologies 
and account for the bulk of current commercial plants. Most 
existing	plants,	however,	have	little	or	no	thermal	storage	and	
rely on burning fuel to provide backup when the sun is not 
shining.	For	example,	CSP	plants	in	Spain	get	12-15%	of	their	
annual electricity production from natural gas. Some newer 
plants, however, have significant thermal storage – up to 7.5 
h@100% capacity.
Central receiver systems (CRSs) use hundreds or thousands of 
two-axis	mobile	reflectors	(heliostats)	to	concentrate	the	sun’s	
rays	on	a	central	receiver	placed	atop	a	fixed	tower.	Some	com-
mercial tower plants now in operation use direct steam gen-
eration	in	the	receiver;	others	use	molten	salts	to	both	transfer	
and	store	heat.	The	world’s	first	commercially	operating	solar	
tower, PS10, was developed by Abengoa Solar – see Figure 16.
Figure 16: Planta Solar 10 or PS10 solar power tower in Sanlúcar la Mayor 
near Seville, Spain. 624 heliostats of 120 square metres focus the sun rays 
on the top of the 115-metre-high tower, where the receiver generates pres-
surised steam to run a conventional power cycle with 11 MW capacity.
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Parabolic	dishes	concentrate	 the	sun’s	rays	at	a	 focal	point	
propped above the centre of the dish. The entire apparatus 
tracks the sun, with the dish and receiver moving in tandem. 
Most dishes have an independent engine/generator (such as 
a Stirling machine or a micro-turbine) at the focal point. 
This design eliminates the need for a heat transfer fluid and 
for cooling water.
Linear	Fresnel	reflectors	(LFRs)	approximate	the	parabolic	
shape of trough systems by using long rows of flat or slightly 
curved	mirrors	 to	 reflect	 the	 sun’s	 rays	onto	a	downward-
facing	linear,	fixed	receiver.	A	more	recent	design	known	as	
the compact linear Fresnel reflectors (CLFRs) uses two par-
allel receivers for each row of mirrors, and thus needs less 
land than a parabolic trough with the same output.
Deployment of CSP
Today’s	CSP	technology	is	implemented	in	the	cost	range	of	
15-20	cents€/kWh.	In	the	conventional	power	market,	it	com-
petes	with	mid-load	power	in	the	range	of	3-4	cents€/kWh.	
Sustainable market integration, as predicted in different scen-
arios, can only be achieved if the cost can be reduced to a 
competitive	level	 in	the	next	10-15	years.	Competitiveness	
is not only impacted by the cost of the technology itself but 
also by a potential rise in the price of fossil energy and by 
the internalisation of associated social costs such as carbon 
emissions. Therefore, we assume that in the medium to long 
term competitiveness is achieved at a level of 5-7 cents€/
kWh	for	dispatchable	mid-load	power.
Among different scenarios aimed at reducing the actual 
electricity costs of these technologies, the European Con-
centrated Solar Thermal Road mapping, ECOSTAR [10] as-
sessed three ways: i) Mass production (e.g. by continuous 
plant	 deployment);	 ii)	 Scaling	 of	 unit	 size	 and	 iii)	 Imple-
mentation of technical innovations. 
In	 the	 short	 term	 (~next	 10	 years),	 research	 challenges	
should focus on identifying and contributing to implement-
ing the potential technical innovations which would have 
the highest impact on CSP cost reduction. The research 
challenges may be divided into three groups:
Increasing modularity:
•	 	Modularity	on	plant	concepts,	e.g.	multi-tower	schemes,	
more cost-effective dish-Stirling systems.
•	 	Modification	of	structures,	application	of	new	materials	
and simplification of concentrator system.
•	 	Modularity	of	spare	parts	or	components,	e.g.	heliostats	
and receiver modules.
Increasing efficiency : 
•	 	Through	 plant	 scheme	 simplifications	 by	 reducing	 the	
need	for	heat	exchangers	when	using	different	working	
fluids (as in Direct Steam Generation). 
•	 	Further	development	of	 the	 thermodynamic	cycle	with	
increased temperatures, or additional superheating for 
the CRS (Central Receiver System) saturated steam plant 
may be considered. These measures provide higher effi-
ciencies and solar fractions.
•	 	Provide	more	 cost-efficient	 solutions	 of	 dry	 cooling	 to	
extend	widely	the	potential	placements	for	these	plants.
Increasing dispatchability and availability:
•	 	Integration	of	thermal	storage	for	several	full-load	hours,	
together with new storage materials and advanced char-
ging/discharging concepts allow for increased solar elec-
tricity production without changing power block size.
•	 	Developing	 improved	 strategies	 for	 control	 and	 opera-
tion under cloud transients.
•	 	Improved	 prediction	 of	 dispatch	 schemes	 in	 meteoro-
logical predictions and demand and market curves.
•	 	Development	of	procedures	(or	methodologies)	for	life-
time assessment by accelerated aging of materials of prin-
cipal components such as receiver, driving mechanism.
•	 Improved	operation	and	maintenance	procedures.
Solar fuels
The direct conversion of solar energy into chemical energy 
is intimately linked to our possibilities for mitigating carbon 
dioxide,	 and	efficient	 solutions	could	potentially	 solve	not	
only	the	energy	challenge	but	also	the	carbon	dioxide	chal-
lenge.	Two	overall	research	lines	exist:
1)  Use of sunlight for the conversion of carbon-free chem-
icals	(i.e.	water	splitting	to	molecular	hydrogen	and	oxy-
gen)
2)  Use of sunlight for the conversion of carbon-containing 
chemicals	(i.e.	photoreduction	of	carbon	dioxide).
While	both	approaches	have	been	demonstrated	at	labora-
tory level, they are both very inefficient, and there are no 
examples	 that	 show	promise	 of	 facile	 upscaling	 routes.	 In	
addition, the greatest challenge for both approaches is the 
associated	carbon	dioxide	emissions.	There	is	currently	no	
available	carbon	dioxide	emission-free	source	of	carbon	di-
oxide,	and	this	implies	that	available	conversion	routes	for	
carbon	dioxide	are	limited	to	reducing	carbon	dioxide	emis-
sions	but	will	never	enable	a	situation	where	carbon	dioxide	
levels	in	the	atmosphere	are	reduced;	only	the	rate	at	which	
carbon	dioxide	is	emitted	will	be	reduced.	There	is	thus	an	
urgent	need	for	finding	carbon	dioxide	emission-free	routes	
to	extracting	carbon	dioxide	directly	from	the	atmosphere	
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and subsequently efficiently converting it to an energy-rich 
carrier (i.e. formic acid, formaldehyde, methanol or me-
thane).	There	is	currently	~	1	teraton	of	carbon	dioxide	in	
excess	in	the	atmosphere	[11],	and	the	scale	at	which	we	can	
currently	 handle	 carbon	 dioxide	 industrially	 approaches	
max.	200	megatons.	Our	infrastructure	thus	falls	desperately	
short	of	enabling	assimilation	of	carbon	dioxide.	This	all	indi-
cates that new technology is needed that encompasses the 
chemical scale of at least multi-gigaton if we are to stop the 
steady	increase	in	carbon	dioxide	in	the	atmosphere,	or	in	
fact ensure a decrease. The most likely successful approach 
will employ sunlight and low-cost systems comprising large-
area solar catalysts.
CSP may likewise power reactive fuels. A number of con-
versions have been demonstrated, including water splitting, 
fossil fuel decarbonisation and the conversion of biomass 
and	organic	wastes	into	gaseous	fuels.	Larger-scale	experi-
ments are needed to support further development. Direct 
water splitting produces hydrogen at temperatures around 
2,500° C. Such high temperatures give rise to many practical 
problems. An alternative – operational already at 1,200° C 
–	is	a	 thermally	driven	reduction	(de-oxidation)	of	metal-
oxides	and	subsequent	reaction	of	the	metal	(Al	or	Mg)	with	
water	to	form	hydrogen	and	metaloxide	again.	Large-scale	
demonstration is still a premise for evaluating the potential.
A Danish perspective
In Denmark, only PV and solar thermal heating technolo-
gies are useful. Half of the daylight takes the form of diffuse 
scattered radiation, and CSP will not be financially viable 
because it requires direct solar radiation.
PV	is	scarcely	deployed	in	Denmark	with	only	4.7	MW	of	
installed capacity at the end of 2009 [12]. A typical PV cap-
acity	 factor	 in	Denmark	 lies	 in	 the	 range	850-1,000	kWh/
Table 3
CSP types
Focus
Line focus
Collectors track the sun along a single axis and 
focus on a linear receiver. This makes tracking the 
sun simpler
Point focus
Collectors track the sun along two axes and focus at 
a single point. This allows higher temperatures
Receiver
Fixed
Stationary devices which remain 
independent of the plant’s focusing 
device. This eases the transport of 
collected heat to the power block
Linear Fresnel reflectors Central receiver system (CRS)
Mobile
Mobile receivers move with the fo-
cusing device. In both line-focus and 
point-focus designs, mobile receivers 
collect more energy
Parabolic troughs Parabolic dishes
Curved mirrors
Absorber tube and reconcentrator
Receiver/engine
Reflector
Heliostats
Solar tower
Reflector
Absorber tube
Solar field piping
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kWp,	which	 is	only	half	of	 the	capacity	 factor	 in	southern	
Europe. Nevertheless, the Danish Solar Cell Association 
(www.solcelle.org), which was founded in 2008, has a vision 
for 5% of the electricity supply in Denmark to be powered 
by PV by 2020. 
Net metering is the only public incentive in Denmark, and it 
allows residential PV owners to feed electricity back into the 
grid	from	systems	no	larger	than	6	kWp.	Rooftop-mounted	
PV and BIPV installations are the basis for PV deploy-
ment in Denmark. The installed capacity is divided among 
residential, industrial and public building installations. In 
their Strategic Research Agenda for Photovoltaic Solar En-
ergy Technology, the European Photovoltaic Technology 
Platform foresees grid parity also in Denmark before 2020. 
Some	Danish	module	suppliers	expect	this	to	happen	much	
sooner for BIPV, and also that a steep market increase is to 
be	expected.
From a technical point of view, a share of at least 10% PV 
power by 2050 will fit well into the Danish energy system. 
Residential	rooftops	 in	Denmark	are	 to	a	great	extent	dir-
ected east and west, and even though a 20% efficiency pen-
alty	for	such	installations	is	expected,	they	benefit	from	the	
improved generation in the mornings and evenings, when 
demand peaks. Hence a large fraction of Danish rooftops 
may potentially be utilised as platforms for PV.
Although this chapter does not cover solar thermal heating 
in details, it must be mentioned that centralised solar ther-
mal heating plants have become a great success in Denmark. 
Some of the largest installations in the world are Danish, 
and they feed hot water directly into the well-developed dis-
trict heating systems in a number of Danish communities. 
Recently,	a	large-scale	experiment	with	geological	seasonal	
heat storage has commenced. According to the Danish Dis-
trict Heating Association, and www.solvarmedata.dk, more 
than 100,000 square metres of solar thermal collectors are 
installed in central heating plants. The typical annual energy 
production	is	in	the	range	of	400-500	kWh/m2, correspond-
ing to a thermal conversion efficiency of about 40%.
On the further perspective towards 2050 for solar thermal 
heating in Denmark, the vision of the Danish Solar Cell As-
sociation is identical to the European vision defined by the 
European Solar Thermal Technology Platform (ESTTP) in 
their 2030 vision: Solar thermal energy systems will provide 
up to 50% of low-temperature heating and cooling demand.
Conclusions
Solar energy is an available resource for heat and electri city 
production throughout the world. Our technical ability to 
utilise this resource has improved dramatically in recent 
years, and it is hard to imagine a society that by 2050 will 
not rely on the sun for a large share of its heat and power 
needs. The IEA currently predicts that the PV and CSP tech-
nologies will each cover 11% of global electricity demand 
by 2050.
Both PV and CSP have the potential to generate electricity 
at a competitive price compared to other generating tech-
nologies.	Over	the	next	ten	years,	incentive	mechanisms	are	
needed to support the build-up of market demand, produc-
tion capacity and the technological advances that will secure 
production cost reductions.
PV is by nature a distributed generation technology, where-
as	CSP	is	a	centralised	technology;	hence	their	deployment	
will follow very different routes. It is traditional – as we do 
in this chapter – to treat PV and CSP together because they 
rely on the same resource. However, the fact is that PV is 
unique among electricity generation technologies in that its 
distributed nature allows it to be integrated with human 
settle ments, both urban and rural. The deployment of PV 
will be market-driven, especially when grid parity is reached 
in the residential, commercial and utilities sectors.
Practical	 PV	 is	 expected	 to	 include	 off-grid,	 residential,	
commercial and large-scale utility installations, of which 
residential uses will account for almost half. In certain ur-
ban	areas	–	“solar	cities”	–	PV	and	solar	thermal	energy	can	
become the major sources of electricity, cooling and heat-
ing. As regards the challenges of energy storage and integra-
tion with smart grids, PV has much in common with wind 
power. Currently, local battery storage is used only for small 
electronics and off-grid applications, where overall energy 
efficiency is not an issue. For grid-connected PV, where 
overall efficiency is vital, there is currently no good way of 
storing large volumes of electricity.
CSP, on the other hand, faces issues common to most cen-
tralised electricity generation technologies. CSP relies on dir-
ect sunshine, which is often most abundant in desert areas 
a good distance from large urban centres. For that reason, 
the future deployment of CSP will require new electricity 
transmission systems. In nations with direct solar resources 
– the south-western USA, Australia, southern Europe – the 
political decision to deploy CSP is relatively simple. Other 
areas such as north Africa and central Asia have enough 
sunshine,	 but	 would	 need	 to	 export	 their	 electricity	 to	 
Europe or Russia. The deployment of CSP will therefore be 
driven by politics as well as markets. 
Many CSP systems separate the harvesting of thermal energy 
from the generation of electricity. This allows the plant to 
store thermal energy and to augment electricity generation 
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with	other	energy	 sources;	 today’s	 commercial	CSP	plants	
include backup capacity from burning fuel. Hybrid systems 
combining heat storage and the facility to burn fossil, bio-
mass or even solar fuels allow for a 100% firm supply and 
potentially a 100% sustainable supply.
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Introduction
The use of wind energy to generate electricity for the grid is 
quite a recent phenomenon following the modern develop-
ment of wind energy starting in the late 1970s in the wake 
of the oil crises. Since then, wind energy has grown at spec-
tacular rates thanks to concerns about energy security, en-
vironmental protection and climate change, and economics.
Thus, over the past 25 years global wind energy capacity has 
doubled	every	three	years,	corresponding	to	a	tenfold	expan-
sion every decade. By the end of 2009, global installed wind 
capacity	was	approximately	160	GW	and	in	2010	is	expected	
to	produce	more	than	331	TWh,	or	1.6%	of	global	electri-
city	consumption.	Approximately	2%	of	the	capacity	installed	
during 2009 was offshore, bringing total offshore capacity to 
2.1	GW,	or	1.3%	of	total	global	wind	energy	capacity.
Future developments for wind power are described in the 
advanced	scenario	of	 the	2008	report	by	 the	Global	Wind	
Energy	 Council	 (GWEC)	 [1],	 by	 the	 German	 Aerospace	
Centre (DLR) [2], and in the 2008 report to the IEA by the 
Risø DTU National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy [3]. 
These suggest that global wind energy penetration could be 
10% by 2020, 20% by 2030 and 25-30% of electricity demand 
by 2050. These scenarios are based on growth rates of 27% 
in 2008, declining to 22% in 2010, 12% by 2020 and 5% by 
2030. Targets of this order are realistic, and the available 
wind resource is not the limiting factor: Current global 
electricity consumption corresponds to that generated by a 
wind farm measuring 1,000 kilometres square. Long-term 
plans should therefore be based on these growth rates.
The huge potential of wind power, the rapid development 
of the technology and the impressive growth of the industry 
justify the perception that wind energy is changing its role to 
become the future backbone of a secure global energy supply.
Between the mid-1980s, when the wind industry took off, 
and 2005, wind turbine technology has seen rapid develop-
ment, leading to impressive increases in the size of turbines, 
with corresponding cost reductions.
From	2005	to	2009	the	industry’s	focus	seems	to	have	been	on	
increasing manufacturing capacity, meeting market demand 
and making wind turbines more reliable. The development of 
new	and	larger	turbines	to	some	extent	stagnated,	and	costs	
even rose due to high demand and rising materials costs.
We	believe,	however	–	and	this	is	supported	by	recent	trends	
–	that	the	next	decade	will	be	a	new	period	of	technology	
development and further scale-up, leading to more cost-
effective, reliable and controllable wind turbines and new 
applications. This is partly due to increased international 
competition, but also because the industry is increasingly 
dominated by high-technology international companies. 
The move to install more capacity offshore also favours 
larger wind turbines and encourages new ways of thinking.
Finally, there is an increasing awareness that renewables in 
general, and not least wind energy, will come to play a major 
role in the global energy supply as oil and gas are phased 
down in the period towards 2050. The cost of power from 
coal will also increase because of the need for carbon cap-
ture and storage.
In this chapter we discuss the current status of wind power 
and	 its	 prospects	 up	 to	 2050,	 including	 both	 existing	 and	
emerging technologies.
Wind 2010: resource, deployment and technology
Studies	of	 the	exploitable	wind	resource	[1],	 [4],	 [5]	dem-
onstrate that wind energy is a practically unlimited and 
emission-free source of energy, of which only a tiny fraction 
is	currently	being	exploited.
While	the	estimates	differ	by	almost	an	order	of	magnitude,	
even the most conservative, such as the 2008 estimate by 
REN	21	[5],	show	that	the	world’s	expected	electricity	con-
sumption	in	2050	of	113-167	EJ/yr	(31,000-46,000	TWh/yr)	
could be delivered by wind energy several times over. The 
potential of onshore wind is thus almost 400 EJ/yr (111,000 
TWh/yr),	even	with	conservative	assumptions	about	resource	
and land availability.
Most forecasts predict an eventual fall in growth rates, and 
following the financial crisis that began in 2008 it seemed 
likely that future growth would be slower than in that year, 
when	cumulative	installed	capacity	grew	by	30%	to	122	GW.	
This did not happen in 2009, however: instead, cumulative 
installed	capacity	grew	by	31%	to	160	GW.
The average cumulative growth rate over the past five years 
has	been	27.3%.	While	 in	the	USA	and	many	other	coun-
tries the industry was encouraged by stimulus packages, the 
main growth came from China, which in 2009 installed al-
most	14	GW.	In	this	light,	assumed	growth	rates	of	10-20%	
for	the	next	20	years	do	not	seem	overly	optimistic.
Until the 1990s, a great variety of different wind turbine 
concepts were tested and manufactured. These included 
turbines with one or two blades, stall-controlled designs, 
and	vertical-axis	turbines.	In	contrast,	the	typical	wind	tur-
bine being installed today (2010) is a three-bladed, upwind, 
pitch-controlled, variable-speed machine connected to the 
electricity	grid,	with	a	capacity	of	1.1-1.5	MW	in	Asia	and	
1.9-2.3	MW	in	Europe	and	the	USA	[6].
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Mainstream technological development for land-based 
utility-scale wind turbines is now characterised primarily by 
scale-up (until 2005 the size of turbines doubled every five 
years (Figure 17). But though most wind turbines now look 
similar on the outside, manufacturers have introduced new 
materials, control principles, generator and converter tech-
nologies. Together with the technical challenges associated 
with scale-up, these developments have called for advanced 
research in a number of fields. 
 
Over the past 20 years, average wind turbine capacity ratings 
have	 grown	 continuously;	 the	 largest	 proportion	 of	 land-
based utility-scale wind turbines installed globally are rated 
from	1.0	MW	to	about	3.6	MW.	The	largest	wind	turbines	
are installed offshore, notably in the UK and Denmark, 
while land-based turbines in Asia are generally smaller, at 
around	1.0-1.4	MW.	This	suggests	that	further	development	
will happen in several tracks, including accelerated scale-up 
for offshore turbines and smaller installations on land, sized 
appropriately for the application and local infrastructure.
Development towards 2050
Table	4	summarises	the	expected	development	of	wind	en-
ergy technology and its penetration of the electricity supply. 
We	will	expand	on	this	information	in	the	sections	to	follow.
Industry trends and costs
Industrial wind turbine technology was originally developed 
primarily by small companies in Europe and the USA work-
ing closely with research organisations. Though this develop-
ment gradually attracted the attention of established indus-
trial manufacturers, the original small companies had made 
considerable progress in diversification, turbine scale-up and 
deployment before some of them were taken over by multi-
national energy companies (GE, Siemens, Alstom), while others 
(Vestas) grew by merging with competitors of similar size.
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Figure 17
Growth in the global average size of installed wind turbines (WTGs). Source: BTM Consult ApS – March 2010. Source [6]
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Table 4
Summary of wind energy technology developments up to 2050
2010 2020 2030 2050
% global electricity 
generated from wind
1.7% 10% 20% 30%
Known technology 3-bladed, geared drive train, 
converter
(98.5% of generating capacity), 
2–3 MW onshore
(1.5%) 3–5 MW offshore, fixed 
foundation of 15–30 m depth
3-bladed, 50/50 geared drive 
train and direct drive, converter
(83%) 2–3 MW onshore
(15%) 6–10 MW offshore, fixed 
foundation of 25–50 m depth
(<1%) <50 kW onshore
3-bladed, 25/75 geared drive 
train and direct drive, converter, 
advanced sensors and control
2–3 MW onshore
3-bladed, 20/80 geared drive 
train and direct drive, converter
2–3 MW onshore
Emerging technology Demo floating wind turbine (1%) 6–10 MW offshore, floating 
foundation
New concepts Small wind turbines in the built 
environment
Demo combined wind-wave 
systems
Demo offshore vertical-axis 
turbine
Demo high-altitude WT
System integration Hourly production forecast
Grid code compliance
Wind farms operated as power 
plants
Offshore grid development
Increased use of hydro with 
pumped storage for balancing
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In Asia, new players initially licensed technology from Eur-
ope, but quickly went on to develop their own wind turbines.
Wind	turbines	are	based	on	a	unique	combination	of	tech-
nologies, and are gradually becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated. The amount and diversity of research carried out will 
determine how far wind turbine technology will develop. 
Wind	turbines	are	complex	designs,	and	in	technical	terms	
there are no limits to how far they can be improved.
However, diminishing returns may cause the industry itself 
to	limit	future	technological	improvements.	Whether	or	not	
this happens depends very much on the future structure of 
the industry, and the ability of turbine manufacturers, R&D 
specialists and legislators to work together to ensure that the 
industry remains vital, dynamic, innovative and competi-
tive. As the motto of Roskilde University puts it, in tranquillo 
mors,	in	fluctu	vita	(“in	stillness	death,	in	movement	life”).
We	can	imagine	four	existing	industries	which	a	future	wind	
turbine industry might come to resemble:
“Shipbuilding” Large structures, but relatively low-tech: 
probably the worst case, as it would discourage investment 
in new technology.
“Aerospace” A handful of global wind turbine manufactur-
ers supported by a larger number of niche suppliers. This 
scenario describes the wind industry until five years ago, 
since which time many new players have entered the scene.
“Automotive” R&D involves the component suppliers as 
well as the wind turbine manufacturers themselves. This 
scenario has the attraction of creating widely used standard 
components which make good use of common R&D effort.
“Power stations” Component manufacturers supply con-
tractors who in turn are project-managed by large energy 
companies.	This	scenario	could	make	it	hard	to	exploit	the	
full benefits of mass production.
The overall goal is to make wind energy steadily more cost-
effective and reliable as a future large-scale global energy 
source. It is likely that the future wind industry will have 
elements of all four scenarios listed above, but of these, the 
third	 (“automotive”)	 offers	 perhaps	 the	 best	 opportunities	
for	innovation	and	technological	development.	We	certainly	
see opportunities for component suppliers to play a larger 
part in the development process.
Up to 2005, the industry saw learning rates of 0.17-0.09 (in 
other words, a doubling of cumulative installed capacity re-
duces	the	cost	of	electricity	per	kWh	by	9-17%)	(Figure	18)	[3].
From 2005 to 2009, installation was limited by manufactur-
ing capacity, higher material costs and higher margins for 
manufacturers, with the industry focused on increasing 
production capacity and improving reliability.
In	future,	we	expect	changes	 in	industry	structure	and	in-
creased competition to accelerate technological develop-
ment,	and	we	see	no	reason	to	expect	a	learning	rate	of	only	
10% as assumed in [3] and Figure 18.
Technology trends
Mainstream technology
The 30-year development of wind energy technology, with 
its focus on reducing the cost of energy, has seen the size of 
the largest turbines increase by a factor of 100, from roughly 
50	kW	to	5	MW.
This	is	in	spite	of	a	theoretical	limit	to	the	maximum	size	of	
a wind turbine. As a wind turbine increases in size (while 
keeping the same proportions) its energy output increases 
as the square of the rotor diameter, but its mass increases 
roughly	as	the	cube	of	the	rotor	diameter	(the	“square-cube	
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Figure 18
Using experience curves to forecast wind energy economics up to 2015. The costs shown are for an average 2 MW turbine with a present-day 
production cost of euro ¢6.1/kWh in a medium wind regime. From [3]
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law”).	As	the	mass	increases,	the	mechanical	loads	imposed	
by gravity increase even faster, until the point where the 
materials available are not strong enough to withstand the 
stresses on the turbine.
So far, engineers have avoided the limits of the square-cube 
law by steering clear of direct geometrical similarity, using 
materials more efficiently, and using stronger materials. Per-
haps most importantly, designers have tailored the respons-
es of turbines ever more carefully to the conditions under 
which they operate, and this remains one of the main ways 
of reducing the cost of energy from future turbine designs.
Issues of geometry notwithstanding, several factors favour 
larger turbines. However, it seems fair to assume that at 
some point the cost of building larger turbines will rise faster 
than the value of the energy gained. At this point scale-up 
will become a losing economic game.
As a result, it is important also to look at other ways of cut-
ting costs. This can be done, for instance, by introducing 
cheaper technology or by increasing the amount of energy 
captured by a rotor.
Conventional wind turbines use gears to match the slow 
speeds of the blades and hub to the higher speeds required 
to drive a standard induction generator. It has been known 
for many years that a multi-pole generator, which can run 
at	slower	speeds,	offers	the	chance	to	eliminate	the	gearbox.	
Early multi-pole generators were large and heavy, but newer 
permanent-magnet designs, in which the rotor spins outside 
the stator, are compact, efficient and relatively lightweight. 
The	next	generation	of	multi-MW	gearless	wind	 turbines	 is	
expected	to	create	a	step	change	in	the	industry,	followed	by	
further gradual cost reductions as with previous turbine types.
Lightweight blades
As described above, geometrical similarity says that as blade 
length	increases,	blade	weight	should	increase	with	an	ex-
ponent of 3 (a cubic law). In fact, several studies have shown 
that	over	recent	decades	the	actual	exponent	has	averaged	
around 2.3, and for the most recent blade designs it is 2.2 or 
2.1 (Figure 19). 
Many factors have aided the move to lighter blades, of which 
the most important has been the development of blades that 
are much thicker than their predecessors, especially near the 
hub. Because they are stiffer at the point where the loads are 
highest, these new blade designs make more efficient use of 
materials and are lighter overall. This principle can continue 
to produce even larger blades that beat the square-cube law 
as long as it is backed by the necessary R&D into better de-
sign methods, new materials such as carbon fibre, and ad-
vanced manufacturing techniques.
One potential drawback of using thicker airfoil shapes at the 
blade root is a loss of aerodynamic efficiency. The answer 
may lie in high-lift designs such as multiple airfoils for use at 
the	blade	root	(Figure	20),	or	the	newly	developed	“flat-back”	
airfoil, which can maintain lift even when it is very thick.
Another way of cutting the cost of wind energy is to increase 
blade length while reducing the fatigue load on the blade. 
There can be a big payoff in this approach because mater-
ial	 consumption	 is	 approximately	 proportional	 to	 fatigue	
loading.
Fatigue	loads	can	be	reduced	by	controlling	the	blade’s	aero-
dynamic response to turbulence. This is already done ac-
tively	via	the	turbine’s	pitch	control	system,	which	turns	the	
complete blade, and future turbines may also feature mov-
able control surfaces distributed along the blades.
An especially elegant idea is to build passive ways of reduc-
ing loads directly into the blade structure. Using the unique 
attributes of composite materials to tailor its structural 
properties, for instance, a blade can be built in a way that 
couples its bending and twisting deformations.
Another	 way	 of	 achieving	 this	 “pitch-flap”	 coupling	 is	 by	
building the blade in a curve so that fluctuations in the aero-
dynamic load produce a twisting movement which varies 
the angle of attack [7]. It should also be possible to vary the 
lift produced by the blade by altering the camber of the air-
foil	in	response	to	flap-wise	deformation,	as	birds’	feathers	
do. Such complicated blade motion will require a very good 
understanding of wind turbine aerodynamics and materials 
science.
Weight (kg) LM Weight (kg) Vestas
20,000
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
B
lade w
eight (kg)
Blade length (m)
Figure 19
New technology and better design means that new blades are much 
lighter than simple geometry would predict, based on the weight 
of older blade designs 
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Innovative systems of trailing-edge control could consider-
ably reduce the fatigue loads on blades. These are now being 
developed in projects involving European research institu-
tions	and	industry,	including	the	large	EU-funded	UpWind	
project.
As well as reducing loads, such advanced multi-control op-
tions could help to improve turbine performance and tune 
the	 turbine’s	operation	 to	on-site	conditions.	For	 instance,	
a laser ranging (LIDAR) system mounted on the turbine 
could measure upstream wind speed and detect turbulence 
before it arrives at the turbine, giving an active control sys-
tem more time to respond.
Indeed, aiming for cost reductions is not only a question of 
improving the rotor and generator as elaborated on here. 
The life-cycle cost of energy from an offshore wind farm 
comprises the wind turbines, installation and substructures, 
grid and O&M as the four dominating elements (Figure 21). 
Hence, for cost reductions to be achieved, a broad approach 
must be taken, addressing wind turbine technology, but also 
substructures, grid and O&M.
Emerging technologies
So far, most development efforts have been dedicated to an evo-
lutionary process of scaling up and optimising the land-based, 
three-bladed standard wind turbines which first emerged as 
commercial products at the beginning of the 1980s.
To the original design have since been added individual 
blade pitch control, variable speed and other refinements to 
match	the	increasing	size	of	the	turbines;	increasingly	strin-
gent	performance	and	reliability	requirements;	and	adapta-
tions for use offshore.
One	example	of	a	technical	development	 is	“negative	con-
ing”,	 in	 which	 the	 blades	 point	 slightly	 forward;	 this	 in-
creases the clearance between the blades and the tower, 
and	 also	 improves	 stability	 for	 very	 flexible	 blades.	 Such	
improvements are only possible when turbine engineering Wind turbine Substructure Grid O&M
Figure 21
Example life-cycle cost of energy distribution for oshore wind farm.
SINTEF Energy Research
Figure 20
Multi-element airfoil to enhance lift (CFD simulation, Risø DTU)
Figure 22: Ideas for floating wind turbines: SWAY (l) and Hywind (r)
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goes hand in hand with the development and application of 
advanced	simulation	and	design	tools.	Without	such	tools,	
it would not have been possible to increase the size of wind 
turbines by a factor of 100 in 30 years.
Offshore wind power brings new opportunities, since off-
shore winds are generally stronger and steadier, but rep-
resents an even bigger challenge for turbine development, 
operation and cost optimisation. Operating conditions off-
shore are very different, so what is most cost-effective on-
shore may need a radical re-think for use out at sea. Figure 
22 shows how future offshore turbines might diverge from 
their land-based counterparts.
New ideas offshore
The strength of the offshore market, and the very different 
conditions found offshore, make it likely that completely 
new	types	of	offshore	 turbine	may	emerge.	An	example	 is	
the	vertical-axis	floating	turbine	illustrated	in	Figure	23.
Vertical-axis	turbines	have	been	tried	and	rejected	for	on-
shore use. The logic for using them offshore runs as follows: 
The need to install turbines in deep water, where founda-
tions	 are	 expensive,	 makes	 floating	 turbines	 an	 attractive	
idea.	But	conventional	horizontal-axis	turbines	carry	a	large	
amount	of	weight	at	the	top	of	the	tower	(high	“top	mass”),	
and this can cause balance problems for floating turbines. 
Vertical-axis	turbines	have	lower	top	mass	and	do	not	need	
to turn into the wind, so large floating versions may become 
attractive.
 
Another idea is to harvest energy from wind and waves at 
the same time (Figure 24). The shared supporting structure 
and infrastructure might create a symbiosis that could ac-
celerate the development of reliable and cost-effective wave 
energy solutions.
High-altitude wind systems
Various arrangements of balloons, kites and other tethered 
airfoils have been proposed to take advantage of strong 
winds at greater heights than rigid turbine towers can reach.
There are two basic approaches: Either transmit mechanical 
energy directly to the ground, where it can generate electri-
city	or	be	used	in	other	ways;	or	generate	electricity	aloft	and	
send power down through a tether.
Up to around 500 metres, wind speed increases with height.
From 500 metres up to 2,000 metres, however, wind power 
density12 actually decreases slightly with altitude.
Above 2,000 metres, wind power density again increases 
monotonically with height.
The	jet	 streams	–	narrow	“corridors”	of	wind	which	move	
around at altitudes of 7-16 kilometres – are an order of 
magni tude faster than winds near the ground.
There may not be much benefit from going higher than 500 
metres, therefore, unless we can place devices above 2,000 
metres, or preferably in the jet streams.
Urban wind turbines
Small wind turbines and urban wind energy might seem just 
a curiosity in terms of their contribution to the energy sup-
ply, but this could change in future.
By 2050, our energy systems are likely to be much less cen-
tralised than at present, and people will be taking more re-
sponsibility for energy at a local level. These changed per-
ceptions could make urban wind energy more attractive.
12 Wind power density is a function of wind speed and air density. It reflects the fact that air density, and hence the amount of energy produced by a 
turbine at a given wind speed, falls off with altitude.
Figure 23: The Risø DTU vertical-axis floating wind turbine
Figure 24: The Poseidon demonstration project is a floating power plant 
which harvests both wind and wave energy
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The	challenge	is	to	develop	“urbines”	that	can	be	integrated	
cost-effectively into the built environment. Low sensitivity 
to turbulence and low noise are essential.
Wind power in context
We	have	shown	above	that	 the	opportunities	 for	wind	en-
ergy	are	enormous;	they	expand	still	further	if	we	take	into	
account the predictability of wind energy when studying the 
economics of energy investments [9].
The	report	Wind	Force	12	[10]	is	based	on	the	realistic	as-
sumption that wind power will continue to grow in the 
next	 ten	 years	 as	 it	 has	 over	 the	 past	 ten.	 If	 this	 is	 so,	 by	
2020	installed	wind	capacity	will	be	increasing	at	151	GW/
yr, representing an annual investment of €75 billion. In this 
scenario,	wind	power	will	produce	12%	of	the	world’s	elec-
tricity requirement by 2020, by which time it is assumed to 
be	30,000	TWh/yr	compared	to	18,000	TWh/yr	today.	The	
technological	vision	of	Wind	Force	12	is	to	make	wind	power	
40% cheaper in 2020 than it was in 2000.
In	2000,	global	electricity	production	was	15,000	TWh/yr.	
This amount of power could be produced by a fictitious 
wind farm measuring 1,000 kilometres square. Such an array 
of turbines would fit into the Great Plains of the USA and 
still leave 98% of the land available for agricultural use. 
Supplying	the	world’s	total	energy	needs	from	wind	would	
require an area around four times bigger, and generating 
60,000	TWh/yr.	For	comparison,	Wind	Force	12	estimates	
the	 world’s	 total	 exploitable	 onshore	 wind	 resource	 to	 be	
53,000	TWh/yr.
Even with the predicted increases in energy demand by 
2050,	the	idea	of	getting	all	the	world’s	energy	from	wind	is	
still realistic in terms of the geographical area needed. This 
would, however, require enormous changes in our systems 
for converting, transporting and storing energy.
Apart from its basic role in getting electricity from wind tur-
bines to consumers, power transmission has an important 
part to play in balancing local fluctuations in wind power 
production against fluctuations in consumption. Europe 
is currently placing much emphasis on strengthening and 
extending	the	transmission	lines	between	load	centres	and	
producers, including offshore wind power plants.
Other ways of balancing demand and production include 
wide geographical distribution of wind power plants, better 
forecasting of wind, demand management and electricity 
storage.
Conclusions
We	believe	 that	 the	development	of	wind	energy	has	only	
just begun, with respect to both technology and application.
The past 30 years of R&D have established a firm foundation 
for	wind	power.	While	further	R&D	will	certainly	be	neces-
sary	to	reduce	costs	and	fully	exploit	the	great	potential	of	
wind, much of the earlier uncertainty about the feasibility of 
wind energy has now been dispelled.
The	next	decade	is	thus	shaping	up	as	a	new	period	of	tech-
nology development and further scale-up, leading to more 
cost-effective, reliable and controllable wind turbines and 
new applications for wind power.
Increased international competition is helping to reveal the 
great	potential	 that	 exists	 for	wind	power	 technology	 and	
markets. The increasing dominance of the industry by high-
tech global companies and the move towards offshore siting 
favours ever-larger wind turbines and opens up new per-
spectives.
Finally, there is increasing awareness that renewables in 
general and wind energy in particular will play a major role 
in the global energy supply as oil and gas are phased out in 
the period towards 2050, and the cost of coal-based energy 
increases, not least due to the cost of carbon capture and 
storage.
Wind	energy	has	the	potential	to	supply	30-50%	of	our	elec-
tricity, and to do this cost-effectively.
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This chapter gives an overview of the various forms of 
hydro power: conventional hydropower, marine currents, 
tides, power from salinity gradients, ocean thermal energy 
conversion and wave power.
Hydropower
Since	1960,	hydropower	has	expanded	globally	from	about	
1,200	TWh	in	1970	to	more	than	3,200	TWh	in	2008	(EN-
ERDATA),	and	is	expected	to	increase	to	4,810	TWh	in	2030	
(IEA 2008).
At present, OECD and non-OECD countries produce 
roughly	 equal	 amounts	 of	 hydroelectricity.	 Within	 the	
OECD,	many	of	the	best	sites	have	already	been	exploited,	
and	future	growth	is	therefore	expected	to	happen	mostly	in	
developing countries. Hydropower has little potential in the 
low-lying terrain of Denmark.
Hydropower is a mature technology close to the limit of effi-
ciency;	most	components	have	been	thoroughly	tested	and	
optimised over many years. However, the efficiency of many 
older hydropower turbines could be improved by retrofit-
ting	new	equipment	(UNWWAP	2006).	About	75%	of	the	
world’s	45,000	large	dams	were	built	for	irrigation	or	flood	
control;	 only	 25%	 are	 used	 for	 hydropower	 or	 as	 multi-
purpose	reservoirs	(WCD	2000).	There	is	thus	a	significant	
potential for increased hydropower generation at many of 
these dams. In fact, 7% of the hydropower projects support-
ed by the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are 
adding	power	production	to	existing	dams.
Marine current and open tidal power
Marine currents carry a lot of kinetic energy, part of which 
can be transformed into electricity by submarine turbines. 
Those are more compact than wind turbines, simply because 
water is almost a thousand times denser than air.
The physical characteristics of marine currents are well 
known.	The	power	available	is	about	4.1	kW/m2 for a cur-
rent	speed	of	2	m/s,	and	13	kW/m2 for a current of 3 m/s. 
Capturing the energy of currents in the open ocean requires 
essentially the same basic technology as for tidal flows, but 
some of the infrastructure will be different. In deep-water 
applications,	 for	 instance,	fixed	bottom	support	 structures	
will be replaced by anchors. In addition, ocean current sys-
tems can have larger rotors since they are not constrained 
by channels.
MCT/SeaGen	has	 successfully	 deployed	 a	 1.2	MW	 instal-
lation at Strangford Lough in Northern Ireland. This takes 
the form of a turbine with two rotors, each of which has two 
blades, mounted on a cross-beam supported by a single pile.
The	Irish	company	Open	Hydro	has	been	testing	a	250-kW	
machine at the European Marine Energy Centre in the Ork-
ney Islands off northern Scotland. Around ten other new 
marine current devices have entered the field recently, and 
a	number	 of	 large	 projects	 are	 planned	 over	 the	 next	 five	
years,	the	biggest	being	the	300	MW	Lunar	Energy	installa-
tion in South Korea by 2015 (Bahaj 2009).
Barrage tidal power
Tidal energy is driven by the gravitational pull of the moon. 
The periodic nature of the tides implies that tidal power 
plants will be discontinuous, generating for only four or 
five hours in each 12-hour tidal cycle. However, tidal power 
plants can be designed to be reversible, so that during periods 
of low electricity demand they can store energy by using 
power generated elsewhere to pump water back against the 
tidal flow.
The	only	large,	modern	example	of	a	tidal	power	installation	
is	the	240	MW	La	Rance	plant	in	France,	built	in	the	1960s	
and representing 91% of world tidal power capacity. An 18 
MW	tidal	barrage	was	commissioned	in	1984	at	Annapolis	
Royal in Nova Scotia, Canada. China has seven small tidal 
plants	with	a	total	capacity	of	over	5	MW,	of	which	the	largest	
is	the	3.2	MW	Jiangxia	plant.	A	400	kW	tidal	plant	at	Kislo	
Gubskaya	in	Russia	has	been	upgraded	to	1.5	MW.
Numerous studies have been completed for promising loca-
tions with unusually high tidal ranges, such as the Severn 
estuary	in	the	UK,	where	proposals	from	0.625	GW	to	14.8	
GW	are	being	investigated.	Several	other	potential	sites	 in	
the	UK	are	also	being	considered.	The	254	MW	Sihwa	Tidal	
Power Plant in South Korea has been registered under the 
Kyoto	Clean	Development	Mechanism	 (CDM)	 and	 is	 ex-
pected to start up in 2010. Other countries, including the 
USA,	India,	Mexico	and	Canada,	have	reported	potential	for	
new tidal projects.
Salinity gradient
Where	fresh	water	from	rivers	runs	into	salty	seawater,	os-
mosis based on the difference in salt concentration between 
the two liquids could be used to generate power. 
Depending on the salt concentration of the seawater, a pres-
sure	of	24-26	bar	will	 exist	 across	a	membrane	 separating	
the seawater from the fresh water. This pressure difference 
can be used to drive a generator.
The global generating potential has been estimated at 1,600 
TWh/yr,	 of	 which	 170	 TWh/yr	 is	 in	 Europe	 (Scråmestø,	
Skilhagen, 2009).
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The first osmotic power plant in the world, built by Norwe-
gian power company Statkraft, started operating in October 
2009 at Tofte, near Oslo. Statkraft will use this working proto-
type	to	develop	a	1-2	MW	plant	within	two	to	five	years.
Ocean thermal energy conversion
Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) systems use the 
oceans’	 natural	 thermal	 gradient	 –	 the	 fact	 that	 layers	 of	
water have different temperatures – as a source of power. 
As long as the temperature between the warm surface water 
and the cold deep water differs by about 20°C, an OTEC sys-
tem can produce a significant amount of power.
Considerable work on OTEC was done after the oil price 
shocks	of	the	1970s.	One	example	is	a	shore-based	100	kWe	
plant tested by Japan in 1981 in the Republic of Nauru in 
the Pacific Ocean. This plant employed a cold-water pipe 
laid on the sea bed at a depth of 580 metres. OTEC research 
waned during the following two decades, but recently there 
has been some revival of interest.
OTEC is useful not only for electricity production but also 
for desalination and cooling. Desalination was demonstrat-
ed	successfully	in	2007	by	India’s	National	Institute	of	Ocean	
Technology on the floating barge Sagar Shakti, which pro-
duced 1,000 m3/day of drinking water.
Cooling	using	seawater	air	conditioning	(SWAC)	is	the	only	
technology based on the thermal properties of the ocean 
water column to have reached commercial maturity. It is 
essentially a land-based technology that relies on easy ac-
cess to cold water from population centres onshore. Many 
SWAC	systems	 are	 currently	being	 considered;	 the	 largest	
system is being planned by Honolulu Seawater Air Condi-
tioning,	while	in	French	Polynesia	existing	projects	have	al-
ready proved successful (Nihous 2009).
Wave power
Wave	energy	can	be	seen	as	stored	wind	energy.	After	 the	
wind has dropped, for instance, waves normally continue 
for	a	further	six	to	eight	hours.	Wave	power	could	therefore	
form an interesting partnership with wind power when en-
ergy storage is needed.
In the long term, wave power could make an important con-
tribution	 to	 the	 world’s	 energy	 demand	 if	 it	 can	 be	made	 
technically and economically feasible. A potential 2,000 
TWh/yr,	or	10%	of	global	electricity	consumption,	at	a	cost	
of	€0.08/kWh	has	been	predicted	by	Ngô	et	al.	(2006).	The	
global	net	potential	resource	(excluding	areas	with	an	aver-
age	wave	power	level	of	less	than	5	kW/m	and	areas	which	may	
experience	ice	coverage)	has	been	estimated	to	be	3.0	TW	(or	
26,000	TWh/yr)	(Mørk	et	al.	2010).	Thus,	wave	power	holds	
a vast as yet unutilised potential. Furthermore, wave power 
machines have the advantage of being quiet and unobtrusive.
Oceanic waves far offshore contain enormous amounts of en-
ergy: Annual average power levels in good offshore locations 
(mostly	 at	 high	 latitudes)	 are	 20-70	 kW/m.	 Seasonal	 vari-
ations are generally larger in the northern than in the southern 
hemisphere, making the southern coasts of South America, 
Africa and Australia particularly attractive (Falcão 2009).
Countries investigating wave power include Japan, the USA, 
Canada, Russia, India, China, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and the UK. At present, the front-runners are 
Portugal and the UK. A study shows that 335 kilometres 
of	Portugal’s	 coastline	 is	available	 for	wave	power	because	
it lies outside zones set aside for fisheries, navigation, en-
vironmental	protection	and	military	activity	(Wave	Energy	
Centre 2007).
Unlike the technology used for large wind turbines, there 
are very many ways to harvest wave energy. More than 1,000 
wave energy conversion techniques have been patented 
worldwide, and new ideas are being invented faster than old 
ones are abandoned. Despite their great number, however, 
wave power devices fall into just three basic types: oscillat-
ing	water	columns	(OWCs),	oscillating	bodies	and	overtop-
ping devices.
Pelamis	 Wave	 Power,	 based	 in	 Edinburgh,	 Scotland,	 has	
developed	the	750	kW	Pelamis	wave	energy	converter.	This	
jointed mechanical snake, 150 metres long and 3.5 metres 
in diameter, floats near the surface and generates power by 
flexing	in	the	waves.	
Three	Pelamis	units	with	a	total	capacity	of	2.25	MW	were	
tested	in	2008	at	the	world’s	first	commercial	wave	farm	off	
the Portuguese coast. After barely two months, however, the 
equipment had to be towed back to shore because of buoy-
ancy issues and a shortage of funds – showing how difficult 
it is to set up a viable wave power system.
Aquamarine Power has developed the Oyster, a hinged 
metallic shell which sits on the sea floor at depths of 10-12 
metres. As waves wash over it, the Oyster opens and closes, 
and this action is used to pump pressurised water to an 
onshore	generator.	A	full-size	prototype	(300-600	kW)	has	
been powering 9,000 homes in Orkney since November 
2009 (Baras 2010).
The	 Wave	 Dragon	 (Figure	 25)	 is	 a	 floating	 overtopping	
wave power device developed in Denmark. A 1:4.5-scale 
prototype has been on test at the Danish test site at Nissum 
Bredning	since	2003.	Wave	Dragon’s	backers	plan	a	4-7	MW	
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demonstration	project	in	Wales,	but	money	has	proved	hard	
to find in the current economic climate. They are therefore 
beginning	to	explore	other	opportunities	such	as	a	smaller	
demonstration project in the Danish North Sea.
 
Figure 25: Wave Dragon 01:04.5 prototype during testing in Nissum Bred-
ning (© Earth-vision.biz)
The	Wave	 Star	 generator	 (Figures	 26	 and	 27)	 uses	 floats	
which can lift out of the water to reduce the risk of dam-
age during storms. A 24-metre-long 1:10 scale model, with 
floats 1 metre in diameter, was installed at Nissum Bred-
ning	in	April	2006.	A	Wave	Star	unit	with	two	floats,	each	
5 metres in diameter, has been on test near the port of 
Hanstholm in western Denmark since 2009. 
The	 first	 commercial	 500	 kW	Wave	 Star	 is	 scheduled	 for	
testing	 in	2011-12.	Within	a	 few	years	 the	plan	 is	 then	 to	
double	 the	 dimensions,	 allowing	 the	Wave	 Star	 to	 handle	
waves	 that	 are	 twice	 as	 large	 and	 boosting	 the	maximum	
power	output	to	6	MW	(Wave	Star	2010).
 
Figure 26: Artist’s impression of the full-scale Wave Star machine
    
At the moment, wave energy systems of many types are at 
several stages of development, and it is not clear which tech-
nologies will win.
For	some	time,	the	Wave	Dragon	and	Wave	Star	have	formed	
the vanguard of wave power in Denmark. In the past few 
years, however, other wave power projects, including Posei-
don,	Wave	Plane,	LeanCon	and	DEXA,	have	begun	to	make	
progress with large-scale tests under real conditions.
Figure 27: The two-float Wave Star prototype at Roshage, Hanstholm, 
Denmark
Most successful wave power projects have required substan-
tial financial support from governments. Denmark has been 
working on wave energy for about 20 years now. From 1998 
to 2002, the Danish Energy Authority contributed DKK 
40	million	 through	 the	Danish	Wave	 Energy	 Programme	
(DWEP).	This	accelerated	the	development	of	wave	energy	
in Denmark and established a rigorous four-step process to 
identify the best technologies.
The first phase of the programme screened up to 50 poten-
tially promising devices. Some 10-20 of these made it to a 
second phase of feasibility and parametric studies. The most 
successful went on to a third phase of testing in protected 
marine environments such as Nissum Bredning. Several of 
these,	including	Wave	Star	and	Wave	Dragon	are	now	pre-
paring for phase four: full-scale testing.
Later programmes such as ForskEL and EUDP have followed 
the	DWEP	four-stage	approach	(Kofoed	&	Frigaard	2009).
Denmark is also promoting the entire wave energy industry 
as well as individual wave power technologies. The Danish 
Council for Strategic Research has granted DKK 20 million 
for a five-year project (a strategic alliance) on the struc-
tural	design	of	wave	energy	devices	led	by	the	Wave	Energy	 
Research Group at Aalborg University (www.sdwed.civil.
aau.dk). The project has a total of 12 alliance partners. The 
main partners include, besides Aalborg University, DTU 
and DHI.
Another	 important	 initiative	 is	 the	 Danish	 Wave	 Energy	
Centre	 (DanWEC)	 which	 has	 been	 established	 in	Hanst-
holm (www.danwec.com) as a non-profit organisation by 
the local harbour, the municipality, the region and Aalborg 
University. Its main aim is to facilitate the demonstration of 
wave energy technologies and help companies bring their 
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products	to	market.	Funding	for	DanWEC	is	being	sought,	
and an application for the Green Labs programme is being 
prepared.
Conclusion
Wave	power	has	the	technical	potential	to	provide	between	
one-third	 and	 two-thirds	 of	Denmark’s	 current	 electricity	
consumption. However, such a large amount of wave power 
would probably require an unreasonably large area of gener-
ators in the Danish part of the North Sea. An ambitious yet 
realistic goal for wave power could be around 5% of Danish 
electricity by 2050.
If Denmark can develop commercial wave power technolo-
gies,	there	is	also	a	vast	export	potential.	Wave	power	could	
one	 day	 provide	 at	 least	 10%	 of	 the	world’s	 electricity,	 or	
even more if we are prepared to pay higher power prices.
The commercial development of wave power technologies 
is still generally at an early stage, but internationally there 
are at least a handful of companies who may soon have mar-
ketable products. The industry leader is currently Pelamis 
in Scotland, which recently launched a second-generation 
full-scale machine. Other designs such as the Oyster from 
Aquamarine	Power,	OPT	in	the	USA	and	Wave	Star	in	Den-
mark are making good progress towards commercialisation.
7
Hydropower 
Risø Energy Report 9 43
The potential of bioenergy and the available technologies 
have been considered in detail in previous Risø Energy 
Reports, notably Energy Report no. 2 (2003) which dealt 
exclusively	with	bioenergy.	The	following	is	therefore	not	a	
fully comprehensive account of potentials and barriers for 
bioenergy, but should be regarded as an update focusing on 
recent developments and concerns.
Biomass resources
The current energy supply is dominated by fossil fuels. Bio-
mass is the most important renewable energy source with a 
contribution	of	approximately	10%	of	the	total	energy	sup-
ply	(Durnberg	et	al.	2010),	and	this	share	is	expected	to	in-
crease over the coming years. However, such a development 
where biomass is removed from forest and agricultural eco-
systems can have negative impacts (Faaij 2008), e.g. chan-
ging land-use patterns can influence GHG emissions and 
put additional pressure on the biodiversity of farmland and 
forests as well as soil and water resources (EEA 2006). 
Growing demand for food from an increasing world popu-
lation, impacts of climate change and more sensitive global 
markets have resulted in a tendency of rising prices on bio-
mass	resources	and	fuels	(Dam	et	al.	2008).	Whether	prices	
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Figure 28
Sources of already available (top) and potential new (above) biomass for sustainable bioenergy
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will increase or decline in future is obviously rather specu-
lative	 to	 conclude	on,	but	 rising	price	fluctuations	 are	 ex-
pected.
Biomass includes a wide range of species and by-products 
from forestry, agriculture, and municipal and industrial 
waste (Figure 28). It includes crop residues, forest and wood 
process residues, animal wastes including human sewage, 
municipal	 solid	 waste	 (excluding	 plastics	 and	 inorganic	
components), food processing wastes, purpose-grown en-
ergy crops and short-rotation forests (IEA 2007). In this 
chapter	we	sometimes	use	the	industrial	term	“feedstock”	to	
reflect this diversity.
The relevance and availability of biomass feedstock in differ-
ent parts of the world will vary according to climate, agricul-
tural and forestry practices, available technologies, and es-
pecially	land	availability	and	quality	(EEA	2006;	FAO	2008;	
IEA 2007). It is estimated that the land currently devoted to 
energy crops globally is to the order of 25 million hectares, 
representing	0.2%	of	the	world’s	total	land	area	and	0.5-1.7%	
of all agricultural land (Ladanai and Vinterbäck 2009).
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to compare the many 
studies on the potential for biomass as a source of energy, 
but	Table	5	shows	one	example,	taken	from	the	comprehen-
sive publication by Hoogwijk et al. (2003). This shows that 
the range of estimates for energy from biomass within the 
next	50	years	or	so	varies	widely,	from	33	exajoules	(EJ)/yr	
to 1,130 EJ/yr.
The upper end of this range matches the highest global en-
ergy consumption estimate – around 1,050 EJ/yr in 2050 
– from the study by Smeets et al. (2007). On this basis, it 
would seem possible for biomass to cover all our future en-
ergy needs, but that is not deemed realistic. Factors affecting 
biomass production include (Hoogwijk et al. 2003):
•	 future	demand	for	food,	determined	by	population		 	
	 growth	and	changes	in	diet;
•	 	the	types	of	food	production	system	that	can	be	adopted	
worldwide	over	the	next	50	years;
•	 productivity	of	forest	and	energy	crops;
•	 increasing	use	of	biomaterials	(see	below);
•	 availability	of	degraded	land;	and
•	 	competition	 for	 land	 use,	 such	 as	 surplus	 agricultural	
land taken up by reforestation.
Furthermore, it is regarded as vital for the sustainability of 
future biomass production strategies to include potential 
ecological impacts, e.g. that no additional pressures on bio-
diversity,	soil	and	water	resources	are	exerted	compared	to	
a development without increased production of biomass for 
bioenergy purposes (EEA 2006). 
Biomass currently used as a source of useful materials in-
cludes wood for building, rubber and cotton. In future, 
biomaterials	are	expected	to	expand	into	new	applications	
such as carbon-neutral alternatives to coal and coke in the 
iron and steel industry, and feedstock for the production of 
chemicals, plastics, paint and solvents.
Narrowing the focus to Europe, the European Environment 
Agency (EEA) calculated how much bioenergy Europe 
could produce by 2030 without harming the environment 
(EEA 2006). The conclusion was that bioenergy from agri-
culture, forestry and waste could yield around 12 EJ/yr by 
2030 (8 EJ/yr in 2010), subject to certain assumptions:
•	 	at	least	30%	of	agricultural	land	is	dedicated	to	“environ-
mentally	oriented	farming”;
Table 5
Contributions of different land-use categories to global biomass potential for energy. Source: Hoogwijk et al. 2003
Land-use category Notes EJ/y
Biomass on surplus agricultural land Area 0–2.6 Gha; yield 10–20 t/ha/yr 0–998
Biomass on degraded land Area 430–580 Mha ; yield 1–10t/ha/yr 8–110
Agricultural residues Estimate from various studies 10–32
Forest residues A significant fraction comes from natural forest reserves; 
estimate from various studies
10–16 (+32 from biomaterial waste)
Animal manure Estimate from various studies 9–25
Organic waste Estimate from various studies 1–3
Biomaterials Depends on demand; area 416–678 Mha as surplus and 
degraded land
83–116
Total 33–1,130
Risø Energy Report 9 45
•	 	extensively	 cultivated	 agricultural	 areas	 are	maintained	
as	such;
•	 	approximately	 3%	 of	 intensively	 cultivated	 agricultural	
land is set aside to establish ecological compensation 
areas;
•	 bioenergy	crops	with	low	environmental	impact	are		  
	 used;
•	 currently	protected	forest	areas	are	maintained;	and
•	 ambitious	waste	minimisation	strategies	are	applied.
As a result, by 2030 the EU25 countries could get 15-16% of 
their projected primary energy requirements from biomass, 
compared to around 5% at present.
Around 33% of this 2030 biomass total would come from 
waste, and around 19% from forestry, both sources changing 
relatively little over time. As a result, most of the growth 
would come from agriculture, whose contribution would 
triple, from 2 EJ/yr in 2010 to 6 EJ/yr in 2030. By then, ag-
riculture	would	be	providing	about	47%	of	Europe’s	energy-
related biomass, and this would require 12% of all agricul-
tural land.
The	necessary	 transformation	 in	Europe’s	agricultural	 sec-
tor would probably happen through both productivity in-
creases and an increase in the land area dedicated to grow-
ing	 biomass.	The	first	 row	of	Table	 5,	 for	 example,	 shows	
that biomass from surplus land could provide up to 998 EJ/
yr	worldwide.	Over	time,	farmers	are	expected	to	find	that	
high fossil fuel prices and increases in carbon prices make 
bioenergy feedstock competitive with traditional wood 
products and food crops (EEA 2006).
Independently of region, soil fertility and the bioenergy 
technologies available, increased bioenergy demand can 
affect	 both	 extensive	 farmland	 and	 grassland	 by	 shifting	
production	from	existing	crops	to	biomass	for	energy.	The	
alternative, which is to harvest biomass from marginal land, 
may have detrimental effects on soil carbon stocks, nutrient 
cycling, soil fertility, pests and diseases because it disturbs 
complex	communities	of	animal,	plant	and	microscopic	life	
above and below ground. Biomass production for energy 
purposes on marginal land needs to meet both economic 
and sustainability criteria in order to become competitive.
Climate change is likely to have a significant influence on 
the types and distribution of biomass grown. Central and 
northern	Europe	is	expected	to	see	a	longer,	warmer	grow-
ing season that will increase the productivity of both bio-
energy crops and forests. In other parts of the world, more 
droughts could reduce productivity and increase the risk of 
forest	fires.	Extreme	weather	can	significantly	influence	the	
supply of biomass, so we should protect biomass conversion 
plants by ensuring that they are not dependent on single 
feedstock.
To help identify the most sustainable agricultural food and 
energy systems, the EEA developed a catalogue of energy 
crop species characteristics ranked by their environmental 
impact (EEA 2006). Table 6 shows the results for selected 
crops. In general, perennial crops such as clover, alfalfa, 
reed, canary grass and short-rotation coppice (poplar and 
willow) have less environmental impact than most annuals.
Table 6
Environmental impact ranking for selected biomass types, as developed by the European Environmental Agency (modified from EEA 2006)
The ratings reflect the risk of harm to the environment
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Increasing demand for biomass for bioenergy can create 
new	uses	for	currently	uneconomic	outputs	from	extensive	
agriculture or forest residues. For instance, grass cut from 
perennial pastures provides useful biomass, while support-
ing	biodiversity	and	taking	advantage	of	grassland’s	ability	
to lock up carbon in the soil.
New and more tightly integrated cropping systems for food 
and bioenergy, which may include perennials, could reduce 
the need for pesticides by increasing biodiversity. Crops 
such	as	clover	could	also	reduce	subsequent	crops’	need	for	
artificial	fertilisers	by	its	ability	to	fix	atmospheric	N2.
It is important to develop new markets for bioenergy and 
bio materials because this will promote a wider range of 
crops. In turn, this will increase biodiversity and help to create 
robust agricultural systems that produce high and stable 
yields of good-quality crops and are resilient to climate 
change	(Østergård	et	al.	2009).
Aquatic biomass like microalgae and macroalgae could be 
considered as an alternative future biomass resource. It has 
barely been investigated so far, compared to terrestrial pro-
duction, and it is at this stage considered as rather innovative 
without	 any	 major	 commercial	 experiences.	 Nevertheless,	
aquatic biomass is an interesting resource because it is not 
increasing the pressure on the already limited land available 
for biomass production, and at the same time algae has a 
high biomass production potential and oil content suitable 
for e.g. biodiesel production. Several options for producing 
macro-algae are available like harvesting from natural eco-
systems, municipal waste and blooms as a result of pollution 
at sea or in lakes, or open-air or covered ponds with culti-
vation of either natural algae populations or more purified 
specific strains. Microalgae will be produced in bioreactor-
based systems under optimised conditions, but also with 
greater capital costs and technical challenges. In any case, a 
new ecological balance needs to be struck when algae bio-
mass is cultivated and regularly harvested which remains an 
important research area to be investigated further.
Bioenergy technologies
At present, the most efficient way to convert dry biomass 
into energy is to burn it in power plants which generate 
electricity and heating for houses. New thermal technolo-
gies which turn biomass into combustible gas may improve 
the efficiency of this process, particularly when the need to 
distribute heat dictates the use of a network of small plants. 
Furthermore,	gasification	can	be	used	for	co-firing	“difficult”	
biomasses in central coal-fired power plants as a substitute 
for coal. For producing liquid fuel from biomass, gasification 
combined with catalytic liquefaction is a very efficient route.
Biomass containing a large proportion of water cannot be 
burned directly or gasified using thermal technologies. In-
stead, effective biological gasification techniques have been 
developed which allow the conversion of such biomass. An-
aerobic digestion of the wet biomass into biogas (methane 
and	carbon	dioxide)	is	a	technology	that	has	been	used	for	
several decades. Often several wastes are treated together 
(co-digestion) to ensure stable and high biogas produc-
tion. The produced biogas can be used for producing heat 
and power, for fuel in cars or pumped into the natural gas 
grid. The effluent from the digestion is used as fertilizer. It is 
very important to understand that biogas production serves 
several purposes: energy production, agriculture advantages 
(e.g. improved utilisation of nutrients) and environmental 
advantages (reduced leaching of nitrate and odour). All these 
technologies are already in use, and further improvements 
can	be	expected.
Electricity generated from biomass can be distributed over 
long distances and used in a variety of ways. To transport 
people and goods, electricity can power trains and small bat-
tery cars with limited range. Apart from these applications, 
however, transport is a challenge since efficient, energy-
dense and abundant biological substitutes for gasoline and 
diesel are not available at present.
The liquid biofuels produced today fall into two categories, 
based on whether they originate from carbohydrates or fats. 
First-generation bioethanol can be produced from carbo-
hydrates by fermenting sugar cane or maize, in the latter case 
only after enzymatic depolymerisation of the starch. Low en-
ergy density means that bioethanol is not an ideal fuel. At 
today’s	oil	prices,	bioethanol	has	difficulties	competing	with	
gasoline, and reducing the cost of bioethanol is a challenge 
because the manufacturing process seems to have been near-
ly optimised. However, in some countries like Brazil a large 
number of cars run on first-generation bioethanol.
Biorefineries, which produce multiple products from mul-
tiple feedstocks, might make bioethanol more economical. 
However, the biggest problem with bioethanol is the fact that 
the raw materials from which it is produced are also needed 
to feed people and animals. Producing enough sugar and 
maize for all three end-uses, without causing environmental 
damage, is a big challenge to agriculture.
Fermentable carbohydrates can be obtained from non-food 
sources like cellulose (straw and wood), but at present the 
processes for making second-generation bioethanol are very 
expensive.	The	challenge	here	is	to	develop	simple,	low-cost	
production methods.
Triglycerides – oils and fats – can be converted into high-
quality diesel fuel for combustion engines through technolo-
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gies	 and	 infrastructure	 that	 already	 exist	 in	 the	 chemical	
industry. The challenge is to produce triglycerides in quan-
tities	that	are	significant	compared	to	the	world’s	huge	con-
sumption of transport fuels based on petroleum. At present, 
biodiesel is made from animal fats and plants with a high 
oil content, notably rapeseed and palm oil. As with first-
generation bioethanol, this production cannot be increased 
significantly because it competes with food production.
The answer may lie in oil-containing microscopic algae 
which can be produced in parts of the world, such as de-
serts, lakes and oceans, that cannot be farmed in a tradi-
tional manner.
Microalgae are photosynthetic microorganisms which con-
vert	sunlight,	water	and	carbon	dioxide	into	biomass.	Their	
huge photosynthetic capacity makes microalgae much more 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 100 200 300 400 500 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 0 100 200 300 400 500%
Figure 29
Relative global warming potential (GWP) of biofuels. From Zah et al. 2007. Overall environmental Life Cycle Assessment of all unblended 
biofuels studied in comparison to fossil reference. GWP = greenhouse warming potential, CDE = cumulated non-renewable energy demand, 
SMOG = summer smog potential, EUTR = excessive fertilizer use, ETOX = ecotoxicity. Reference (=100%) is petrol EURO3 in each case. 
Biofuels are shown in diagram at left ranked by their respective GHG emission reductions. 
GWP CED SMOG EUTR ECOTOX
Methane manure, optimised
Methane manure+cosubstrate, optim.
100% Recycled plant oil ME FR
Ethanol whey CH
100% Recycled plant oil ME CH
Methanol fixed bed CH
Methane wood
Methanol fluidized bed CH
Ethanol sugar cane BR
Ethanol grass CH
Ethanol wood CH
Ethanol sweet sorghum CN
Ethanol sugar beets CH
Methane sewage sludge
Methane  grass biorefinery
100% Soy ME US
Methane biowaste
100% Palm oil ME MY
100% Rape ME CH
Methane manure+cosubstrate
Methane manure
100% Rape ME RER
Ethanol corn US
Ethanol rye RER
Ethanol potatoes CH
100% Soy ME BR
Natural gas, EUR03
Diesel, low-sulphur EUR03
Petrol, low-sulphur EUR03
Fuels that have a total GHG emission reduction of more than 50% as versus petrol
Fuels that have a total GHG emission reduction of more than 50% as versus petrol (production paths from waste materials or residue)
Fuels that have a total GHG emission reduction of more than 30% as versus petrol
Fuels that have a total GHG emission reduction of more than 30% as versus petrol (production paths from waste materials or residue)
Fuels that have a total GHG emission reduction of less than 30% as versus petrol
Fuels that have a total GHG emission reduction of less than 30% as versus petrol (production paths from waste materials or residue)
Fossil fuels
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productive than the highest-yielding vegetable oil crops: They 
out-produce oil palms by a factor of 8-25 and rapeseed by 
a factor of 40-120 (Christy 2007). Many microalgae are 
also	extremely	rich	 in	 intracellular	 lipids	 (fats),	which	can	
reach up to 80% of the dry biomass by weight (Spolaore et 
al.	2006).	Currently,	algal	biodiesel	is	still	too	expensive	to	
be	commercialised.	The	costs	of	extracting	the	oil	and	pro-
cessing the biodiesel are fairly static, so development needs 
to concentrate on increasing the biomass production rate 
and the oil content of the algae.
New knowledge on the cultivation of algae is emerging con-
tinuously, and in particular, research on the effects of carbon 
dioxide	concentration	and	stress	has	significantly	increased	
productivity in closed reactors. However, only a small part 
of	the	potential	of	microalgae	has	been	explored.	As	an	ex-
ample, oil production capacity has only been studied for a 
few species of algae out of the vast numbers available, and 
then	only	under	conditions	which	do	not	 fully	exploit	 the	
physiological diversity of this group of organisms. At Risø 
we aim to identify previously unrecognised groups of micro-
algae	and	adapt	them	to	industrial	oil	production;	import-
ant characteristics are growth rate, robustness, symbiotic 
relationships,	extractability	and	lipid	content.
Microalgae can grow in salt water or wastewater. Their ability 
to remove polluting salts from wastewater, rivers and lakes, 
when combined with oil production, could yield cheaper 
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Figure 30
Technical and sustainable biomass supply potentials, expected demand for biomass (primary energy) based on global energy models, and expected 
total world primary energy demand in 2050. Current world biomass use and primary energy demand are shown for comparative purposes. 
Source: IEA BIOENERGY 2009
Current world energy demand (500 EJ/yr)
Current world biomass demand (50 EJ/yr)
Total world primary energy demand in 2050 in World Energy Assessment (600 - 1000 EJ/yr).
Modelled biomass demand in 2050 as found in literature studies (50 - 250 EJ/yr).
Technical potential for biomass production in 2050 as found in literature studies (50 - 250 EJ/yr).
Sustainable biomass potential in 2050 (200 - 500 EJ/yr). Sustainable biomass potentials consist of: 
(I) residues from agriculture and forestry (˜ 100 EJ);
(II) surplus forest production - net annual increment minus current harvest (˜ 80 EJ);
(III) energy crops, excluding areas with moderately degraded soils and/or moderate water scarcity (˜ 120 EJ);
(IV) additional energy crops grown in areas with moderately degraded soils and/or moderate water scarcity (˜ 70 EJ) and
(V) additional potential when agricultural productivity increases faster than historic trends thereby producing more food from the same land area (˜ 140 EJ).
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biofuels.	Another	example	of	a	double	benefit	would	be	to	
use	microalgae	 to	consume	carbon	dioxide	removed	 from	
power station flue gas.
After	the	oil	has	been	extracted,	the	residual	algal	biomass	
contains substantial amounts of protein with an amino acid 
composition that makes it suitable as an animal feed or even 
as food for humans. Such an application fits the idea of a 
biorefinery producing both fuel and food.
Sustainability
In	 the	 context	of	bioenergy,	 an	 important	 issue	 is	 the	po-
tential of biofuels to mitigate global warming by reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), most importantly 
carbon	 dioxide	 (CO2),	 nitrous	 oxide	 (N2O) and methane 
(CH4). Other air pollutants relevant to global warming are 
soot,	aerosol	particles,	nitric	oxide	(NO),	carbon	monoxide	
(CO) and ozone (O3);	 the	 last	 of	 these,	 as	well	 as	being	 a	
GHG, is bad for human and plant health.
Assessments of sustainability should take account of the en-
ergy used to produce, handle and process the feedstock, any 
changes in land use needed to grow fuel crops, and the ef-
fects on food production and prices. Sustainability analysis is 
quite complicated, and it is often difficult to compare different 
analyses.	Work	has	therefore	started	to	define	a	common	set	
of criteria by which to measure the sustainability of biofuels 
(European Commission 2010).
As Figure 28 shows, a wide variety of feedstocks can be used 
for biofuels. Figure 29 provides an overview of the global 
warming	potential	(GWP)	of	various	biofuels	relative	to	petrol	
(gasoline);	note	that	there	is	some	controversy	about	the	exact	
numbers, depending on how the analysis is done.
According to this study, biogas from manure provides the low-
est	GWP,	provided	that	none	of	the	CH4 produced is lost at 
a later stage. Lignocellulosic (second-generation) bioethanol 
is	also	attractive,	with	a	GWP	of	typically	50-80%	below	that	
of fossil fuels. Corn ethanol and biodiesel from rapeseed oil 
have	much	greater	GWPs,	often	only	about	20%	below	that	of	
petrol. However, this analysis for biodiesel includes only the 
rape	seeds;	using	the	whole	plant	can	significantly	improve	the	
sustainability of oilseed plants in energy production. Another 
benefit of bioethanol is that when used in petrol at concentra-
tions	as	low	as	6%,	it	avoids	the	need	to	add	the	toxic	chemical	
MBTE, which is used to increase the octane number.
 
As Figure 29 shows for soybeans, biofuels can actually have 
worse	GWPs	than	fossil	fuels	if	we	take	into	account	changes	
in land use (Searchinger et al. 2008). A recent study concluded 
that the best solutions for light transport were wind-powered 
battery-electric or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (Jacobson 2009). 
The worst solutions were shown to be biofuels from corn and 
lignocellulosic ethanol, which could even worsen climate 
change	and	air	pollution;	despite	 their	 relatively	 low	GWPs,	
these fuels bring other environmental concerns. 
We	should	therefore	consider	biofuels	carefully	in	terms	of	the	
energy balances, GHG savings and potential secondary pollu-
tion associated with their feedstocks and manufacturing pro-
cesses. To ensure that future biofuels are sustainable, the EU 
has set up rules for certification (EU 2009).
Future share of bioenergy
It is difficult to assess the possible contribution of bio-
energy to future energy demand. Many attempts have been 
made to do this, some optimistic and others pessimistic. 
One of the more balanced approaches is that of the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA Bioenergy 2009). The IEA 
report distinguishes between the technical potential, 
which is the unconstrained production potential limited 
only by the technology used and the natural circumstances, 
and the sustainable potential, which further considers a 
range of environmental and social constraints in order to 
guarantee sustainable feedstock production.
According to the IEA estimate, the total sustainable biomass 
potential in 2050 is 200-500 EJ/yr out of a total world primary 
energy demand of 600-1,000 EJ/yr. Thus by 2050 biomass has 
the potential to meet a substantial share – between a quarter 
and	a	third	–	of	the	world’s	energy	demand	(Figure	30).
Conclusions
Bioenergy will certainly play a larger role in future, both in 
Denmark and globally.
A large proportion of biofuel use will probably still be as 
wood and agricultural waste for direct burning in less devel-
oped areas of the world.
Biomass has special roles to play as an easily storable form of 
energy, as a fuel for CHP based on sophisticated combustion 
technologies, and as a source of liquid fuel for transport.
Much more organic waste can be used for bioenergy, solving 
a waste problem and recirculating nutrients to ecosystems. 
New biomass forms such as algae can also contribute. Sev-
eral techniques are now being developed with a view to im-
proving biomass use, and this rise in productivity will help 
to make biofuels competitive when oil prices increase.
It is not likely, however, that bioenergy will be able to pro-
vide	the	bulk	of	the	world’s	energy,	but	it	can	make	a	sub-
stantial contribution. Biomass is a limited resource, and it 
is a challenge to increase biomass production in ways that 
do not compete with our food supply and have no negative 
environmental impacts.
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Heat from the interior of the Earth is transmitted through 
the	 Earth’s	 continental	 crust	 at	 a	 rate	 corresponding	 to	 a	
temperature gradient of normally 25-30°C per kilometre. 
The main sources of this energy are due to heat flow from 
the	Earth’s	core	and	mantle	and	that	are	generated	from	the	
nuclear decay of natural radioactive isotopes (238U, 235U, 
232Th and 40K). In general terms, geothermal energy is div-
ided into the following systems.
Low temperature
Heat production from porous sandstone layers, typically 
800-3,000 metres below ground. From these reservoirs, it 
is	 possible	 to	 exploit	water	with	 temperatures	of	 25-90°C.	
The geothermal system consists of one or more production 
wells,	heat	exchangers	and/or	heat	pumps	transferring	heat	
into the district heating network and one or more re-injec-
tion wells returning the cooled water to the same reservoir 
maintaining the reservoir pressure. The heat pumps can 
either be compressor heat pumps driven by electricity or ab-
sorption pumps driven by heat. The assessment of when it 
is economically and environmentally ideal to use electrical 
heat pumps or absorption heat pumps depends on the en-
ergy source used to generate the electricity.
Middle and high temperature 
Geothermal heat at a temperature level where generation of 
both heat and power is possible. The high temperatures are 
often found in connection with volcanic activity.
Geothermal energy can be used for electricity generation, 
but the temperatures in the Danish subsurface are, with the 
present technology, not sufficiently high to produce electri-
city directly. At least 24 countries produce electricity from 
geothermal energy, and 76 countries use geothermal energy 
for heating and cooling without conversion.
In 2008, the worldwide production of geothermal heat was 
186 PJ/yr (ENERDATA 2010), up 43% from 1999 to 2004. 
Global geothermal electricity production capacity increased 
from	8,933	MW	in	2005	to	10,715	MW	in	2010,	represent-
ing an increase of 20% (Holm et al. 2010), see the top 10 
in Table 7. The top 10 countries in geothermal electricity 
production (Holm et al. 2010) and in geothermal heat use 
(ENERDATA 2010).
Table 7 shows that many of the top countries generating 
electricity from geothermal resources are developing coun-
tries. The USA is presently the top geothermal electricity 
producer. The State Renewable Portfolio Standards and the 
Federal	Production	Tax	Credit	have	opened	a	market	oppor-
tunity for geothermal power. The activity is concentrated in 
a few western states, particularly in California and Nevada.
Outside the USA, more than 30% of the global capacity 
is installed in the Philippines and Indonesia. Indonesia is 
expected	to	evolve	as	the	larger	geothermal	growth	market	
in the longer term due to its resource potential (Stephure 
2009).
The	countries	in	Central	America	can	serve	as	an	example	of	
the	development	potential	that	exists	in	densely	populated	
geographical regions. El Salvador, Costa Rica and Nicara-
gua	are	 among	 the	 six	 countries	where	geothermal	power	
supplies more than 10% of the national electricity. It has 
been estimated that the geothermal potential for electri-
city	generation	in	Central	America	is	4,000	MWe	(Lippman	
2002),	and	only	about	500	MWe	of	this	potential	has	been	
harnessed so far.
In Europe, high temperatures at shallow depth are found in 
Italy, Turkey and in Iceland, as well as in other oceanic is-
lands such as the Azores. The installed generating capacity 
in	the	EU	has	grown	from	370	MW	in	1970	to	893	MW	in	
9
Geothermal energy
Jørgen Fenhann, Risø DTU, Denmark; Anders Mathiesen and Lars Henrik Nielsen, 
The Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), Denmark
Table 7
The top 10 countries in geothermal electricity production (source: Holm et al. 2010) and geothermal heat use (source: ENERDATA 2010)
Geothermal electricity production Geothermal heat production
2010 MW 2008 PJ/y
USA 3,086 Turkey 45.8
Philippines 1,904 USA 44.3
Indonesia 1,197 Iceland 28.4
Mexico 958 New Zealand 19.7
Italy 843 Italy 8.9
New Zealand 628 Japan 8.8
Iceland 575 France 4.8
Japan 536 Hungary 3.6
El Salvador 204 Georgia 0.7
Kenya 167 Denmark 0.5
Total 10,098 Total 165.4
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2005. Most of the capacity is installed in Italy and Iceland. 
The	10	MW	of	capacity	installed	in	Portugal	is	located	in	the	
Azores, where capacity will soon be doubled. 
Hot dry rock geothermal energy 
Hot dry rock formations at a depth of 3,000-4,000 metres 
or more below ground are another source of geothermal 
energy. The technology for utilising the energy is still being 
developed,	as	described	in	the	next	section.	
1.1 New developments
In the past two decades, there have been several projects in-
volving heat mining by injecting cold water into hot rocks 
in deep boreholes. These heat mining projects have operat-
ed	under	different	names,	such	as	“Hot	Dry	Rocks	(HDR)”,	
“Enhanced	 Geothermal	 Systems	 (EGS)”	 and	 “Engineered	
Geothermal	Systems	(EGS)”,	and	have	been	tested	to	vari-
ous	extents	in	the	USA,	Europe	and	Japan.
At a depth of 5,000 metres, temperatures are around 200°C 
in an area covering 125,000 square kilometres under Eur-
ope.	The	“European	Hot	Dry	Rock”	project	within	the	6th	
EU Research Framework utilises widened natural fracture 
systems and injects water at high pressure that is then heated 
and	 returned	 to	 the	Earth’s	 surface	via	 several	production	
wells. Europe is currently the leader in this technology. A 1.5 
MW	pilot	plant	has	been	built	in	Soultz-sous-Forêt	(Soultz	
2009),	and	a	small	commercial	plant	exists	in	Landau,	Ger-
many. A high-temperature source is also available under 
Denmark.	The	 achievement	 of	 the	 Soultz	 experiment	 and	
several other successful spin-off projects open the adult age 
for the development of EGS. A real boom can be observed 
in Australia, where large volumes of geothermal heat have 
been located at a depth of up to 4.5-5 kilometres. More than 
50	companies	are	exploring	geothermal	energy	projects	 in	
Australia (The Economist 2010). The first EGS plants will be 
built	in	Australia	in	2010	(Bertani	2007).	Over	the	next	10	
years, Geodynamics, a company based in Queensland, Aus-
tralia,	is	planning	to	build	ten	50	MW	power	plants	by	drill-
ing 90 wells in the Cooper Basin, a desert region in South 
Australia with large geothermal energy reserves.
A comprehensive assessment of enhanced geothermal sys-
tems was carried out at MIT to evaluate the potential of geo-
thermal energy in the USA. Despite its enormous potential, 
the geothermal option for the USA has been largely ignored. 
The conclusion of the study was that, if just 2% of the ther-
mal energy available in the rocks 3-10 kilometres beneath 
the	Earth’s	surface	could	be	tapped	by	EGS,	it	would	be	more	
than is needed to supply all of America (MIT 2007). For it 
to be tapped, however, both technical and economic hurdles 
must be overcome.
A new acronym has recently been added: DUGR for Deep 
Unconventional Geothermal Resources. DUGRs require 
drilling to depths of 4-5 kilometres with temperatures in the 
400-600°C and high-pressure range and can produce super-
critical fluids since the critical point for water is 221 bars and 
374°C. If DUGR is possible, the global geothermal potential 
could increase by a substantial factor. The concept is to bring 
the supercritical fluid to the surface where it transitions dir-
ectly to superheated steam, resulting in a ten times bigger 
power output from a well. The first such drilling started in 
2008 in the Iceland Deep Drilling Project (IDDP). Geother-
mal reservoirs at supercritical conditions are potentially to 
be	found	worldwide	in	any	active	volcanic	complex.
1.2 Geothermal heat in Denmark
Two Danish geothermal plants, the Thisted plant in north-
ern Jutland and the Margretheholm demonstration plant 
near Copenhagen (Figure 31), have shown that it is possible 
to produce large volumes of warm water for district heat-
ing. Only 5-10% of the total energy output from the plant 
is	used	to	extract	the	heat	from	the	subsurface	by	pumping	
warm formation water to the surface and returning it to the 
subsurface in a closed system. Both Danish plants have two 
wells, a production well and an injection well in which the 
cooled formation water is returned to the geological reser-
voir about one kilometre away from the production point, in 
order	to	avoid	mixing	warm	and	cold	water.	
In the past five years, the utilisation of geothermal energy 
has attracted growing interest. This is further substantiated 
by ongoing studies around Sønderborg and Viborg, where 
it	is	expected	that	new	geothermal	plants	will	be	established	
within	the	next	few	years.	Furthermore,	several	local	district	
heating plants are currently looking into the possibilities. It 
is	estimated	that	32	existing	district	heating	networks	have	
a potential for utilising geothermal heat (Danish Energy 
Agency 2010).
Because	geothermal	energy	is	expected	to	play	an	increas-
ingly	important	role	in	Denmark’s	energy	strategy,	the	Geo-
logical Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) and the 
Danish Energy Agency have conducted a regional study to 
update the assessment of the geothermal potential in Den-
mark	(Mathiesen	et	al.	2009).	Based	on	existing	well,	seis-
mic and temperature data and the detailed knowledge of the 
subsurface stratigraphy gathered by GEUS over many years, 
the assessment has documented a huge geothermal poten-
tial in many parts of Denmark, even though the specific po-
tential in local areas was not evaluated in detail.
Four main stratigraphic units with a regional geothermal 
potential have been identified, and are generally described 
as five geothermal reservoirs defined by their stratigraph-
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ic	 and	 area	 extent	 and	 each	 containing	 a	 large	number	of	
potential sandstone layers. The new assessment shows that 
large areas have a large geothermal potential, as they con-
tain several porous and water-bearing sandstone reservoirs 
in the economic interval 800-3,000 metres below ground 
with formation temperatures of 25-90°C (Mathiesen et al. 
2009). It is estimated that the geothermal resource in Den-
mark amounts to several hundred years of the present heat 
consumption, and only a small fraction of this potential is 
utilised by the geothermal power plants in Thisted and Mar-
gretheholm. 
A major challenge in geothermal prospecting is finding suit-
able reservoirs with high continuity (small number of faults 
and lateral changes in lithological composition) and suffi-
cient flow capacity (thickness, porosity and permeability) 
of warm water. The new assessment (Mathiesen et al. 2009) 
stresses that depositional processes during the formation of 
the reservoirs and their subsequent burial depths determine 
their qualities as geothermal reservoirs. The reservoir qual-
ity is primarily described by porosity and permeability, fac-
tors that decrease with increasing depth due to mechanical 
compaction and the formation of diagenetic minerals which 
both reduce pore volume (porosity) and the connections 
between the pores (permeability). 
However, the mutual dependency of the various factors and 
processes is not fully understood, which weakens the pre-
dictive strength and reliability of the geological models cur-
rently used to identify areas of interest. Permeability is very 
critical, but difficult to predict since very large variations occur 
depending on depositional facies, provenance, mineral-
ogical composition, burial history and position in the basin. 
One	of	the	barriers	to	a	significant	increase	in	the	exploit-
ation of the large geothermal resource in Denmark is the 
geological	uncertainty	in	the	exploration	phase.	This	uncer-
tainty	relates	to	the	extent	to	which	it	is	possible	to	make	ac-
curate and reliable predictions of the presence in the subsur-
face of sufficiently high-quality reservoirs with high lateral 
continuity below urban areas where the infrastructures and 
consumers are in place. Precise predictions are dependent 
not	 only	 on	 existing	well	 and	 seismic	data,	which	 show	a	
highly variable density and quality, but also on our under-
standing of the geological processes that lead to the forma-
tion of the geothermal reservoirs.
A newly funded multi-disciplinary research project headed 
by GEUS will address these uncertainties.
The potential for using geothermal energy from aquifers in 
the Danish subsurface is very large because it is highly suit-
able	for	district	heating	systems.	It	is	expected	to	cover	a	large	
part of the demand for district heating in the future. The 
partners in the Greater Copenhagen geothermal licence 
have completed a study on the geothermal reserves in the 
area. The conclusion was that the producible heat at a com-
mercial cut-off heat price in the Greater Copenhagen area 
reaches 60 EJ/yr. Compared to the district heat consump-
tion for the area of 40 PJ/yr, the underground is seen to have 
a capacity to supply whatever heat is needed for thousands 
of years (Magtengaard 2010). Heat storage in combination 
with the utilisation of geothermal energy is at an early stage. 
In	future,	waste	heat	from,	for	example,	solar	plants	and	in-
cineration plants could be used for heating the geothermal 
reservoir temperature in summer. In winter, it would then 
be possible to increase the energy output from the reservoir.
Figure 31 The distribution of potential sandstone reservoirs in Denmark 
with depths in the 800-3,000-metre interval and thicknesses above 25 metres. 
The dark-grey and dark-brown areas indicate that the reservoirs are buried 
too deep (Gassum in northern Jutland, Bunter in western Jutland; both 
located in the central parts of the Danish Basin), while the light-grey areas 
indicate areas where no reservoirs are expected to be present (Ringkøbing-
Funen High) or the reservoirs are too shallow (< ~800 m; northernmost 
Jutland). The hatched areas indicate that two or more of the mapped 
reservoirs are expected to have geothermal potential. The existing deep 
wells are shown together with the location of the two geothermal plants at 
Thisted and Margretheholm near Copenhagen.
Figure 31
Potential sandstone reservoirs in Denmark at depths of 800–3,000 m 
and with thicknesses above 25 m
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Conclusions
The present annual global consumption of primary energy 
is about 500 EJ. AR4 estimated the global potential at 50 EJ/
yr, which is now considered conservative. Table 4.3 in AR4 
estimated the geothermal energy resource available (in-
cluding potential reserves) at 5,000 EJ/yr. The International 
Energy Agency has estimated the most probable potential 
for the global geothermal resource at 205 EJ/yr (Danish 
Energy Agency 2010), including 65 EJ/yr from electricity 
production. 
An analysis by Goldstein et al. (2008) yields a forecast for 
global EGS deployment of 10% of the global baseload power 
by 2050 without considering commercial risks or technical 
uncertainties. 
The beauty of the EGS concept is that it can work almost 
anywhere in the world. The International Geothermal As-
sociation	predicts	that	there	will	be	160	GW	of	geothermal	
electric capacity installed worldwide by 2050, about half of 
which	will	 be	 EGS.	Whether	 EGS	 can	 overcome	 the	 obs-
tacles	 it	 currently	 faces	 should	 become	 clear	 in	 the	 next	 
decade. The company Geodynamics imagines that, in a couple 
of decades, all the drilling rigs which will be redundant 
because we have run out of oil will be drilling geothermal 
wells instead (The Economist 2010).
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The need to store energy
The	production	of	renewable	energy	is	to	a	large	extent	vari-
able and difficult to control. In contrast to fossil energy, re-
newable energy must therefore be harvested when it is avail-
able, and to maintain a balance between production and 
consumption, some sort of energy storage is needed or at 
least of value. This is true of energy used in the power sector, 
for transport fuels, and of the various thermal sources used 
to heat and cool buildings.
At present, the balance between consumption and produc-
tion is relatively easy to maintain, since most of the energy 
we consume is stored in fossil fuels which can be readily 
used when needed. However, as the penetration of renew-
able energy increases, balancing production and consump-
tion will become more challenging.
The	challenges	depend	largely	on	the	mix	of	renewable	en-
ergy sources in the different sectors and the strength of the 
links	between	the	sectors.	For	example,	bioenergy	from	re-
newable sources can be transformed into liquid biofuels and 
biogas, so its consumption in, say, the transport sector does 
not pose any challenges different from those associated with 
fossil fuels. For that reason, we will not consider energy stor-
age in the form of biomass and biofuels any further in this 
chapter.
Instead, we focus on energy storage technologies and their 
possible uses in a renewable energy system. The biggest 
challenges are in the electricity sector, where the real-time 
balance between production and consumption is closely 
linked to grid stability. However, energy storage technology 
can also facilitate higher levels of renewable energy in the 
heating, cooling and transport sectors.
This chapter contains sections covering thermal energy 
storage, electrical energy storage for stationary applications 
and energy storage for transport. The focus is on applica-
tions and technologies with the potential to facilitate the 
transition to a fossil-free energy system.
Thermal energy storage
Heating and cooling account for almost half of the total final 
energy demand in industrialised countries (Figure 32).
Heat for buildings and industrial processes today comes pri-
marily from electricity and the combustion of fossil fuels, 
either just for that purpose or in combined heat and power 
plants. Cooling is done by electric heat pumps, the electri-
city often coming originally from fossil fuels.
In a future renewable energy system, heating can come from 
a number of sources, including geothermal energy, the com-
bustion of renewable fuels, from combined heat and power 
systems (including nuclear plants), electric heat pumps, solar 
thermal collectors and electric heaters. In future, cooling 
will mainly be provided by electric heat pumps.
Since heat demand does not necessarily follow power de-
mand, the balance of production and consumption from 
combined heat and power plants is sometimes challenged. 
Furthermore, direct heat sources such as solar heating are 
typically less available when the heat is actually needed than 
when it is not. Cooling and heating demands are also not 
well correlated with renewable power production, and this 
challenges the use of fluctuating renewable sources to power 
the necessary heat pumps.
The challenges can be overcome effectively by adding heat 
and	cold	stores.	These	add	valuable	flexibility	to	energy	sys-
tems, not only for heating and cooling but also in their links 
to electricity production.
Based on scenarios cited in Figure 33, efficiency gains in 
heating could save about 3,000 PJ/yr by 2050 in the OECD 
Europe countries, representing 10% of total heat demand. 
This would be achieved through better energy manage-
ment in buildings and industrial processes, but not simply 
through thicker insulation or improved design of industrial 
processes;	about	a	third	of	the	energy	saving	would	depend	
on the appropriate use of heat storage.
 
Thermal energy storage technologies fall into two categories 
based on the physical processes involved: phase change ma-
terials (PCM) and sensible heat storage.
PCMs take advantage of latent heat – the large amounts of 
heat released or absorbed when materials change phase be-
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Figure 32
Distribution of final energy demand in the EU in 2006. 
Source: European Solar Thermal Technology Platform [10] 
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tween solid and liquid, or liquid and vapour. The fact that 
PCMs absorb and release heat at a constant temperature is 
an advantage in heat storage applications.
PCMs	can	have	energy	densities	to	the	order	of	100	kWh/
m3, and are commercially available with operating tempera-
tures	from	–21°C	up	to	120°C.	Reference	2	contains	an	ex-
tensive list of PCMs and their applications.
Heat stored or released by changing the temperature of a 
storage medium is known as sensible heat because the tem-
perature	change	can	be	felt	(latent	heat,	in	contrast,	is	“hid-
den”	because	it	involves	no	temperature	change).	The	most	
common application of sensible heat storage is in district 
and domestic heating and is based on water, which is cheap 
and	 safe.	Water	 also	has	 a	 high	heat	 capacity:	The	 energy	
stored by heating a cubic metre of water from 20°C to 95°C 
is	about	90	kWh.
Heat storage in large water tanks is commonly used in com-
bined heat and power plants supplying district heating. An 
example	is	the	system	at	the	Avedøreværket	coal-fired	pow-
er	plant	 in	Copenhagen,	which	stores	about	2.6	GWh	[3].	
Water-based	heat	storage	is	also	used	with	solar	heat	collec-
tors, collecting heat during the summer and releasing it for 
domestic heating during the winter [1].
A characteristic of thermal energy storage is that larger 
systems are more efficient. This is because doubling the 
dimensions of the tank increases the heat storage capacity 
eightfold, but the area from which heat is lost increases only 
fourfold. Very large systems (like underground caverns or 
aquifers) are therefore a relatively efficient way of storing 
large amounts of energy (possibly for heating or cooling 
in urban areas) in the future energy system. Such large 
energy storage systems could function as energy buffers on 
a seasonal basis, allowing higher penetrations of fluctuating 
power sources like wind and solar power.
Electrical energy storage for stationary applications
Integrating more renewable, intermittent energy, like wind 
and solar power, into the electrical grid brings two challeng-
es which could in principle be addressed through electricity 
storage. Both relate to the fluctuating and unpredictable na-
ture of renewable power sources, but on different timescales.
Fluctuations in renewable power production require the 
remaining	 generating	 units	 to	 be	 very	 flexible.	 The	 first	
challenge is therefore what to do if fluctuating renewable 
power sources are to completely replace fossil-fuelled power 
plants;	without	electricity	storage,	security	of	supply	will	be	
compromised when renewable power is not available, for 
instance at times with no wind. Large electricity storage sys-
tems	 can	help	by	 absorbing	 excess	 renewable	 energy	dur-
ing hours or days of high production and low consumption, 
and then releasing it when production is low and demand 
is high.
The second challenge is that the variable nature of renew-
able energy generation makes it more difficult to plan power 
production, and this in turn increases the need for short-
term regulation and reserves. This issue can be overcome 
by adding electricity storage systems that can provide both 
up and down-regulation as well as reserves at short notice, 
sometimes down to below one second.
One interesting technology for short-term regulation is me-
chanical flywheels. These have made considerable technical 
progress in recent years thanks to companies such as Bea-
con	Power	in	the	USA	(Figure	34).	Working	at	timescales	of	
seconds to minutes (between inertial reserve and spinning 
reserve), they combine high regulating effectiveness with al-
most instantaneous response.
Many other stationary electricity storage technologies have 
been developed, and several systems are operating around 
the world, although not in widespread use. In addition to 
Figure 33
Development of the heat supply structure under three scenarios for OECD Europe. The two non-reference scenarios show savings of about 10% 
by 2050 relative to 2003. Such savings rely on considerable eciency improvements, which will in turn require extended use of energy storage
P
J/a 30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
R E F E ( R ) a d v
E ( R )
2007 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
R E F E ( R ) a d v
E ( R )
R E F E ( R ) a d v
E ( R )
R E F E ( R ) a d v
E ( R )
R E F E ( R ) a d v
E ( R )
R E F E ( R ) a d v
E ( R )
Eciency Hydrogen Geothermal Solar Biomass Fossil fuels
Risø Energy Report 9 57
flywheels, other well-known technologies are stationary bat-
teries (typically used for fast response), compressed air en-
ergy storage (CAES) and pumped hydro, both of which are 
suitable for spot market arbitrage.
Figure 35 provides an overview of electricity storage tech-
nologies in terms of rated power and discharge time (energy 
capacity). The graph was prepared by the Electricity Storage 
Association (www.electricitystorage.org) in 2008, but is still 
an	excellent	 guide	 to	 the	general	 suitability	of	 the	various	
technologies for different applications.
It is the opinion of the authors that storage systems are likely 
to increase their market in the near future, while new tech-
nologies currently being developed will reach commercial 
maturity	 in	the	next	few	decades.	An	example	of	a	system	
which	might	be	seen	by	2050	is	the	“energy	island”	(Figure	
36). The underlying technology is simply pumped hydro, 
but unlike pumped hydropower, the energy island does not 
require mountains – though there are other problems to be 
overcome. It illustrates the kind of vision we need to over-
come the challenges posed by the widespread use of sustain-
able energy.
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System ratings for electricity storage technologies. Source: Electricity 
Storage Association, www.electricitystorage.org/ESA/home 
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Figure 36: Artist’s impression of an energy island. At the centre is a deep reservoir from which water is pumped out when electricity is plentiful. The 
electricity is later regenerated by turbines through which water flows back into the reservoir. The concept could be expanded with solar cells (circle in the 
middle) and algae production (source: Gottlieb Paludan Architects)
Figure 34: 100 kW/25 kWh Beacon flywheel unit. The flywheel is sealed 
in a vacuum chamber and spins at 8,000-16,000 rpm (source: Beacon 
Power, www.beaconpower.com)
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Energy storage for transport
The	transport	sector	accounts	for	approximately	20%	of	the	
world’s	total	energy	demand	(30%	in	many	developed	coun-
tries	like	Denmark)	and	is	powered	almost	exclusively	by	fos-
sil fuels. There is little doubt that this picture will change as 
we move towards 2050: Renewable sources will have to take 
over for environmental reasons and due to a decline in fossil 
fuel resources.
The energy currently used for transport is mostly stored on 
board	vehicles	in	tanks	containing	liquid	fossil	fuels,	excep-
tions being electric trains and buses supplied directly from 
the grid. A shift to sustainable energy in the form of electri-
city (i.e. bioenergy disregarded) will require mobile technolo-
gies which can store electricity from wind and solar sources 
in concentrated form, guaranteeing driving ranges similar 
to those of gasoline and diesel vehicles. Range is especially 
important for drivers of private cars, who appreciate the free-
dom their vehicles provide and are likely to demand the same 
capability from future electric vehicles.
Batteries may at a first glance seem the obvious way of stor-
ing electrical energy for transport. Unfortunately, the driving 
ranges guaranteed by even advanced batteries fall far below 
those possible with fossil fuels. The fundamental problem is 
that the energy density of batteries is almost two orders of 
magnitude lower than that of fossil fuels. This means that 
about 1.5-2 tonnes of batteries are required to provide the 
same driving range as a tank holding 50 kg of gasoline, even 
taking the different conversion efficiencies into account.
Since such a great weight of batteries is clearly not viable, the 
idea of combining batteries with other fuel systems (some-
times	called	range	extenders)	is	attracting	interest	among	car	
manufacturers. The parallel fuel system could be hydrogen or 
another synthetic fuel made using wind or solar power. At 
some point in the future, it may even become economical to 
use synthetic hydrocarbons made from hydrogen and carbon 
dioxide	extracted	from	the	atmosphere.	The	technologies	re-
quired to do this are complicated but well-known.
It is worth noting that consumers may value the convenience 
of liquid fuels over future energy storage methods that are 
more direct and more efficient, even if they end up paying 
more	as	a	result.	Today’s	liquid-fuelled	vehicles	have	driving	
ranges of around 1,000 kilometres. The distribution system 
for liquid fuels is already in place, so new synthetic liquid fuels 
would not need huge investments in infrastructure. Engines 
for liquid fuels are highly developed and affordable, so there 
may be no need to rush new traction systems such as fuel cells 
and batteries to market before they are fully developed. Fi-
nally, synthetic liquid fuels are easily blended with biofuels.
Nevertheless, batteries will undoubtedly see dramatic 
changes in the coming decades. The trend towards new bat-
tery types with higher power outputs and greater energy 
densities is already noticeable. By 2050, rechargeable lithium-
air batteries with properties much better than those of 
current batteries are likely to be on the market, since intense 
development is going on in many countries.
We	anticipate	 that	 electricity	 storage	 for	 transport	 applica-
tions will become embedded in future electricity grids and 
markets. Depending on the market, producing synthetic 
transport fuels and charging transport batteries may become 
the preferred use for surplus electricity. In this way, trans-
port-related energy storage may come to play the same bal-
ancing role in the power system as we discussed above under 
electrical energy storage for stationary applications.
The	logical	conclusion	is	to	devolve	control	for	exchanging	
energy with vehicle batteries or generating synthetic fuels to 
the companies which control the transmission grid, and are 
therefore responsible for balancing electricity supply against 
demand. This fits in with the concept of a future intelligent 
energy system, where the supply and demand of electricity 
are both controlled and optimised according to needs as 
well as prices.
Conclusions
The vision of fossil-free energy by 2050 is not unrealistic, 
provided we are determined to make it happen and per-
haps	willing	to	pay	a	little	extra,	at	least	for	a	while.	Fossil	
fuel resources are certain to run out eventually, and before 
this	happens	we	can	expect	fossil	energy	prices	to	increase	
dramatically.	As	fossil	energy	becomes	more	expensive,	sus-
tainable energy will become competitive.
A fossil-free future will require energy storage, but to what 
extent	is	difficult	to	judge.	So	far,	electricity	storage	has	re-
ceived much R&D attention, probably because it has the 
most obvious, straightforward and urgent role to play in the 
energy market.
However, Figures 32 and 33 above also show that heat stor-
age has considerable technical and economical potential. 
Unfortunately, heat and cold storage is currently not very 
efficient, especially over long storage periods, because it de-
pends on thermal insulation. In future, huge underground 
thermal storage reservoirs may be used for seasonal storage 
of heat and cold wherever there is an appropriate balance 
of local climate and geology. If these reservoirs are large 
enough, their energy losses could be relatively small.
The technical potential for energy storage is enormous, but 
unfortunately the costs are often considerable and some-
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times prohibitive. New ideas and technologies which could 
lower energy storage costs should therefore be encouraged.
Some emerging technologies could also reduce the need 
for	storage.	Examples	are	smart	management	of	electricity	 
demand and transmission of electricity over very long dis-
tances, perhaps using superconductors, so that we could 
move electricity economically from a region with surplus 
wind power, for instance, to one where the wind is not blowing. 
However, this would not solve the problem of mobile energy 
storage for transport.
We	have	no	doubt	that	many	types	of	electricity	storage	will	
be important in the coming decades as components of the 
future integrated and sustainable energy system.
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The energy released in nuclear reactions is orders of mag-
nitude greater than the molecular energies released in the 
breaking and forming of chemical bonds. As a result, the 
stored energy density in nuclear fuel is about one million 
times larger than in fossil fuels.
This	 fact	 is	 exploited	 in	nuclear	power	 reactors.	A	1	GWe	
power plant uses roughly one train car of uranium per year, 
whereas a coal plant of similar size needs about one long 
train	 load	 of	 coal	 per	 day.	 With	 fusion	 reactor	 technol-
ogy, the hydrogen contained in a bathtub of water and the 
amount of lithium in a single battery would in principle pro-
vide	all	the	energy	needed	for	one	person’s	lifetime.
Nuclear fission is a proven technology, but for the past 30 
years	 its	exploitation	has	grown	only	slowly.	However,	 the	
need to cut reliance on fossil fuels and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions has led to renewed interest in nuclear energy, 
and	many	countries	now	plan	to	 introduce	or	expand	nu-
clear fission power.
As the amount of fuel needed for nuclear fission is very 
small, the volume of waste is correspondingly small. How-
ever, nuclear reactions produce radioactive elements, so this 
waste must be sequestered to prevent danger to the public. 
In	addition,	exploitation	of	nuclear	fission	energy	is	closely	
linked to the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. To 
accept	nuclear	 expansion,	 the	public	needs	 assurance	 that	
these risks are being controlled effectively.
Nuclear fusion power is a developing technology which 
will most likely not be available for large-scale electricity 
production until the middle of the century. The successful 
development	of	fusion	energy,	however,	would	make	the	ex-
ploitation of nuclear energy even cleaner, with less radioac-
tive waste. Since nuclear fusion does not involve fissionable 
materials, the anti-proliferation challenge will be consider-
ably smaller than with fission power.
Fission energy – current status and outlook
Nuclear fission splits heavy elements, in particular uranium, 
releasing energy and neutrons. The neutrons allow the fis-
sion process to be sustained through a controlled chain re-
action in a nuclear reactor.
Nuclear fission reactors are deployed in 30 countries, pre-
dominantly OECD members in North America, Europe, 
south-east Asia and the former Soviet Union. Nuclear fis-
sion	provides	14%	of	the	world’s	electricity,	though	this	fig-
ure has fallen slightly in recent years.
Most nuclear power reactors operating today are light-water 
reactors built in the 1970s and 1980s. Heavy-water reactors 
were developed in Canada and India, while the UK focused 
on gas-cooled reactors. The less safe RBMK-type power re-
actor was developed in the Soviet Union, but has since been 
abandoned outside Russia. Russia and Japan each have one 
operating fast-breeder power reactor.
Reactor sizes range from very small first-generation pro-
totypes up to the large third-generation reactors (1,700 
MWe)	currently	being	built	in	Finland	and	France.	As	nu-
clear	plants	are	expensive	to	build	but	rather	cheap	to	run,	
thanks to their low fuel consumption, nuclear energy is used 
mainly for base-load electricity production. Other uses of 
nuclear energy are limited but include ship propulsion and 
district heating.
In the mid-1980s, the building of new nuclear reactors in 
the USA and Europe almost came to a complete stop. This 
was mainly caused by construction-cost overruns and the 
poor reliability of nuclear power plants in the USA, as well 
as the accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and at Cherno-
byl in 1986. The performance and safety of nuclear reactors, 
however, continued to improve. Capacity factors are now up 
to 90%, yielding nuclear power that is more economical and 
reliable than ever before.
The European Union aims to maintain European competi-
tiveness in fission technologies, and the development of so-
called Generation IV reactors is a priority for the EU (Figure 
37) [1]. It is left to individual member states, however, to 
decide whether and how to use nuclear energy. France, the 
UK, Finland, Poland and a number of countries in eastern 
Europe are planning to build new nuclear plants, while Ger-
many, Spain and Belgium currently have policies calling for 
a	phase-out	of	nuclear	power.	Sweden’s	phase-out	has	been	
halted, and the present government has removed the ban on 
planning	and	building	new	reactors.	The	USA	expects	a	nu-
clear renaissance, with licence applications for 28 new react-
ors under consideration by the regulators. China, India and 
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Future deployment of Generation III and IV reactors. 
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Russia	have	even	more	ambitious	plans	 to	expand	nuclear	
power,	installing	100,	60	and	20	GWe,	respectively,	by	2030.
 
Based	on	existing	plans,	world	nuclear	capacity	may	there-
fore	increase	from	the	present	340	GWe	to	more	than	1,000	
GWe	in	2050,	enabling	nuclear	power	to	provide	20%	of	all	
electricity [2].
Most of these new reactors will be of Generations III/III+. 
Most	 existing	Generation	 II	 reactors	 are	 expected	 to	 have	
their	operating	lives	extended	to	60	years,	helping	to	bridge	
the gap until sufficient new capacity can be installed. Gener-
ation IV technology awaits further development and probably 
will not become an option for commercial power production 
until after 2040.
Whether	 these	 expansion	 plans	 materialise	 depends	 on	 a	
number of factors, including public acceptance, financing 
and how well the new Generation III+ reactors being built 
today will perform. Another important factor is the avail-
ability of skilled personnel and the specialised manufacturing 
infrastructure needed to install and run the plants.
Because	nuclear	plants	do	not	produce	carbon	dioxide,	they	
will generally be favoured by policies to limit climate change. 
Nuclear power will be able to compete economically with 
electricity from fossil fuels provided the financial risks can 
be managed [3].
Public acceptance of nuclear power, especially in the USA 
and Europe, has increased considerably since the mid-1980s. 
But concerns over safety and nuclear waste may still adverse-
ly	influence	nuclear	expansion.	Concerns	over	proliferation	
issues may slow nuclear development in third world coun-
tries. Current management of spent nuclear fuel still relies on 
interim storage of the high-level waste, but final geological 
disposal options may become available within a decade in 
Finland, Sweden and possibly other countries. Reprocessing 
of spent fuel and transmutation of minor actinides may limit 
the amount of high-level waste produced, but ultimately the 
waste will need to be buried in geological repositories.
Generation IV fission reactors
The	three	existing	generations	of	nuclear	reactors	represent	
an evolution of thermal neutron reactor technology to im-
prove safety and economic performance, but with only minor 
changes in the basic concepts. Generation III+ emphasises 
simplified designs, reducing the likelihood of system failure, 
and greater use of passive safety systems that do not rely on 
external	power.
In 2000, the US DOE initiated the Generation IV Interna-
tional Forum (GIF), which now has 13 members13, to pro-
mote international cooperation in research and development 
for	 the	next	generation	of	nuclear	energy	 systems.	Reactor	
designs should be competitively priced while satisfactorily 
addressing nuclear safety, waste, proliferation and public 
perception.	With	enough	progress	in	research	and	develop-
ment, first-of-a-kind Generation IV reactors could be de-
veloped around 2030, with commercial deployment starting 
from 2040.
The	GIF	has	chosen	six	reactor	concepts	which	 it	believes	
can meet the requirements (see also Table 8):
1. Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR)
2. Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR)
3. Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR)
4.	 Super	Critical	Water-cooled	Reactor	(SCWR)
5. Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR)
6. Molten Salt Reactor (MSR)
Three of these systems (SFR, GFR and LFR) are based on 
fast neutrons, one on epithermal neutrons (MSR), and two 
operate	 with	 thermal	 neutrons	 (VHTR	 and	 SCWR),	 like	 
today’s	nuclear	power	plants.	The	fast	and	epi	thermal	neutron	
reactor	 systems	 all	 employ	 closed	 fuel	 cycles	 to	maximise	
fuel utilisation and minimise high-level waste. Operating 
temperatures range from 500°C to 1,000°C, compared to 
about 300°C in present-day light-water reactors. The high 
temperatures increase the thermal efficiency of electricity 
production, and would open up the possibility of producing 
liquid chemical fuels and for thermo-chemical hydrogen 
production.
The three fast-neutron reactors on the list also address con-
cerns about proliferation. In contrast to conventional fast 
breeders, they do not have a blanket assembly producing 
Pu-239;	instead,	plutonium	breeding	takes	place	in	the	core,	
where burn-up is high and Pu-240 is produced. Pu-240 pro-
duces penetrating and intense gamma radiation, making it 
difficult to divert to nuclear weapons. In addition, new re-
processing technologies may enable the fuel to be recycled 
without separating the plutonium.
13 USA, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Japan, Russia, South Korea, South Africa, Switzerland and the UK are charter members of the GIF, 
along with the EU (Euratom).
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The SFR technology is the most mature of the Generation 
IV reactor systems, as it builds on more than 300 reactor-
years	of	experience.	It	may	enter	commercial	operation	even	
before 2030. In Europe, SFR is the reference fast-reactor sys-
tem, with GFR and LFR selected as alternative technologies 
to be assessed [4]. The USA is focusing on VHTR.
Fission fuel cycle
The naturally occurring fuel resources for fission nuclear 
power	 are	 uranium	 and	 thorium.	The	 world’s	 known	 re-
serves of cheap uranium (up to $130/kg U) are very roughly 
60 times the current annual consumption, so there is little 
incentive for further prospecting. Moreover, several factors 
could	considerably	extend	fission	resources	in	the	long	term.
First, it is conservatively estimated that at least 10 and per-
haps 100 times more terrestrial uranium is accessible at 
moderately higher cost, still low enough that it would make 
up only a tiny fraction of the overall cost of electricity. Sec-
ond, fast-neutron reactors and recycling of spent fuel can 
increase	the	amount	of	energy	extracted	from	the	uranium	
ore by a factor of probably 20-50. And if these resources fail, 
uranium is present in sea water at levels (roughly three parts 
per billion) that in the long term may become economically 
viable	to	extract.
Fission is therefore sustainable for thousands of years, 
even at substantially higher rates of use. There is no pro-
spect that resources of fission fuels will become strained by 
2050, though increased fission use may call for additional 
ore-processing and uranium enrichment facilities. Thorium 
resources are comparable to those of uranium, but their geo-
graphical distribution is different.
Light-water	reactors	(LWRs)	require	the	uranium	in	which	
the natural level of U-235, the fissionable isotope of uran-
ium, is about 0.7% to be enriched to a few per cent. This is 
currently done most efficiently by gas centrifuges. Proposed 
alternative schemes such as laser isotope separation might 
reach commercial scale by 2050, but concerns about pro-
liferation	discourage	government	 investment,	 and	existing	
technology is fully adequate.
The	enriched	uranium	is	fabricated	into	fuel	for	LWRs,	gen-
erally	in	the	form	of	rods	containing	uranium	oxide	pellets	
encased in zirconium. The fuel provides energy in an oper-
ating reactor for about one to three years, after which it is 
considered spent and removed. The remaining radioactivity 
in	spent	fuel	decays	quite	rapidly:	LWR	fuel	generates	about	
12	kW	of	heat	per	tonne	of	fuel	one	year	after	it	leaves	the	
reactor,	but	after	ten	years	this	has	fallen	to	2	kW/t.	Spent	
fuel is generally kept in ponds of cooling water for the first 
ten years, after which it can be transferred to robust dry-
storage casks.
In some countries, notably France, Japan, the UK and Rus-
sia,	 fuel	 is	 reprocessed	 to	 extract	 the	 remaining	 uranium	
and the plutonium which has been generated in the fuel. 
These	materials	are	recycled	into	mixed	oxide	fuel	(MOX)	
and reused in reactors.
Building new reprocessing plants is not economical: The 
fuel	they	produce	would	be	more	expensive	than	new	fuel	
from uranium ore, and because uranium is almost certain 
to remain abundant, this situation will probably not change 
by 2050. Since capital costs dominate the economics of re-
processing, it may, however, make sense to continue to run 
existing	reprocessing	plants	at	 full	capacity.	Otherwise	 the	
once-through fuel cycle will generally remain the most eco-
nomic option even by 2050. Policy preferences might never-
theless favour reprocessing to improve uranium resource 
utilisation and to reduce high-level waste.
In the longer term, the continued use of nuclear fission will 
eventually encourage the breeding of fissile isotopes from 
U-238	and	subsequent	reprocessing	to	extract	the	large	ex-
Table 8
Basic design data for the six Generation IV reactor candidates
Neutron 
spectrum
Coolant
Temperature 
(°C)
Pressure Fuel Fuel cycle Size (MWe) Uses
SFR Fast Sodium 550 Low U-238 
& MOX
Closed 300–1,500 Electricity
GFR Fast Helium 850 High U-238+ 
Pu-239
Closed 1,200 Electricity and 
hydrogen
VHTR Thermal Helium 900–1,000 High UO2
prism or pebbles
Open 250–300 Electricity and 
hydrogen
SCWR Thermal Water 510–625 Very high UO2 Open 1,000–1,500 Electricity
LFR Fast Lead or Pb-Bi 400–800 Low U-238+ 
Pu-239
Closed 600–1,000 Electricity and 
hydrogen
MSR Epithermal Fluoride salts 700–800 Low UF in salt Closed 1,000 Electricity and 
hydrogen
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tra amounts of energy these isotopes contain. Prudent man-
agement of resources suggests that, for now, we should store 
used fuel in ways that would allow it to be retrieved for fu-
ture reprocessing.
New reactor designs for new applications of nuclear power, 
for	 example	 to	 provide	 high-temperature	 process	 heat,	 li-
quid chemical fuels or nuclear breeding, will almost certainly 
require new types of fission fuel. The timescale for commer-
cialising these new types of reactors and fuels is typically 
10-20 years, so if public opinion favours new nuclear capacity, 
we	can	expect	to	see	wider	application	new-generation	reactors	
coming into use in the 2050 timeframe, together with the 
fuel facilities to support them.
Fusion energy
Nuclear energy from controlled thermonuclear fusion has 
the potential to provide an environmentally friendly and al-
most	inexhaustible	energy	source	for	humanity.	Fusion	en-
ergy, which powers our sun and the stars, is released when 
light elements such as the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and 
tritium fuse together. This occurs at very high temperatures, 
where all matter is in the state known as plasma.
Open and globally coordinated fusion research started 50 
years ago. It was realised early on that building a reliable fu-
sion	power	plant	would	be	extremely	challenging,	but	 the	
prospect of fusion power is attractive enough to make the 
necessary research worthwhile. Fusion promises safe, clean, 
zero-carbon energy from a fuel that is abundantly available 
everywhere.
The many challenges lie predominantly in confining the 
plasma particles and energy tightly enough and for a suf-
ficiently	 long	 time	 for	producing	excess	 energy	by	 the	 fu-
sion processes. Aside from issues of plasma physics, this 
requires the development of new materials which can resist 
large	neutron	fluxes	and	high	power	loads	without	becom-
ing dangerously radioactive.
A fusion reactor carries no risk of a runaway nuclear reac-
tion, since optimal conditions are needed for the plasma to 
ignite, and any change in these conditions will stop the pro-
duction	of	excess	energy.	Furthermore,	the	total	amount	of	
fuel in an operating reactor is very small – typically a few 
tens of grammes – so the fusion reaction will stop within 
seconds once the fuel supply is cut off. As a further safety 
factor, the energy stored in the plasma is insufficient to des-
troy	the	system’s	safety	barriers.
Several schemes for achieving fusion energy have been 
suggested over the years [5]. Currently, two concepts seem 
capable of confining the hot plasma sufficiently well to pro-
duce useful power: magnetic confinement fusion (MCF) 
and inertial confinement fusion (ICF).
Magnetic confinement
Among the various MCF configurations that have been test-
ed, the tokamak, which confines the plasma in a doughnut-
shaped chamber – a torus – surrounded by electromagnets, 
is now close to operation with net production of energy. The 
Joint European Torus (JET) [6] in the UK is run jointly by 
the European Fusion Associations. As early as 1997, JET 
produced	a	peak	of	16.1	MW	of	fusion	power,	correspond-
ing to 65% of the input power needed to maintain the plasma, 
and sustained power production for half a second.
Based on the results from JET and several other tokamaks 
worldwide,	 fusion	 research	 is	 now	 taking	 the	 next	 step:	
the construction of a large-scale R&D tokamak, ITER, [7] 
in	France.	The	construction	of	ITER,	expected	to	finish	in	
2020, is a worldwide collaborative effort. The purpose of the 
project is a scientific demonstration of a self-sustaining con-
trolled fusion reaction.
Further into the future, a facility known as DEMO will build 
on	 experience	 from	 ITER	 to	 demonstrate	 significant	 net	
electricity	production	(several	hundreds	of	MW)	from	fu-
sion	for	an	extended	period	of	time.	DEMO	is	also	intended	
to test and qualify key fusion reactor components under 
realistic operating conditions. After, DEMO would be - 
come the first commercial fusion power plant (FPP). The 
generally accepted roadmap towards fusion power envisages 
ITER	burning	plasma	by	2026;	DEMO	being	built	2030-2040	
and	operating	2040-2050;	and	(optimistically)	a	first	FPP	in	
oper ation by 2050.
Inertial confinement
The basic principle of inertial confinement fusion (ICF) is 
to confine and compress the plasma using focused beams 
such as high-energy lasers. The most direct method is to 
compress	a	millimetre-sized	pellet	containing	a	mixture	of	
deuterium and tritium.
The laser energy delivered to the surface of the pellet com-
presses the fuel, creating a shock wave which heats the cen-
tre of the pellet to a temperature at which fusion can take 
place. As fusion begins, it releases energy which further 
heats the surrounding fuel and so accelerates the fusion 
processes. The goal is to achieve a self-sustaining reaction 
rate	(“ignition”)	with	an	energy	gain	high	enough	eventually	
to allow net electricity production.
Experiments	 have	 demonstrated	 significant	 compression	
and heating of the fuel pellet, but ignition has still not been 
achieved. The newly opened American National Ignition Fa-
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cility	(NIF)	[8]	experiment	has	obtained	promising	results,	
and it is predicted that ignition will be demonstrated within 
the	next	year,	marking	a	significant	milestone	for	ICF.
Apart from the ICF activities in the USA, significant work 
is being done in Japan and Europe. The European project 
is the High Power Laser Energy Research Facility (HiPER, 
www.hiper-laser.org), which is presently in the design phase 
with construction planned to start in 2015. HiPER is de-
signed to demonstrate a promising concept known as fast 
ignition, which should lower the energy input needed from 
the laser driver. Despite significant activity in ICF, most re-
searchers believe that building the first ICF power plant will 
take at least as long as the first MCF plant.
Taking an optimistic view, the first energy-producing fusion 
reactors will be available around 2050. After that, fusion 
energy	 is	expected	 to	become	 increasingly	 important	dur-
ing the second half of the century, and to make a signifi-
cant contribution by 2100. The power plants now being dis-
cussed	[9]	will	typically	be	around	1-1.5	GWe	–	equivalent	
to large fission power plants. The successful development 
of fusion reactors will, however, require continuous, strong 
and dedicated involvement from industry as well as public 
research institutions.
Conclusions
With	concerns	over	 the	emission	of	GHGs	and	 increasing	
international focus on securing stable and economically 
viable energy supplies, nuclear energy will continue as an 
important	part	of	the	global	energy	mix.	The	nuclear	share	
of electricity production could rise to 20% or more by 2050.
The	extent	to	which	nuclear	energy	will	contribute	is	influ-
enced by political and economic factors, including setting a 
price on carbon emissions, the ability to constrain prolifer-
ation risks, public acceptance and the availability of capital 
to build new plants. Public acceptance will be aided by the 
continued safe running of nuclear power plants and the devel-
opment of safe and acceptable repositories for nuclear waste.
In the longer term, new high-temperature fission reactors 
may become available for energy applications other than 
electricity,	further	expanding	the	demand	for	nuclear	power.
Nuclear power is not part of current Danish energy plan-
ning.	Whether	this	will	remain	the	case	in	2050	is	basically	
a political question: Is Denmark willing to depend on im-
ported electricity to complement local production from 
renewables, and are we willing to pay the additional costs? 
If the answer to either of these questions is no, Denmark 
in 2050 could have a limited number of fission reactors to 
supplement its high proportion of renewable energy while 
ensuring a low carbon footprint.
Fuel resources for nuclear fission will remain available for 
centuries to come, even using current technology. Suc-
cessful implementation of Generation IV technology with 
closed fuel cycles would ensure that we have enough fuel for 
thousands of years.
Fusion power holds great promise for the future, but also 
poses great challenges. Its implementation requires ad-
vancement of plasma confinement science and development 
of specific fusion engineering technology. If successful, fu-
sion will provide energy for thousands of years, with less radio-
active waste than fission power. The development of both 
fusion energy and future Generation IV fission technology 
will require new advanced materials. The successful im-
plementation of these technologies will also require a new 
generation	 of	 scientists,	 engineers	 and	 regulatory	 experts.	
The research required to develop these technologies is so 
advanced that no single institution or nation can support 
the complete process. Only with concerted action from in-
dustry, politicians, regulators and research institutions can 
advanced nuclear technologies fulfil their promise.
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Introduction to CCS
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a way of reducing the 
amount	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 (CO2) released by large indus-
trial plants burning fossil fuels. Most or potentially all of the 
CO2 present in the flue gas can be captured, after which it 
is compressed and pumped into geological reservoirs, on-
shore or offshore, for long-term storage. The technologies 
for	the	individual	steps	in	CCS	already	exist	and	are	rather	
well known, and there is proven geological storage capacity 
for large-scale implementation.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that CCS 
could reduce the worldwide emissions by 10 Gt CO2/yr, and 
that the cost of achieving climate stability14 by 2050 would 
be at least 70% higher without CCS [1]. In future, CCS fitted 
to biomass-fired power and industrial plants could be used 
to decrease the atmospheric concentration of CO2. 
Capture
CCS	can	be	used	on	 large	 “point	 sources”	of	CO2 such as 
power plants and large industrial furnaces. In general, there 
are three approaches to capturing the CO2: post-combus-
tion,	pre-combustion	and	oxy-fuel	combustion	(Figure	38).
In post-combustion capture, the CO2 is separated from the 
flue gas produced by combustion of the fuel. The most com-
mon way of doing this is by scrubbing the flue gas with an 
amine solvent to absorb the CO2, which is then recovered 
from the solvent in a regeneration stage. Impurities such as 
particulates	and	oxides	of	sulphur	and	nitrogen	must	be	re-
moved before CO2 scrubbing. The technology can be retro-
fitted	without	major	changes	to	existing	power	plants	if	the	
layout and space requirements allow it, but has rather high 
running costs.
12
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Figure 38
The three approaches to CO2 capture. Source: [2]
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In pre-combustion capture, the CO2 is removed before 
combustion takes place. The fuel is either steam-reformed 
or	partially	oxidised	to	create	a	synthesis	gas	(syngas)	com-
posed	of	hydrogen	and	carbon	monoxide	(CO).	The	carbon	
monoxide	is	further	converted	to	CO2 in a shift conversion 
by the addition of steam. After removing the CO2, the re-
maining hydrogen-rich gas is burned to generate power or 
alternatively used in fuel cells. The technology has been used 
for a long time, but not on the scale required for CCS, and 
the investment cost is rather high. 
Oxy-fuel	combustion	capture	uses	pure	oxygen	for	the	com-
bustion process. Compared to combustion in air, this results 
in a much smaller volume of flue gas consisting largely of 
water vapour and CO2. The water vapour is easily removed 
by cooling and condensation, and after treatment to remove 
other pollutants, the resulting gas is nearly pure CO2. The 
main	drawback	is	the	need	to	use	pure	oxygen,	which	car-
ries a large energy penalty.
Transport and storage
The captured CO2 is compressed to its supercritical phase 
which can be transported by pipeline or ship.
Extensive	commercial	experience	in	handling	CO2 in pipelines 
already	exists	from	projects	using	CO2 in enhanced oil recovery 
(EOR) projects. In the USA alone, around 2,500 kilometres of 
pipelines transport 50 Mt CO2/yr ([3], [4]). The pressure dur-
ing transport is typically kept above 100 bar, and long pipelines 
require recompression stations along their lengths. Corrosion 
can be a problem if the CO2 is not carefully dried.
In general, the transport price per tonne of CO2 falls rapidly 
as	quantities	increase;	CO2 is cheaper to transport by pipeline 
than	 by	 ship	 except	 over	 very	 long	 distances	 [3].	However,	
transport	 by	 ship	 is	 very	 flexible	 and	 can	 be	 cost-effective,	 
especially in the emerging phase of CCS.
The captured CO2 can be stored or used in several ways. It can 
be used to grow algae in closed tanks, or to boost the product-
ivity of forests. It can be locked up in soils or minerals, or in-
jected deep into the ocean or geological formations. Of these 
options, only ocean and geological storage have the potential 
to take up very large amounts of CO2. However, over time, 
CO2 stored in the oceans will reach chemical equilibrium with 
the atmosphere. Ocean storage will therefore reduce the atmos-
pheric CO2 level for several centuries but not on the long time-
scale (millennial). CO2 in suitable geological formations, on the 
other hand, should remain locked up for millions of years. 
CO2 can be stored underground in sedimentary structures 
such as saline aquifers, depleted gas and oil fields, and deep 
coal	seams.	Saline	aquifers	exist	worldwide	and	have	the	po-
tential to store very large amounts of CO2. However, the effect 
of CO2 on aquifers and the geology is not as well known as for 
depleted oil fields, where injected CO2 can fill the empty spac-
es left by the removal of hydrocarbons. Since these reservoirs 
have stored oil and gas for millions of years, they are promising 
locations for CO2 storage. 
CO2 in deep coal seams is stored in pores on the surface of 
the coal and in fractures. As well as providing storage, CO2 
injection could increase the recovery of coal-bed methane in 
a similar way to its use in EOR in conventional oil fields. This 
application of CO2 injection is very likely to increase in future.
CO2	is	not	a	poisonous	gas	but	is	an	asphyxiant	in	large	con-
centrations so proper monitoring should be in place. However, 
the risk of leakage from properly chosen geological storage 
sites is very small. The risk also decreases with time, because 
over timescales ranging from days to thousands of years, sev-
eral processes combine to lock the CO2 in place with increas-
ing permanence. 
CO2 injected into a suitable geological formation is less 
dense than the surrounding liquids, so it percolates up through 
pores in the rock until it is trapped by an impermeable layer of 
cap-rock at the top of the formation (Figure 39). As it moves 
through the rock pores, some of the CO2 is left behind as 
re sidual droplets in the pore spaces. These droplets are im-
mobile, so the overall risk of leakage falls.
CO2 also dissolves in the brine already present in the rock 
pores. The resulting solution is denser than the surround-
ing fluids, so in time it sinks to the bottom of the forma-
tion, trapping the CO2 even more securely. The final phase, 
100
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Figure 39
The dierent stages of CO2 trapping. When first injected, CO2 is 
trapped by impermeable cap-rock and as residual droplets in the pore 
space. Over time, some of the CO2 will dissolve in the brine, and 
eventually more CO2 will be locked up by reacting with minerals.
Source: [3]
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mineral trapping, results from the fact that CO2 dissolved in 
water forms a weak acid (carbonic acid). Eventually this acid 
reacts with the surrounding rock to form solid carbonate 
minerals	which	are	extremely	stable.
Estimating storage potential
Denmark	has	extensive	potential	for	storing	CO2, especially 
onshore. Saline aquifers both onshore and offshore have an 
estimated capacity of nearly 17 Gt (Figure 40), with a further 
800 Mt in old oilfields in the Danish sector of the North Sea 
[5].	For	comparison,	the	country’s	ten	largest	point	sources	of	
CO2 emit 21 Mt CO2/yr between them, so Denmark could 
potentially store all its CO2 for hundreds of years.
 
Calculating CO2 storage possibilities worldwide is not 
straightforward, and estimates vary from hundreds to tens 
of thousands of gigatonnes [6]. For the EU countries, more 
detailed studies indicate a storage capacity of several hun-
dred gigatonnes (Table 9) [7].
CO2 emissions from large point sources in the EU are of the 
order of 2 Gt CO2/yr, and around 15 Gt CO2/yr worldwide, 
so in principle there is enough capacity to store all emissions 
for a very long time. However, the locations of emissions 
and potential storage sites do not always coincide so a few 
countries will not have the storage capacity they need for 
their own CO2 emissions.
The cost of CCS
The main cost of CCS lies in the capture stage, both in the 
capital cost of the CCS equipment and the loss in efficiency 
of the power plant. The costs of transport and storage, while 
substantial, are lower (Table 10). The fuel use for the cap-
ture	alone	increases	by	10-25%,	and	expressed	in	terms	of	
increased	power	prices,	the	total	extra	cost	of	CCS	is	0.01-
0.05	$/kWh15 [3].
The overall cost of CCS is estimated at €60-90/t CO2 during 
the demonstration phase, falling to €35-50/t CO2 during the 
early commercial phase (2020–2030) and to €30-45/t CO2 
after 2030, once the technology is commercially mature. All 
prices are per tonne of CO2 abated ([3], [9]). All these costs 
are on top of the original cost of electricity, and whether 
CCS is economical depends on the future price of CO2. 
15 Calculations based on technology available in 2002.
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Figure 40
The largest potential sites for Danish underground CO2 storage 
(excluding hydrocarbon fields in the North Sea), and the largest 
emitters. Source: Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland
CO2 point sources 
> 0.2 million tonnes/year
Structural closure of deep saline aquifer
Extent of emission
Table 10
CCS prices (CO2 abated) for an early commercial reference case 
around 2020. Capex refers to capital expenditure and Opex to 
operating expenditure. The figures do not refer to any specific 
technology. Source: [9]
€/t CO2 Notes
Capture 25-32 Capex: 14-19
Opex: 5-7
Fuel: 2-6
Transport 4-6 Capex: onshore 4, offshore 6
Opex: 0.1
Storage 4-12 Capex: onshore 3-4, offshore 10-11
Opex: 1
Table 9
Estimates of CO2 storage capacity in hydrocarbon fields, saline aquifers and coal seams. Based on data from [3], [7], and [8]
Location Hydrocarbon fields (Gt) Saline aquifers (Gt) Coal seams (Gt)
Denmark 0.2-0.8 2.6-16.7 –
EU 30 325 1.5
World 675-900 1,000-10,000 3-200
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Carbon capture and storage
However, if a 50% reduction in CO2 emissions (compared 
to 2005) is to be reached by 2050, the cost would be at least 
70% higher without CCS ([1], [10]). To reach this target, 
an investment over the coming 40 years in the power sec-
tor alone of around $2.5 trillion is needed, and by 2020, 100 
CCS projects should be running. At present, low CO2 prices 
make	CCS	demonstration	projects	 too	expensive,	 so	extra	
funding is required (Figure 41).
On top of this, some issues remain to be solved. Public and 
political support is often lacking, especially for onshore stor-
age. Legal issues must also be resolved, since CO2 could be 
classified as waste, and this could cause problems for storage 
and transport. The question of liability would also have to be 
clarified to cover the unlikely event of a serious CO2 leak.
At present, there are no fully-integrated commercial power 
plants with CCS, but a few large-scale commercial CCS 
projects are in operation. These include Sleipner in Norway 
(1	Mt/yr),	Weyburn	in	the	USA/Canada	(3	Mt/yr,	used	for	
EOR) and In Salah in Algeria (1 Mt/yr). In Denmark, DONG 
Energy temporarily captured CO2 from 0.5% of the flue gas 
at its Esbjerg power plant as part of the European CASTOR 
project. Vattenfall also had plans to fit CCS to the Nordjyl-
landsværket	power	plant	in	northern	Jutland	and	store	the	
CO2 in a nearby onshore aquifer, but has postponed the pro-
ject, partly due to negative public opinion.
Several countries have announced funding for new CCS 
projects. The USA is funding twelve projects with budgets 
totalling $1.4 billion, and Canada has four projects worth 
nearly $2 billion investigating the use of CO2 for EOR as 
well as storing it. The UK is on its way, with four demonstra-
tion plants receiving more than €100 million. The EU has 
set aside €1 billion in total for CCS demonstration projects, 
plus a further sum – currently corresponding to around €5 
billion – from the auction of 300 million permits under the 
emissions trading scheme (ETS). Australia, Korea and Japan 
have also committed to a number of CCS projects.
Conclusions
To provide a realistic chance of meeting the required CO2 
reduction targets, CCS must be used worldwide, and full-
scale demonstration projects must be accelerated to drive 
down the cost of CCS. The proven reserves of fossil fuels, 
especially coal, will far outlast this century, and in order 
to continue using these reserves without adding CO2 to 
the atmosphere, CCS is essential. Indeed, adding CCS to 
biomass-fired plants would be an effective way of cutting 
atmospheric CO2.
Technologies for the three individual steps in CCS (cap-
ture, transport and storage) have already been developed, 
and	proven	geological	storage	capacity	exists	for	the	large-
scale implementation of CCS. However, CCS technologies 
still need further refinement through demonstration plants. 
Public opinion of CCS has in some cases been negative 
enough to stop projects going ahead, so this position should 
be improved through public information or sidestepped by 
storing CO2 offshore.
Denmark still has a good chance of becoming one of the 
leaders in CCS. The country has plenty of geological storage 
capacity both onshore and offshore and great potential to 
combine the offshore storage with EOR in the coming dec-
ades. Alongside the planned increase in wind energy, coal-
fired power plants with CCS could provide the baseload 
until biomass-fuelled power plants – also with CCS – are 
ready to take over. Other countries are investing heavily in 
CCS, however, and without the funding and support that 
is currently lacking, Denmark will have trouble keeping its 
current position. 
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Estimated development of the cost of CCS. Source: [9]
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Introduction
The energy systems of today have developed gradually over 
the past 100 years or more. This evolutionary process has 
created energy systems based primarily on central produc-
tion units which deliver electricity through transmission 
lines, from there to distribution networks, and finally to 
end-users.
Future energy systems will have to be much more sophisti-
cated, with both central and decentralised generating units 
intelligently linked to end-users. This will take decades to 
achieve in industrialised countries. Intelligent energy sys-
tems could be developed more rapidly in developing coun-
tries with fast-growing economies, as these countries have 
to invest in a new infrastructure. 
New energy supply technologies such as photovoltaics, and 
new highly efficient end-uses, are certain to influence the 
economics and sustainability of energy systems. However, 
the implications of technological development on the supply 
and use of energy, and on the enabling technologies used by 
future energy systems, are still uncertain.
We	cannot	 create	 the	 energy	 systems	of	 the	 future,	 or	 sig-
nificantly reduce our primary energy consumption, by incre-
mentally improving individual components of the present 
systems. Instead, we need to integrate and optimise the entire 
system – production, conversion to an energy carrier, trans-
port and distribution of the carrier and the efficient end-use 
of energy, better matching the energy quality of demand and 
supply type – and back this up with stable energy policies. 
We	need	a	paradigm	shift	to	create	revolutionary	change	so	
that, for instance, consumption adapts automatically to the 
changing availability of all energy sources or carriers.
In	 its	World	Energy	Outlook	2009	[1],	 the	IEA	points	out	
that many different initiatives are needed simultaneously 
covering both end-use, efficiency improvements and new 
supply technologies if we are to limit the future atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases to 450 ppm CO2eq. Ac-
cording to the 4th Assessment Report from the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change, this figure is needed to 
limit the global mean temperature increase to 2°C.
Electricity will play an even more important role in this new 
energy world, thanks to its ability to be created from a var-
iety of energy sources, its ease of transmission and its con-
venience to end-users. Research and development in new 
technologies for creating, transporting and using electricity 
is	essential,	and	at	a	greatly	expanded	scale.
However, new energy carriers such as hydrogen or hydro-
gen-rich biofuels could supplement (or compete with) elec-
tricity in the years up to 2050. Efficiency improvements in 
the	conversion,	transmission	and	use	of	energy	are	expected	
to take place at all levels.
Energy conversion and storage
Sustainable electricity generation technologies can be de-
veloped to a higher level of efficiency than we know today. 
Besides steady development in conventional thermal power 
plants, for instance with cycles operating above 700°C, there 
is great potential for improving the newer technologies. 
Examples	 include	 the	 aerodynamic	 optimisation	 of	 wind	
turbines, new photovoltaic cells, new materials for fuel cells 
and second-generation biomass conversion processes.
New low-temperature processes also need to be developed 
and brought to market. These systems have huge technical 
potential for generating power from geothermal and waste 
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Eciency measures account for two-thirds of the 3.8 Gt of CO2 abatement required by 2020 to meet the 450 ppm CO2eq target. 
Renewables would contribute close to one-fifth. Source: WEO 2009
26
Reference scenario 450 Scenario
Abatement
(Mt CO2)
Investment 
($2008 billion)
2020 2030 2010-2020 2021-2030
Efficiency 2,517 7,880 1 999 5 586
End-use 2,284 7,145 1,933 5,551
Power plants 233 735 66 35
Renewables 680 2,741 527 2,260
Biofuels 57 429 27 378
Nuclear 493 1,380 125 491
CCS 102 1,410 56 646
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heat, but their efficiency, availability and economics first 
need to improve significantly.
In general, primary measures such as improvements in en-
ergy efficiency are always preferable to secondary measures 
such as CCS, which is highly energy-intensive and not likely 
to provide a sustainable solution in the long term.
Storage	technologies	aimed	at	ensuring	flexibility	in	future	
energy systems include hydrogen, pumped hydro, large bat-
teries and compressed air energy storage (CAES). Challeng-
es	in	the	management	of	energy	supply	exist	on	both	long	
and short timescales. The long end of the spectrum (hours, 
days or more) covers independent fluctuations in both 
electricity demand and renewable energy supply, while the 
short term (minutes to hours) is concerned with imbalances 
created by uncertainty in predicting supplies of renewable 
energy, such as wind and solar power. Large-scale electri-
city storage would be able to shift demand and supply, help-
ing to balance the power system at all timescales, and could 
therefore play an important role in future intelligent power 
systems.
Recent	years	have	seen	extensive	discussion	of	a	hydrogen	
economy.	Among	some	experts,	 there	have	been	great	ex-
pectations of the use of hydrogen as a carrier for alternative 
fuels, especially in transport and as a storable form of elec-
tricity. Developing the associated infrastructure will require 
huge investments and new technological solutions. How-
ever,	there	is	a	long-standing	debate	among	experts	whether	
a hydrogen economy will indeed play a large role, or other 
alternatives (such as electric ones) develop further to pre-
vent the need for such massive infrastructural changes. So 
it seems unlikely that hydrogen will make a major contribu-
tion before the middle of the century.
Transmission and distribution
The natural gas grid
Natural gas is often highlighted as an important enabler in 
the transition towards a low-carbon society. The low carbon 
content of methane relative to coal and petroleum means that 
gas	demand	will	continue	 to	expand:	The	WEO’s	450	ppm	
scenario predicts that world primary gas demand will grow 
by 17% between 2007 and 2030, though the figure for 2030 is 
17%	lower	than	in	the	WEO’s	reference	scenario.	Most	gas-
importing regions, including Europe and developing Asia, 
will	see	their	net	imports	of	natural	gas	rise	(WEO	2009).
Global proven gas reserves at the end of 2008 totalled more 
than 180 trillion cubic metres (tcm), equal to about 60 years 
of production at current rates. The long-term global recov-
erable gas resource is estimated at more than 850 tcm.
In view of the above, it is not surprising that the world is 
investing	in	expanding	natural	gas	grids.	In	Europe,	a	new	
and important gas pipeline is Nord Stream, which will link 
Russia and the EU via the Baltic Sea. The first line is due for 
completion in 2011. Natural gas grids will play a major role 
in most regions of the world through 2050.
District heating and cooling
District heating and cooling (DHC) grids, like natural gas 
grids, are often deemed to facilitate GHG reduction. Many 
countries with a tradition of DHC are renewing their com-
mitment as they find new ways of using the technologies to 
reduce environmental impacts. DHC facilitates environ-
mentally desirable links between energy supplies that would 
not otherwise be available to end-users.
District	heating	is	a	flexible	technology	as	it	can	make	use	
of any energy source, including waste heat, renewables, geo-
thermal energy, and most significantly combined heat and 
power (CHP). Denmark has, along with former communist 
countries, been a leader in DHC for a long time.
The European CHP+ technology platform imagines that by 
2050 district heating and cooling networks will constitute 
widespread	systems	of	energy	exchange.	In	this	vision,	DHC	
will be part of the infrastructure of most European cities and 
towns, installed together with other basic networks. Inter-
connected local grids will create regionwide DHC networks. 
Heating and cooling would be based solely on low-carbon 
renewable energy sources or those using state-of-the-art 
carbon abatement, so the network would offer customers 
a carbon-neutral solution for both heating and cooling [2].
DHC seems to have a role in the long run, but it faces a chal-
lenge in the development of new energy-efficient houses. 
These have low annual energy demands, but not necessarily 
low peak demands, and could thus require DHC networks 
to be oversized for much of the time. However, if buildings 
become very low or zero-energy, DH/DHC networks will 
likely not be economical any more.
Supergrids
“Supergrids”	based	on	high-voltage	direct	current	(HVDC)	
technology are attractive because they offer the controllabil-
ity needed to transmit varying amounts of wind power and 
to act as highways for electricity trade, even between differ-
ent synchronous zones.
The ultimate, global, supergrid would be able to balance 
power consumption, by operating across different time 
zones, and generation, because somewhere in the world the 
sun is always shining and the wind is always blowing.
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Although primarily installed offshore, supergrids could 
include onshore nodes that might avoid the need to rein-
force	existing	onshore	grids	close	to	the	coast	[3].	It	is	worth	
nothing that the need to build new onshore transmission 
lines may be a limiting factor in building large offshore wind 
farms, due to public resistance and legal problems in obtaining 
the necessary rights of way. To make sure that construction 
costs are shared fairly, we should agree now on the roadmap 
for	building	these	grid	extensions.
The planned European offshore supergrid will allow electri-
city to be transmitted easily between the grids of participating 
countries (Figure 43). In December 2009, the UK, Germany, 
France,	Belgium,	 the	Netherlands,	Luxembourg,	Denmark,	
Sweden	and	Ireland	launched	the	North	Seas	Countries’	Off-
shore Grid Initiative to cooperate on infrastructure for wind 
power in the North Sea and the Irish Sea [4], [5].
   
Energinet.dk, Vattenfall Europe Transmission and Svenska 
Kraftnät are investigating an offshore grid linking the na-
tional grids of Denmark, Sweden and Germany and con-
necting these to the planned international wind farm at 
Kriegers Flak in the Baltic Sea.
Distribution and flexible grids
At	the	local	level,	there	is	a	need	for	intelligent	(“smart”)	dis-
tributed generating systems, especially cogeneration units 
with climate-neutral fuels based on internal combustion 
engines or fuel cells. These are highly efficient in any ap-
plication where electricity and heat are required at more or 
less the same time, or can be buffered by heat storage. Many 
CHP units can combine to form a virtual power plant that 
is centrally controlled, so that it reacts to the overall state 
of	the	grid	and	can	even	export	power	over	long	distances	
when necessary.
Such	a	mix	of	distributed	power	 sources	will	work	best	 if	
matched	by	flexible	consumption.	Electric	vehicles,	electric	
heating, heat pumps, heat storage and small-scale distrib-
uted generation from CHP or solar panels together form a 
promising	 combination.	This	 flexibility	 in	 supply	 and	 de-
mand is particularly important for electricity grids, which 
have almost no storage capacity of their own. It is somewhat 
less critical for gas, district heating and hydrogen grids, 
which by their nature include a certain amount of storage.
The combination of three grids – for power, district heating 
and natural gas – gives Denmark a highly efficient supply 
system with a large proportion of CHP. Proposed increases 
in renewable energy, primarily wind power, must interact 
as	effectively	as	possible	with	these	grids	if	they	are	to	max-
imise displacement of fossil fuels in the electricity, heat and 
transport sectors.
End-use
A future intelligent energy system will depend on end-users 
to stay in balance. Power demand, for instance, must be 
highest when plenty of power is available and prices are low 
– which may well mean when the wind is blowing strongly. 
New end-user technologies must be introduced on a large 
scale;	an	example	is	houses	which	are	almost	self-sufficient	
in energy, with effective insulation, smart electronic equip-
Figure 43
The SuperNode configuration could be a first step towards a European supergrid. It would allow the three-way trading of power between the UK, 
Norway and Germany, and would include two 1 GW oshore wind farms, one in the UK and one in Germany. To balance fluctuations in wind 
power, up to 1 GW could be transferred between any two of the three countries [6]. 
Germany
Norway
UK
1 GW 1 GW
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ment, heat storage, and their own energy supplied by heat 
pumps, solar energy and small wind turbines. Many future 
energy users will become increasingly self-sufficient, able to 
meet all their limited needs for electricity and heat over long 
periods.
Supplying energy for transport via the power grid has sev-
eral	advantages,	such	as	increased	flexibility	through	closer	
links between the power and transport sectors, increased 
energy efficiency, and the chance to include transport- 
related greenhouse gas emissions in carbon trading schemes. 
“Transport”	here	refers	not	just	to	cars	and	lorries	but	could	
also cover shipping and air travel.
Higher acceptance of electric vehicles (EVs) will require 
batteries with better performance: both specific energy to 
increase range, and specific power for acceleration. An in-
frastructure for charging vehicle batteries needs to be built 
up while making sure that power plants and the local distri-
bution grid can handle the resulting load.
Since ultimately it will be preferable to charge EVs using re-
newable electricity, a central control system has to ensure that 
batteries are charged when wind or solar power is most abun-
dant. The issue with EVs is not the total amount of energy 
they	use	(a	million	EVs	require	only	2	TWh/yr),	but	lack	of	
grid capacity when millions of batteries are being charged si-
multaneously. 
In each EV, meanwhile, an intelligent controller will need to 
work with the battery management system, the navigation 
system, the driver and the power grid at the start and end 
points of the journey to ensure that the vehicle never runs 
out of charge.
Electricity is traditionally billed at standard rates for each cus-
tomer, with little effort to adapt consumption to suit varying 
conditions in the supply system. However, a combination of 
liberalisation of electricity markets, an increase in renewable 
power and new communications technologies have made it 
possible – and attractive – to develop active demand response.
In households, direct electric heating and heat pumps are 
well-suited to provide demand response, because of the 
thermal inertia of buildings. In demonstration projects, 
switching off electric heating for up to three hours has been 
shown to cause few comfort problems [7]. Several studies 
have analysed the value of demand response [8], [9].
Today, the welfare gains are too insignificant to motivate end- 
users, because in most countries the production cost of 
electricity	is	small	compared	to	the	added	taxes	and	tariffs.	 
Switching	 to	 value	 added	 taxes,	 grid	 pay	ments	 which	 
vary according to the grid load, and variable tariffs and 
taxes	 could	 stimulate	 flexible	 demand	 and	 “demand	 
shifting”	and	smart	metering.
Demand	flexibility	requires	smart	electricity	meters	which	
communicate with the grid and adjust the flow of power to 
match the supply situation and customer priorities. Smart 
metering in turn needs communication standards to ensure 
that the devices connected to the intelligent power system 
are compatible and a system which can accommodate both 
scalability	 (large	 numbers	 of	 units)	 and	 flexibility	 (new	
types of units).
Integrated systems
Smart distribution systems
Local smart distribution systems will use information and 
communications technologies (ICT) to link end-users with 
both local and central energy supply as required. ICT offers 
a wide range of new ways of using market incentives to opti-
mise the control of the overall energy system, from gene-
ration to consumption. For this to work, however, we need 
a	 deep	 understanding	 of	 the	 energy	 system;	 in	 the	 worst	
case, the result could even be worse than before, for instance 
if we overestimate the need for new generating capacity. 
So we need to focus on better ways of modelling and analys-
ing	complex	networks	on	timescales	of	up	to	50	years,	corre	s-
ponding to the life of many parts of the energy system.
Various clustering arrangements have been suggested to 
manage the increasing penetration of distributed energy 
resources (DERs). One of these is the virtual power plant 
(VPP), which aggregates up to 1,000 individual DERs and 
manages them in such a way that they appear to the sys-
tem operator as a single, reliable and integrated resource. 
In some areas, aggregation is already practised with larger 
units	(above	400	kW).
VPPs could be useful in several ways. In the short term, they 
could act as an enabling technology for small and innovative 
generating units, allowing these to enter electricity markets 
which in some countries are restricted to large power plants. 
In the long term, it may be better for system operators to 
continue	to	deal	with	a	small	number	of	generating	plants;	
as DERs become more common, the alternative will be to 
negotiate production plans, prices and contracts with thou-
sands of small generators. And for small consumers or pro-
ducers, it may be advantageous to be a member of a larger 
entity with the resources to handle negotiations and stay 
abreast of changing regulations. Other aspects which may 
become	issues	in	future	include	complex	services,	forecast-
ing, islanding and security, control and management strat-
egies, and market interaction [10].
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Safety, reliability and security of supply
In all energy systems, stability is essential to ensuring that 
the system operates satisfactorily and serves its customers 
adequately. Stability is a particular concern in electricity sys-
tems	 if	we	want	 to	maintain	 the	existing	high	standard	of	
supply in modern power systems, with a minimum number 
and duration of blackouts and disturbances.
Power systems are particularly vulnerable for a number of 
reasons. First of all, they require that voltages and frequen-
cies	 remain	 within	 narrow	 margins;	 generators	 will	 trip	
out when there is a power surge or a drop in voltage. Fur-
thermore, the availability of the transmission and distribu-
tion grid can be reduced by disturbances such as lightning 
strikes and accidents.
When	renewable	energy	sources	partly	replace	large	central	
thermal power plants, the inertia of the power system often 
falls.	 Fixed-speed	 wind	 turbines	 with	 directly	 connected	
generators do contribute inertia, but typically less so than 
conventional power plants of the same capacity.
ICT will therefore be important to the successful integra-
tion of renewables. The benefits of distributed power sys-
tems include increased reliability and greater overall energy 
efficiency, for instance through better use of waste heat. Of 
these factors, reliability of service is one of the most import-
ant. The rapidly increasing capabilities and falling costs of 
ICT open the way to two-way communication between end-
users and suppliers, making this one of the most important 
enabling technologies for future power and gas systems. 
ICT systems can give market signals to both producers and 
consumers, allowing much more creative models of energy 
distribution and especially power trading. The latter is be-
coming increasingly important in stabilising electric grids 
against the inherently fluctuating nature of much renewable 
electricity.
A high proportion of renewable energy in the system will 
require a number of support technologies, including energy 
storage and load management, to deal with the fluctuating 
power	 from,	 for	example,	wind	 turbines.	Such	 systems,	 in	
addition to the obvious benefit of providing a cleaner and 
sustainable environment, have the advantage that it is easy 
to add generating capacity as required, using local energy 
resources.	The	cost	of	such	expansion	is	predictable	over	the	
life cycle of the generating plant, regardless of the price fluc-
tuations and shortages that may affect fossil fuels in future.
The geographical spread of renewable energy sources will 
become important as they develop. Some renewable sources 
like wind, solar and wave power are intermittent and need 
backup from other sources which have inertia or storage. An 
added problem is that these resources are not evenly distrib-
uted throughout the world, and are not necessarily available 
where they are most needed. It is windier on the west coast 
of Scotland than in central Germany, for instance, and more 
solar power can usually be produced in Spain or Africa, e.g. 
the project Desertech (http://www.desertec.org/), than in 
Denmark. Hydropower resources are unevenly distributed 
throughout the world, and so too is biomass. Transport of 
basic biomass such as straw and wood is very costly, limit-
ing the cost-effective use of such fuels to the vicinity of pro-
duction unless they can be upgraded locally to liquid fuels 
which are easy to transport and distribute.
Economics and politics
Low-carbon	growth	to	meet	the	WEO	2009	450	ppm	scenario	
would cumulatively cost around $10.5 trillion more than the 
reference scenario in the years up to 2030, in terms of global 
energy infrastructure and energy-related capital stock.
Around	45%	of	this	extra	investment	would	be	in	transport.	
The rest would be spent on buildings ($2.5 trillion, includ-
ing energy-related equipment bought by households), power 
plants ($1.7 trillion), industry ($1.1 trillion) and second- 
generation biofuels ($0.4 trillion).
About	half	the	total	extra	investment	would	be	in	the	OECD	
countries, and about a quarter would be needed before 2020.
These costs are partly offset by benefits to economies (lower 
energy costs), health, avoided climate change and energy se-
curity (lower oil and gas imports).
A future intelligent power system requires investment now. 
An	 expansion	 of	 renewable	 energy	 will	 first	 need	 large	
amounts of money to be spent on improving the transmission 
system, among other things, and this is not yet happening.
We	therefore	need	stable	plans	for	government	investment	
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Figure 44
According to the World Energy Outlook 2009, stabilising at 450 ppm 
CO2eq would need $10.5 trillion of extra investment in the period 
2010–2030 compared with the reference scenario. The additional 
cost is equivalent to 0.5% of global GDP in 2020 and 1.1% in 2030
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System aspects
in the grid, and predictable regulation regimes, to guarantee 
the improvements in grid performance – both capacity and 
intelligent control – which in turn will make possible the 
goal of more renewable energy.
Energy and the environmental policies can strongly impact 
the development of future energy systems, in both direc-
tions. The main rules are:
•	 	Politicians	have	 to	determine	 the	overall	primary	goals.	
Further parallel goals to be defined, such as amounts of 
renewables or domestic heating loads, have to be chosen 
carefully.
•	 	It	is	important	to	consider	the	effect	of	energy	policies	on		
economic, social, security and environmental issues.
•	 	Goals	should	be	stable	for	long	periods,	so	as	to	attract	
investors.
•	 	Cooperation	is	essential	between	businesses	and	govern-
ments, between governments and on a regional level. 
Conclusion
We	cannot	get	the	future	energy	system	we	need	simply	by	
improving	the	components	of	the	existing	system.	Instead,	
we need an integrated process that will optimise the entire 
system, from energy production, through conversion to an 
energy carrier, energy transport and distribution, and effi-
cient end-use.
Similarly, significant reductions in primary energy con-
sumption will not be reached through evolutionary de-
velopment	of	 existing	 systems.	This	will	 require	paradigm	
shifts and revolutionary changes, such as the automatic ad-
aptation of consumption to match the instantaneous avail-
ability of all forms of energy.
In this new energy world, electricity and natural gas will be 
even more important than they are at present. Electricity is 
key because of its ability to be produced from a variety of en-
ergy sources, transmitted instantly over long distances and 
used in many different ways, and because of its convenience 
to end-users. Natural gas is valued for its lower emissions 
compared to other fossil fuels, and the fact that it can be 
used	as	a	carrier	for	hydrogen:	Existing	stoves	and	heaters	
can burn natural gas containing 5-10% hydrogen without 
needing adjustment.
The rising number of efficient small-generation systems 
such as fuel cells will create a more decentralised electricity 
system, especially in cogeneration applications which can 
use the resulting waste heat. Rising prices for conventionally 
generated electricity and natural gas, together with falling 
costs for generation based on renewables, will cause a shift 
in the structure and use of energy transport and distribution 
systems. To accommodate the rising number of small virtual 
power plants, we need to develop a new electricity system 
with	 an	optimum	mixture	 of	 central	 and	distributed	 gen-
erators;	this	is	a	challenge	for	the	generating	technology	it-
self,	and	even	more	so	for	the	complex	instrumentation	and	
control technologies required for smart metering, demand 
management and smart grids.
Large-scale and cost-effective electricity storage will form 
an important part of the future intelligent power system, 
enabling a balancing of the system over all timescales by 
shifting demand and supply. Small-scale electricity storage 
in electric vehicles will also be important to maintaining 
short-term grid stability as well as controlling demand over 
longer periods.
An important task of energy system modelling is to main-
tain	 up-to-date	 analyses	 of	 all	 the	 possible	 “least-regrets”	
options, taking into account the constant changes in energy 
prices, resource availability and politics. Three rules can 
help us to identify these options:
•	 	diversify	primary	energy	carriers	 to	 create	flexibility	 in	
the	energy	system;
•	 	increase	the	efficiency	of	energy	use,	even	low-power	ap-
plications,	to	reduce	demand;	and
•	 	centralise	emissions	wherever	possible	 to	simplify	 their	
treatment.
Scientists and engineers cannot predict the nature of the fu-
ture energy system, but in certain frames of reference they 
can	help	 to	 separate	 the	 “no-go”	 choices	 from	valid	 least-
regrets	 options.	Our	 children’s	 children	may	 look	 back	 in	
disbelief that for so long we could tolerate an antiquated 
energy system without putting in place improvements that 
were	already	possible.	We	are	already	quite	good	at	the	indi-
vidual	components;	now	it	is	high	time	for	the	bold	restruc-
turing	that	will	give	us	a	flexible	low-carbon	energy	system	
by 2050.
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Introduction
Long-term energy security depends on the continuing avail-
ability of fossil fuels and their potential substitution by re-
newable energy sources. Coal and gas may well dominate the 
global primary energy supply for the rest of this century if no 
special effort is made to promote renewables. However, for 
many countries energy security concerns are accompanied 
by a preference for renewable options which can reduce their 
dependence on imported oil and gas, as well as helping to 
meet environmental policy objectives.
Policies designed to stabilise climate change have some com-
monality with those for energy security, since both give pri-
ority to renewable energy. However, climate change goals can 
also be met by fitting carbon capture and storage (CCS) at 
fossil-fuelled power plants, and CCS competes with renew-
able energy. As a result, global energy studies show that in-
creasing the proportion of renewable energy we use will re-
quire	extra	effort	beyond	that	demanded	by	climate	change.
The increasing interest in green economics and green energy 
on	many	nations’	political	agendas	may	change	underlying	
assumptions rapidly. Countries like the USA, China and 
South Korea are aggressively promoting investment in re-
newable	energy	and	energy	efficiency.	Given	the	actual	ex-
pansion of wind energy installations in various global models, 
it	seems	that	the	fast	expansion	of	wind	capacity	in	the	past	
couple of years is not well reflected in these projections. 
To keep the global mean temperature rise below 2°C, we 
need	serious	cuts	 in	greenhouse	gas	 (GHG)	emissions;	ac-
cording to the IPCC, the necessary reduction in GHGs is 50-
60% before 2050. To do this globally while leaving room for 
development, the OECD countries, including the EU, should 
reduce their GHG emissions by 80-95% before 2050.
According to the analyses presented in this report, it will be 
difficult for the European countries to meet these targets as 
mitigation options from the energy sector alone do not seem 
to be sufficient, but have to be supplemented by action from 
other	sectors,	for	example	the	agricultural	sector.
The Danish case described in this report shows that Den-
mark	stands	an	excellent	chance	of	phasing	out	 fossil	 fuels	
rapidly and of reducing GHG emissions at the pace needed 
to reach global stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2eq.	Denmark’s	
wind and biomass resources, especially, would allow the 
country to phase out fossil fuels from the production of elec-
tricity and heat before 2040.
In Denmark, the combination of three grids – for power, 
district heating and natural gas – has produced a highly effi-
cient supply system with a high proportion of combined heat 
and power. The future increase in renewable energy, primar-
ily wind power, must interact as effectively as possible with 
these	grids	to	maximise	the	displacement	of	fossil	fuels	from	
the electricity, heat and transport sectors.
Solar
Solar energy technologies either convert sunlight directly 
into heat and electrical energy or use it to power chemical re-
actions	to	create	“solar	fuels”	or	other	useful	materials.	Solar	
heating technologies have developed steadily for many years, 
and	 except	 for	 traditional	 biomass,	 solar	heating	 is	 among	
the most abundant renewable energy technologies globally.
In past decades, two technologies for converting solar energy 
into electricity have dominated: photovoltaics (PV) and con-
centrating solar power (CSP). The global financial crisis led 
to a dramatic drop in PV module prices in 2009.
CSP technology has been used in central power plants for 
more than 20 years in a few installations. Mirrors focus solar 
radiation on a receiver, and the resulting high-temperature 
heat is used to generate electricity by driving a turbine or 
some other engine. Heat can also be used to generate hydro-
gen	from	water,	and	to	power	more	complex	chemical	reac-
tions producing solar fuels.
Solar energy can be used to generate heat and electricity 
all over the world. Our technical ability to make use of this 
resource has improved dramatically in recent years, and by 
2050 it is hard to imagine a society that does not rely on solar 
energy for large parts of its heating and electric power. The 
IEA forecasts that PV and CSP will each produce 11% of the 
world’s	electricity	by	2050.
PV is by nature a distributed generation technology, whereas 
CSP is a centralised technology, so their deployment will 
follow very different routes. PV is unique among electricity 
generation technologies in that its distributed nature allows 
it to be integrated with human settlements of all sizes, urban 
or rural.
CSP, on the other hand, has advantages and disadvantages 
common	to	most	centralised	generating	technologies;	so,	for	
instance, new CSP plants will require new electricity trans-
mission capacity. CSP also has some advantages of its own: 
The fact that most CSP systems separate the harvesting of 
energy from the electricity generation step allows them to 
store energy in the form of heat, and to generate power from 
other fuels when the sun is not shining.
Wind
Since 1970, wind energy has grown at spectacular rates, and 
in the past 25 years, global wind energy capacity has doubled 
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every three years. The current wind energy capacity of 
approximately	160	GW	is	expected	 to	generate	more	 than	
331	TWh	in	2010,	covering	1.6%	of	global	electricity	con-
sumption.	Approximately	2%	of	the	capacity	installed	dur-
ing 2009 was offshore, bringing the total offshore capacity to 
2.1	GW,	or	1.3%	of	global	wind	energy	capacity.
Onshore wind has enormous potential: at almost 400 EJ/yr. 
An estimate of 22 EJ/yr for offshore wind potential is con-
servative, as it includes only wind-intensive areas on con-
tinental shelves outside shipping lines and protected areas.
Most of the development effort so far has been dedicated 
to the evolutionary scale-up and optimisation of the land-
based three-bladed standard wind turbines which emerged 
as	commercial	products	at	the	beginning	of	the	1980s.	With	
increased focus on offshore deployment combined with the 
radically different conditions compared to onshore, it is 
likely that completely new concepts will emerge, such as the 
vertical-axis	turbine	currently	being	developed	at	Risø	DTU.
Offshore	exploitation	represents	an	even	bigger	challenge	for	
wind turbine development, operation and cost-optimisation. 
It also brings new potential, since wind resources offshore 
are generally higher, and many of the constraints are very dif-
ferent to those onshore.
In energy scenarios involving large proportions of wind power, 
wind should be seen as a baseload-generating technology. 
For instance, in an integrated power system comprising wind 
and hydropower, and possibly high-efficiency pumped stor-
age too, the best use of wind power is to deliver the baseload.
The coming decade may see new technological advances and 
further scale-up, leading to more cost-effective, reliable and 
controllable wind turbines and new offshore and onshore ap-
plications, including the introduction of wind power in the 
built	environment.	Wind	energy	has	the	potential	to	play	a	
major	role	in	tomorrow’s	energy	supply,	cost-effectively	cover-
ing 30-50% of our electricity consumption.
Hydropower and wave power
Hydropower is a mature technology close to the limit of ef-
ficiency, in which most components have been tested and 
optimised over many years. However, the efficiency of many 
old hydropower turbines could be improved by retrofitting 
new equipment. Hydropower has little or no potential in the 
low-lying terrain of Denmark.
Wave	energy	can	be	seen	as	stored	wind	energy,	and	could	
therefore form an interesting partnership with wind energy. 
Waves	will	normally	persist	 for	six	 to	eight	hours	after	 the	
wind has dropped.
The technical potential for wave power in Denmark is esti-
mated to be able to cover one-third to two-thirds of current 
electricity consumption. However, this would probably re-
quire an unacceptably large area in the Danish part of the 
North Sea. An ambitious yet realistic goal for Danish wave 
power by 2050 could be around 5% of electricity consump-
tion. Globally, the potential for wave power is at least 10% of 
total electricity consumption, or more if we tolerate higher 
prices.
Bioenergy
Biomass	presently	covers	approximately	10%	of	the	world’s	
energy consumption. A realistic estimate of the total sus-
tainable biomass potential in 2050 is 200-500 EJ/yr, covering 
up	to	half	of	the	world’s	energy	needs	in	2050.
However, the variability of biomass production makes such 
a comparison simplistic. Factors to take into account in-
clude:
•	 	future	 demand	 for	 food,	 determined	 by	 population	
growth	and	changes	in	diet;
•	 	the	types	of	food	production	systems	that	can	be	adopted	
worldwide	over	the	next	50	years;
•	 productivity	of	forest	and	energy	crops;
•	 increasing	use	of	biomaterials;
•	 	availability	of	degraded	land	on	which	to	grow	biomass;	
•	 	competition	between	different	 land	uses,	 such	as	 refor-
estation	on	surplus	agricultural	land;	
 and
•	 ecological	impacts.
A large proportion of biomass will probably still be in the 
form of wood for direct burning in less developed areas of 
the world. Biomass plays a special role as an easily storable 
form of energy, deployable in CHP systems based on sophis-
ticated combustion technologies, and as a source of liquid 
fuels for transport.
Much more organic waste will be used for bioenergy in the 
future, solving a waste problem and recirculating nutrients 
to ecosystems. New forms of biomass such as algae might 
also contribute.
Several technologies are currently being developed with a 
view to improving biomass use, and these will help to make 
bioenergy competitive when oil prices increase. However, it 
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is	unlikely	that	bioenergy	can	provide	the	bulk	of	the	world’s	
energy. Biomass is a limited resource, and increases in bio-
mass production should preferably not compete with food 
supply.
Geothermal
Geothermal energy is used in two ways: At least 24 countries 
produce electricity from geothermal energy, while 76 coun-
tries use geothermal energy directly for heating and cooling. In 
2008, the global production of geothermal heat was 0.2 EJ, with 
10	GW	of	installed	baseload	electricity	production	capacity.
The	last	two	decades	have	seen	several	projects	“mining”	high-
temperature heat by injecting cold water into hot rocks in very 
deep boreholes. Known variously as hot dry rocks (HDR), en-
hanced geothermal systems (EGS) and engineered geothermal 
systems (EGS), these projects have been tested in the USA, 
Eur ope and Japan. 
In Denmark, the potential for geothermal energy is substantial 
since suitable aquifers are available, and the technology is an 
excellent	match	for	the	district	heating	systems	already	widely	
used.	Geothermal	energy	is	therefore	expected	to	cover	a	large	
part of the demand for future district heating. The Greater 
Copenhagen area has enough geothermal reserves to meet all 
its needs for heat for thousands of years.
Heat storage in combination with geothermal energy is at an 
early stage of development. In future, spare heat in the sum-
mertime from sources such as solar plants and incinerators 
could be used to raise the temperatures of geothermal reser-
voirs. In winter, it would then be possible to increase the en-
ergy output of the geothermal systems.
According to estimates by the International Energy Agency, 
the most probable potential for the global geothermal resource 
is 205 EJ/yr, including 65 EJ/yr from electricity production. 
Storage
To date, R&D work on energy storage has focused on elec-
tricity, probably because electricity storage has an obvious, 
straightforward and urgent role in the energy market. There 
is no doubt that many types of electricity storage will be of 
great importance in the coming decades.
Several different electricity storage technologies have been 
developed, and systems are in operation around the world, 
though	they	are	not	widespread.	Well-known	technologies	
typically used for fast response include stationary batteries 
and flywheels, while compressed air energy storage (CAES) 
and pumped hydropower both provide longer-term storage 
suitable for spot market arbitrage.
A shift to sustainable energy sources will also require mobile 
storage technologies for vehicles. Capturing electricity from 
wind and solar sources, mobile storage technologies will 
need to deliver driving ranges similar to those of modern 
gasoline and diesel vehicles.
At a first glance, batteries may seem the obvious choice to 
replace	fossil	 fuels	for	transport,	but	even	with	today’s	ad-
vanced batteries, the driving range of electric vehicles falls 
far short of conventional vehicles. The fundamental prob-
lem is that batteries have an energy density almost two or-
ders of magnitude lower than fossil fuels.
At some point in future, storing energy as hydrocarbons 
synthesised from hydrogen, made by the electrolysis of water, 
and	 carbon	 dioxide	 extracted	 from	 the	 atmosphere	may	 
become viable. The distribution system for liquid fuels is in 
place, so synthetic liquid fuels will not require huge invest-
ments in new distribution systems.
There is also considerable technical and economic poten-
tial for heat storage. Thermal energy storage technologies 
fall into two categories based on the physical processes in-
volved: phase change materials (PCM) and sensible heat 
storage utilising the heat capacity of storage material. For 
both technologies effective thermal insulation is essential, 
particularly when used to store heat over long periods.
Huge underground heat storage reservoirs might become 
important for the seasonal storage of heat and cold in ap-
propriate locations around the world, depending on geol-
ogy and surface temperature variations. If such stores were 
large enough, their heat losses could be relatively small and 
therefore acceptable.
Energy storage has enormous technical potential, and it is 
likely to appear in many different guises among the building 
blocks of a future sustainable energy system. However, the 
costs associated with storing energy are often considerable 
and sometimes prohibitive.
Nuclear
Nuclear	fission	is	a	proven	technology,	but	 its	exploitation	
has grown slowly in the past 30 years. However, the need 
for an energy supply with low fossil fuel dependence and 
low greenhouse gas emissions has led to renewed interest in 
nuclear	energy.	Many	countries	now	plan	to	adopt	or	expand	
their use of nuclear fission.
The	USA	 expects	 a	 nuclear	 renaissance,	 and	China,	 India	
and	Russia	have	even	more	ambitious	plans	for	expanding	
nuclear power by 2030 through the installation of 100, 60 
and	20	GWe,	respectively.
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Nuclear fusion power is a developing technology that will 
not be available for large-scale electricity production until 
the middle of the century. Compared to fission, however, the 
successful development of fusion energy would mean less 
radioactive waste and much less worry about the prolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear fission reactors are used in 30 nations, predomi-
nantly in the OECD countries of North America and Europe, 
in south-east Asia and in the former Soviet Union. In total, 
nuclear	fission	provides	14%	of	the	world’s	electricity	consump-
tion, though this figure has fallen slightly in recent years.
Based	on	existing	plans,	world	nuclear	capacity	may	there-
fore	increase	from	its	present	340	GWe	to	more	than	1,000	
GWe	 in	 2050,	 increasing	 nuclear’s	 share	 of	 the	 electricity	
supply to 20%. However, such projections are highly un-
certain since they are influenced by technical, economic and 
especially political and social considerations.
The	 three	 existing	 generations	 of	 nuclear	 fission	 reactors	
represent an evolution of thermal neutron technology to-
wards improved safety and economics, but with relatively 
minor changes to the basic concept. Generation III+ em-
phasises simplified designs, reducing the likelihood of sys-
tem	failure,	and	the	expanded	use	of	passive	safety	systems	
which	do	not	rely	on	external	power.	In	the	next	generation	
of nuclear energy systems known as Generation IV, reactor 
designs are developed for improved sustainability, meet-
ing requirements for economics and safety while address-
ing concerns over proliferation and radioactive waste. The 
Generation IV energy systems include fast-neutron breeder 
reactors that employ closed fuel cycles, allowing for a much 
improved utilisation of uranium resources as well as a re-
duction of the volume of radioactive waste. The Genera-
tion IV reactors have higher operating temperatures, which 
opens up for new applications of nuclear energy, such as 
high-temperature process heat, and liquid chemical fuels 
and	thermo-chemical	hydrogen	production.	With	sufficient	
progress in research and development, first-of-a-kind Gen-
eration IV reactors could be developed around 2030, with 
commercial deployment starting from 2040. 
Fusion	research	 is	now	taking	 the	next	 step	with	 the	con-
struction of a large-scale research tokamak, ITER, in France. 
Expected	 to	 start	 operating	 in	 2020,	 ITER	 is	 a	worldwide	
collaboration that will demonstrate net energy production 
from controlled fusion for the first time by 2026.
Building	on	experience	gained	from	ITER,	plans	are	to	build	
the future DEMO facility in 2030-2040 and for it to operate 
during 2040-2050, generating several hundreds of mega-
watts	electricity	 for	extended	periods	of	 time.	DEMO	will	
also test and qualify key components under realistic operating 
conditions. If everything goes according to plan, the first 
commercial fusion power plant will then be in operation by 
2050.
CCS
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be used on large 
point sources based on fossil fuels such as power plants and 
industrial	furnaces.	The	technology	can	be	retrofitted	at	ex-
isting combustion plants without major changes, but run-
ning costs are rather high.
The CO2 produced can be stored or used in several differ-
ent ways, though only ocean and geological storage have the 
potential to take up very large amounts. In time, CO2 stored 
in the oceans will reach equilibrium with the atmosphere, 
so this is not a permanent disposal route. CO2 injected into 
geological formations, on the other hand, is potentially stable 
for millions of years.
The main cost of CCS is for the CO2 capture stage, in terms of 
both its capital cost and the loss in efficiency at the power plant 
to which it is fitted.
To improve the chances of meeting the targets for CO2 reduc-
tion, CCS should be used worldwide, and the building of full-
scale demonstration plants must be accelerated to drive down 
costs. Proven fossil fuel reserves, especially coal, will last far 
beyond	this	century.	With	CCS,	we	can	continue	to	burn	fossil	
fuels even in a carbon-neutral future. Later, CCS can even be 
used with biomass-fired power plants to create net negative 
CO2 emissions.
Technologies for the three individual steps in CCS (capture, 
transport	and	storage)	already	exist,	and	there	is	enough	proven	
geological storage capacity to allow large-scale use of CCS. 
However, the technology needs further development and re-
finement through demonstration plants. 
System aspects
The energy systems of today have developed gradually over 
the past 100 years or more. This evolution is reflected in 
their structure, which is based primarily on central produc-
tion units delivering electricity through transmission lines 
to the distribution networks and thence to end-users.
Future systems will have to be much more sophisticated, 
with both central and decentralised generating units closely 
linked to end-users through intelligent communications 
networks. This will take decades to achieve in industrial-
ised nations. Intelligent energy systems could be developed 
more rapidly in developing countries with fast-growing 
economies, as these countries have to invest in a new in-
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frastructure. As a result, intelligent energy systems could be 
widespread by 2050. 
There is also a need for a smart grid which will link produc-
tion and end-use at the local level. End-users must help to 
maintain balance in the future energy system. New end-use 
technologies have to be widely introduced, including highly 
insulated, almost self-sufficient houses, smart electronic 
equipment, energy storage and heat pumps. Information 
and communications technology (ICT) will be very impor-
tant to the successful integration of renewables in the grid.
In the past ten years, the hydrogen economy has been dis-
cussed	intensively,	and	among	some	experts	there	have	been	
high	expectations	that	hydrogen	will	become	an	alternative	
energy	carrier	for	transport	applications.	However,	experts	
have also for a long time been debating whether a hydrogen 
economy will indeed come to play a large role.
Developing the necessary infrastructure will, however, 
require huge investments and new technology, so it is un-
likely that hydrogen will make a major contribution before 
the middle of this century.
District heating and cooling (DHC) grids, like their coun-
terparts carrying natural gas, are often deemed to contribute 
to	reducing	GHGs.	District	heating	is	a	flexible	technology	
which can use any fuel or heat source, including waste en-
ergy, renewables, geothermal energy and, most significantly, 
heat from combined heat and power (CHP) systems. Den-
mark has, along with former communist countries, been at 
the	forefront	in	exploiting	DHC	for	a	long	time.	In	the	long	
term, it seems likely that DHC will remain important, but 
there will be challenges following the widespread introduc-
tion of low-energy houses with a very low annual demand 
for heating, but not necessarily low peak demand.
Electric supergrids based on high-voltage direct current 
(HVDC) technology are promising because they offer the 
controllability needed to handle wind power effectively as 
well as efficient transport of electricity over long distances, 
even between different synchronous zones. Compared to 
other energy distribution systems, power grids are particu-
larly vulnerable to disturbances and accidents. Information 
and communications technology (ICT) will therefore be 
very important to the successful integration of renewables 
with the grid.
High proportions of renewable energy in energy systems 
will also require a number of supporting technologies, in-
cluding energy storage and load management, to deal with 
fluctuating power from renewables such as wind turbines.
Today, the welfare gains are too insignificant to motivate 
end-users, because in most countries the production cost of 
electricity	is	small	compared	to	the	fixed	additives.	Switch-
ing to percentage-type additives, grid payments which vary 
according	 to	 the	 grid	 load,	 and	 variable	 tariffs	 and	 taxes	
could	stimulate	flexible	demand	and	“demand	shifting”.
Large-scale electricity storage would be able to shift demand 
and supply, helping to provide balance at all timescales, and 
may therefore be important in future intelligent power sys-
tems.
Conclusions
By 2050, the sum of the potential of all the low-carbon en-
ergy	 sources	 exceeds	 the	 expected	demand.	The	challenge	
for a sustainable global energy system with low CO2 emis-
sions by 2050 is therefore to utilise this potential in the 
energy system in an economically attractive way. It will not 
be possible to develop the energy systems of the future sim-
ply	by	 improving	 the	 components	of	 existing	 systems.	 In-
stead, we need an integrated process that will optimise the 
entire system, from energy production, through conversion 
to an energy carrier, energy transport and distribution, and 
efficient end-use.
Similarly, significant reductions in primary energy con-
sumption will not be reached through evolutionary de-
velopment	of	 existing	 systems.	This	will	 require	paradigm	
shifts and revolutionary changes, such as the automatic ad-
aptation of consumption to match the instantaneous avail-
ability of all forms of energy.
A future intelligent power system requires investment now, 
since uncertainty among investors is already hindering 
progress towards a higher share of renewable energy. If we 
do not make this investment, future generations may look 
back in disbelief that for so long we tolerated an antiquated 
energy system without putting in place the improvements 
that were already possible.
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New and emerging bioenergy technologies
Three growing concerns – sustainability (particularly in 
the transport sector), security of energy supply and climate 
change – have combined to increase interest in bioenergy. 
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advances in biomass conversion and significant changes in 
energy	markets.	We	 even	have	 a	new	 term,	 “modern	bio-
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550-3262-1, Risø-R-1430(EN)
Risø Energy Report 3
Hydrogen and its competitors
Interest in the hydrogen economy has grown rapidly in 
recent years. Countries with long traditions of activity in 
hydrogen research and development have now been joined 
by a large number of newcomers. The main reason for this 
surge of interest is that the hydrogen economy may be an 
answer to the two main challenges facing the world in the 
years to come: climate change and the need for security of 
energy supplies. Both these challenges require the develop-
ment of new, highly efficient energy technologies that are 
either carbon-neutral or low-carbon.
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Sønderberg Petersen
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The future energy system: distributed production 
and use
The coming decades will bring big changes in energy sys-
tems	throughout	the	world.	These	systems	are	expected	to	
change from central power plants producing electricity and 
sometimes heat for customers, to a combination of central 
units and a variety of distributed units such as renewable 
energy systems and fuel cells.
Edited by Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
Risø National Laboratory, October 2005, 62 pp., ISBN 87-
550-3474-8, Risø-R-1534(EN)
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Renewable energy for power and transport
Global energy policy today is dominated by three concerns: 
security of supply, climate change and energy for develop-
ment and poverty alleviation. This is the starting point for 
Risø Energy Report 5, which addresses trends in renew-
able energy and gives an overview of the global forces that 
will transform our energy systems in the light of security 
of supply, climate change and economic growth. The report 
discusses the status of, and trends in, renewable energy 
technologies for broader applications in off-grid power pro-
duction (and heat).
Edited by Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
Risø National Laboratory, November 2006, 72 pp., ISBN 87-
550-3515-9, Risø-R-1557(EN)
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Future options for energy technologies
Fossil fuels provide about 80% of global energy demand, and 
this will continue to be the situation for decades to come. In 
the European Community, we are facing two major energy 
challenges. The first is sustainability, and the second is secu-
rity of supply, since Europe is becoming more dependent on 
imported fuels. These challenges are the starting point for 
the present Risø Energy Report 6.
Edited by Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
Risø National Laboratory, November 2007, 84 pp., ISBN 
978-87-550-3611-6, Risø-R-1621(EN)
Risø Energy Report 7
Future low-carbon energy systems
The report presents state-of-the-art and development per-
spectives for energy supply technologies, new energy sys-
tems, end-use energy efficiency improvements and new 
policy measures. It also includes estimates of the CO2 reduc-
tion potentials for different technologies. The technologies 
are characterised with regard to their ability to contribute 
either to ensuring a peak in CO2 emissions within 10-15 
years, or to long-term CO2 reductions. The report outlines 
the current and likely future composition of energy systems 
in	 Denmark	 and	 examines	 three	 groups	 of	 countries:	 i)	 
Europe	and	the	other	OECD	member	nations;	ii)	large	and	
rapidly growing developing economies, notably India and 
China;	 iii)	 typical	 least	developed	countries,	such	as	many	
African nations. The report emphasises how future energy 
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developments and systems might be composed in these 
three	 country	 groupings,	 and	 to	what	 extent	 the	 different	
technologies might contribute.
Edited by Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
Risø DTU, October 2008, 86 pp., ISBN 978-87-550-3690-1, 
Risø-R-1651(EN)
Risø Energy Report 8 
The intelligent energy system infrastructure for the 
future  
The report takes its point of reference in the need for the 
development	of	a	highly	flexible	and	intelligent	energy	sys-
tem infrastructure which facilitates the integration of sub-
stantially	higher	amounts	of	renewable	energy	than	today’s	
energy	systems.	This	intelligent	and	flexible	infrastructure	is	
a prerequisite for achieving the goals set up by IPCC in 2007 
on CO2 reductions as well as ensuring the future security of 
energy supply in all regions of the world. 
The report presents a generic approach to future infrastruc-
tural issues on a local, regional and global scale with focus 
on the energy system.
The report is based on chapters and updates from Risø En-
ergy Reports 1-7, as well as input from contributors to the 
DTU Climate Change Technology workshops and available 
international literature and reports.
Edited by Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
Risø DTU, September 2009, 72 pp., ISBN 978-87-550-3755-
7, Risø-R-1695(EN)
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